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Abstract
During the past twenty-five years, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission has been progressing
toward a more risk-informed, performance-based regulation. This regulatory framework has
effectively supported the development of online maintenance practices. In France, while the
safety authority has been encouraging particular risk-informed applications, PRA (Probabilistic
Risk Assessment) techniques have not penetrated the nuclear regulatory framework and industry
to the same extent.
After presenting relevant differences between the French and US nuclear industries and
regulatory frameworks, the development and use of risk-informed applications in both countries
are reviewed. In the United States, these techniques are usually well-accepted and have brought
positive results regarding operational performance, plant safety and regulatory efficiency. In
France, there have been in some cases difficulties regarding the acceptability of these techniques
with the safety authority, but also within the operating company. While PRA results are
commonly used in the US at the operational level through the use of risk-monitors, there appear
to be in France obstacles to such practices.
Online maintenance regulations and practices are then presented. US technical specifications
provide much flexibility to voluntarily enter technical specifications action statements for online
maintenance. As a result, following the implementation of the Maintenance Rule, online
maintenance has been increasingly applied, leading to operational as well as safety
improvements. In France technical specifications are more restrictive regarding these aspects,
and online maintenance of safety-significant systems is often not allowed or allowed under
restrictive conditions. A case study concerning the maintenance of emergency diesel generators
and emergency core cooling systems is presented to illustrate and study these points in more
detail. Finally, possible directions to facilitate the implementation of an online maintenance
strategy in France are identified, and their implications are discussed.
This study is part of a research project sponsored by EDF at MIT.
Disclaimer: This thesis presents analyses and opinions of the author, which are not endorsed by
EDF.
Thesis Supervisor: Michael W. Golay
Title: Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1. Thesis objective
The work presented in this thesis has been conducted as part of a larger project sponsored
by EDF on Nuclear Safety Regulatory Treatments in France and the United States. This thesis
focuses on the comparison and the analysis of risk-informed applications and online maintenance
practices in France and the US. Specifically, the objectives of this thesis are to:
- Compare the French and US regulatory frameworks applicable to probabilistic risk
assessment (PRA), understand the main differences, analyze the development of risk-
informed applications, and understand the differences in the status of these techniques in
the two countries
- Compare general regulations applicable to maintenance in both countries, and the role of
risk-information in the formulation and the justification of maintenance programs
- Analyze and understand the main differences in the regulation of online maintenance to
explain the difference in the amount of online maintenance performed in each country
- Identify the implications of an online maintenance strategy
- Understand the ongoing evolutions regarding online maintenance regulation and practices
in the US
- Identify possible directions to facilitate (if needed) the development of an online
maintenance strategy, if EDF were to consider such a strategy (which is not currently the
case).
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1.2. Background
There are significant differences in the structure of French and US nuclear industries that
have consequences at many levels on the observations and analyses conducted in this thesis.
1.2.1. US nuclear industry and regulatory structure
1.2.1.1. Nuclear safety authority
In the United States, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is the fundamental law regarding
both civilian and military uses of nuclear materials. Under this act, a single agency (the Atomic
Energy Commission) had responsibility of all uses of nuclear materials. The Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974 split this responsibility, creating the US Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) as an independent agency in charge of regulating the use of radioactive
materials for civilian purposes.
The NRC regulates commercial nuclear power plants as well as other uses of nuclear
materials (e.g. nuclear medicine) through licensing, inspection and enforcement of its
requirements, to ensure that people and the environment are protected. The NRC is headed by
five Commissioners who are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for five-
year terms.
The NRC has created 4 regions, overseeing a total of 104 power-producing reactors, and
36 non-power-producing reactors. In each power-producing reactor site there are Resident
Inspectors, who monitor daily operations. The NRC has a staff of approximately 3,800 persons.
In 2009, the NRC received a budget of 1,046 million dollars, distributed among nuclear reactor
safety (75%), nuclear materials and waste safety (24%), and inspections (1%).
NRC's regulations are found in Chapter I of Title 10, "Energy", of the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR). In addition to these rules, the NRC issues Regulatory Guides (RG), which
are intended to aid licensees to implement regulations, but they do not contain regulatory
requirements. The NRC issues many other types of documents that are encountered throughout
this thesis, among which can already be mentioned the NUREG-Series publications, which are
reports or brochures on regulatory decisions, results of research, of investigations, or on any
other technical and administrative information. The NRC conducts its own research programs,
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often through contractors. Its work is also complemented through research and analyses by the
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and by licensees. In addition, The NRC works with
standards organizations to develop consensus standards/codes on systems, equipment, or
materials used by the nuclear industry, for example with the ASME (American Society of
Mechanical Engineers) or the ANS (American Nuclear Society).
1.2.1.2. Reactor fleet
The US is the largest producer of nuclear energy in the world, accounting for about 20 %
of its total electric energy generation. There are 104 reactors in operation at 65 sites, in 31
different states, operated by some 30 different operating companies. All commercial reactors are
Light Water Reactors (LWR), with about two thirds of Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR) and
one third of Boiling Water Reactors (BWR). There are about 80 different designs categorized
according to their vendor: Westinghouse PWRs, General Electric BWRs, Combustion
Engineering PWRs, and Babcock and Wilcox PWRs.
1.2.1.3. Organizations and Institutes
In addition to NRC and individual licensees, there are several organizations and institutes
that play an important role in the US nuclear industry, in particular:
- EPRI (Electric Power Research Institute), an independent, utility-funded, non-profit
research institute.
- NEI (Nuclear Energy Institute), a US nuclear industry lobbying group that represents the
nuclear industry before the US congress and the NRC, and which conducts public
communication activities.
- INPO (Institute of Nuclear Power Operations), a non-profit organization established by
the US nuclear power industry after Three Mile Island (TMI) accident to promote best
practices in the operation of US nuclear power plants.
1.2.2. French nuclear industry and regulatory structure
1.2.2.1. Regulatory structure
The legal framework applicable to nuclear activities has been fundamentally recast in
2006 with the publication of the "Loi relative h la Transparence et la Securit6 en matiere
15
Nucleaire (TSN)" (Nuclear Transparency and Safety Act, June 13, 2006), along with the
implementation decree 2007-1557 (nov. 2, 2007), which constitutes the new base for nuclear
regulation. It introduces an integrated system based upon a broader conception of nuclear safety
that covers accident prevention and mitigation as well as public health and environment
protection. The TSN Act will soon be complemented by the "arret6 INB" (in course of
finalization), which will regulate the design, construction and operation of nuclear facilities. It
will also transpose the WENRA reference levels (see below) into the French regulation.
The TSN Act establishes the ASN (Autorit6 de Surete Nucl6aire), the French nuclear
safety authority, as an independent authority in charge of regulating nuclear safety and radiation
protection and informing the public in these areas; it concerns commercial plants as well as
small-scale nuclear facilities (nuclear research facilities, nuclear cycle utilities, medical
installations using ionizing radiations).
In this new framework, there are three main actors in the oversight of nuclear safety: the
Parliament, the Government, and the ASN. The Parliament votes laws on nuclear safety and
radiation protection, while the role of the Government is to promulgate decrees on nuclear safety
and radiation protection as well as to take major decisions concerning nuclear utilities. Its action
is based upon recommendations from the ASN. The government also consults specialized
authorities such as the High Committee on Transparency and Information on Nuclear Safety
(HCTISN) or the High Council on Public Health (HCSP).
The ASN acts in many different ways:
- It advises the Government on general regulatory matters and on individual decisions,
- It prepares regulatory documents for the Government,
- It takes decisions and prescriptions that are legally binding, as per the TSN act; it may
take sanctions against utilities, close a nuclear facility, or set penalties,
- It grants individual authorizations and suggests others to the Government,
- Its inspectors oversee and control nuclear activities,
- It helps to manage emergency situations,
- It informs the public (e.g. about incidents at utilities, emergency situations ...).
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For technical aspects, the ASN relies upon the expertise of the IRSN (Radioprotection and
Nuclear Safety Institute) and the seven Permanent Groups of Experts (GP) (e.g. for reactors
(GPR), factories (GPU), ... ).
The ASN is run by a board of 5 commissioners, each appointed for six years. The board
defines the general strategy. Contrary to the US, there are no resident inspectors for commercial
nuclear power plants. Instead, the ASN is organized in territorial divisions that are in charge of
the oversight of plants in a given region (these regions being much smaller than NRC's regions).
Territorial divisions deal with most licensees' requests within their territory. ASN staff is
composed of about 450 people, with roughly half working in territorial divisions.
In 2010, 460 inspections were performed in French NPPs. The utility remains in any case
responsible for nuclear safety, while the ASN focuses on control. For activities with an
intermediary importance in terms of safety and radiation protection, the ASN allows the licensee
to be responsible for it if a systematic, internal control system is set up by the licensee. The ASN
controls the licensee's internal control systems through inspections and analysis of periodic
reports provided by the licensee, and can at any time suspend the overall process (called
"Internal Authorization Process").
In 2008, the budget of the ASN was 43 million Euros (about 60 million dollars), and the budget
of the IRSN related to work in support to ASN's action was 69 million Euros (about 97 million
dollars), hence a total of about 157 million dollars if ASN and IRSN are grouped together.
1.2.2.2. ASN decision and guidance
The ASN supplements laws, decrees or orders with 'technical regulatory decisions",
which are legally binding once validated by the relevant Minister, takes individual decisions
regarding nuclear activities, and sets forth individual requirements.
Regarding regulatory guidance, the ASN used to issue Basic Safety Rules (RFS)
concerning many different technical subjects, such as the use of PRA. RFS are
recommendations, not legally binding, that define safety objectives and present practices that the
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ASN considers acceptable to achieve these objectives. A licensee may decide not to comply with
an RFS if he can demonstrate that the safety objectives can be achieved with alternative means
that he proposes to implement. In some RFS, the ASN endorsed industrial standards, such as
those developed by the AFCEN, an association of industrial companies (including EDF and
Areva) that has produced the RCC standards series, which concerns design, construction and
operation of electrical materials (RCC-E), civil engineering (RCC-G) and mechanical materials
(RCC-M). Now, since passage of the TSN Act, the ASN is in the process of issuing Guides, still
not legally binding, that may supersede some RFS.
Also, since all French nuclear power plants are operated by a single company, many
technical rules governing design and operation have been set in letters to EDF, usually letters
accepting or amending EDF's proposal, without being formalized in regulatory documents.
However, one of the objectives of the new regulatory framework initiated by the TSN Act is
precisely to make this framework more formal and more adapted to the emergence of new
operators and reactor designs.
1.2.2.3. WENRA
The ASN is a member of the Western European Nuclear Regulators' Association
(WENRA), which was originally created on the initiative of the French safety authority to
examine nuclear safety in countries of Central and Eastern Europe desiring to join the European
Union (EU). Nowadays, one of the main objectives of WENRA is to harmonize to some extent
nuclear safety approaches in member countries, starting from the observation that, even though
nuclear safety remains a national responsibility, a nuclear incident or accident can have
consequences that go beyond national borders. WENRA has established "Reactor Safety
Reference Levels" (Ref. [1]), primarily based upon IAEA Safety Standards, that member safety
authorities have committed to implement in the short term, including the ASN. It has
consequences on ASN's regulation, in particular regarding the use of probabilistic risk
assessment, as explained later in this thesis. Also, WENRA has published a document called
"Safety Objectives for New Power Reactors", so that new reactors to be built in Europe may
offer improved level of protection and may have high and comparable levels of safety.
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1.2.2.4. Reactor fleet
With 58 reactors at 19 different sites, France is the second largest producer of nuclear
energy in the world, after the United States, and the nuclear sector generates about 75 % of total
electricity produced in the country, which makes France the country that relies the most on
nuclear energy. Contrary to the US reactor fleet, the French one is highly standardized: all
reactors are PWRs, and there are only three main designs (or series):
- 900 MWe series, with three sub-designs: CPO, CP1 and CP2 (34 units, licensed from
1972 to 1982) (CP1 and CP2 are sometimes grouped under the designation CPY)
- 1300 MWe series, with two sub-designs: P4 and P'4 (20 units, licensed from 1978 to
1985)
- 1450 MWe series, with only one design called N4 (4 units, licensed from 1984 to 1993).
All these reactors are operated by a single company, EDF (Electricit6 de France), owned 84% by
the state.
1.2.3. Fundamental differences
There are major differences between the French and US nuclear industries and regulatory
frameworks. The US industry is made up of plants of many different reactor designs, operated by
many companies, while the French nuclear fleet is highly standardized and operated by a single
company, EDF. A consequence of this structural difference is the relationship between the
regulator and the licensee(s) in both countries:
- In the US, this relationship is based upon very formalized, generic regulatory documents,
as well as individual communications with each licensee, all of these documents being
made available to the public on NRC's website.
- In France, little regulation was formalized up to recently, and most of the regulations
have been based upon a less formal, direct technical dialogue between the ASN and EDF.
This point has been particularly evoked in the process of harmonization of nuclear safety
regulation within WENRA (see Section 1.2.2.3). An advantage of this process was the
possibility for the ASN to focus on this single operating company, which facilitated
communication and applicability of the regulation. However, it also made the process less
favorable to the entry of a new operating company or to the emergence of different
reactor designs, and it made this process less transparent to the outsiders, since few
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regulatory documents were formalized and made public by the ASN. However, as is
explained above, these aspects are currently evolving due to the significant modifications
of the regulatory framework initiated by the promulgation of the TSN Act.
As a result, safety regulation in the US is conducted largely in public, using abundant
documentation that can easily become involved in public litigation. It has usually not been the
case in France, where most of the regulation has been conducted outside the public view between
the safety authority and the licensee. However, the TSN Act has modified this issue significantly:
information regarding risks and risk reduction measures undertaken at the different NPPs must
now be publicly available. In particular, for the past five years, the ASN has been publishing on
its website all the letters that it sent to utilities regarding Permanent Group of Experts meetings,
results of inspections...
Another important difference is the existence in France of Periodic Safety Reviews. Such
safety reviews are required by the European Directive on nuclear safety (2009), with the
objective of continuous improvement of safety. This requirement also appears in IAEA
Fundamentals and IAEA Safety Standards, and in the TSN Act.
Also, the difference of budget between the NRC and the ASN plus IRSN taken together
should be noted: the budget of the NRC is nearly seven times the budget of the combined ASN
plus IRSN (considering only the part of IRSN's budget that is related to its work in support of
ASN's actions), while the US reactor fleet is less than twice as large as the French one.
The status of the IRSN is also particular: while in the US the NRC pays National
Laboratories and other contractors for work in support of regulatory actions, the IRSN has its
own budget. The relationship between the safety authority and its research support is therefore
different between France and the United States. In particular, the IRSN often performs research
on its own initiative, and results can be presented to the ASN to suggest regulatory actions. In
consequence, the IRSN should not be seen as a mere research support working in background of
ASN's action. For many technical subjects, it works directly with EDF, and final regulatory
decisions are generally primarily based upon its conclusions.
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With a single operating company in France, there is no need for a lobbying group such as
NEI to represent the industry before the safety authority, or for an organization such as INPO to
promote best practices among utilities (at least at a national level). In France, these roles are hold
by some centralized departments within EDF. Therefore, there are many fewer actors in the
French nuclear industry than in the US one.
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Chapter 2
Probabilistic Risk Assessment - Basic
Overview
2.1. Introduction
2.1.1. Deterministic background
At the beginning of the nuclear industry, no attempt was made to quantify the risks
generated by nuclear power plants, mostly because no experience was available upon which to
base this quantification. In order to address underlying uncertainties, deterministic safety
principles have been implemented, employing conservative design and operational policies,
significant safety margins, design basis accidents (DBAs) and defense-in-depth.
A major drawback of these deterministic principles is that the implicit risk remains
unquantified. Safety margins are used and redundancy is implemented without quantifying the
underlying effects upon risk. In addition, it is assumed that if the plant is able to withstand
serious accidents, then it will be able to withstand less serious ones, which is not necessarily
obvious or true. Therefore specific defenses against smaller, but more frequent accidents are not
developed. Designers may focus on serious accidents that are highly unlikely while they may
neglect less challenging ones that are much more likely to occur, and that could provide a greater
contribution to the plant risk. Furthermore, deterministic principles rely mostly upon expert
judgments, often without a formal, technical basis of the choices they make.
2.1.2. Probabilistic Risk Assessment
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PRA is defined by the NRC as "a systematic method for assessing three questions that
the NRC uses to define "risk". These questions consider (1) what can go wrong, (2) how likely it
is, and (3) what its consequences might be". PRA enables one to calculate the failure probability
of systems or lines of defense, using a systematic method typically based upon the following
steps:
- Identification of relevant initiating events
- Development of event trees that describe the possible sequences of events starting from
the initiating events
- Evaluation at each step of the event tree, of the failure probabilities using fault trees. The
final outcome (= the end state) is assumed, and possible sequences leading to this
outcome are identified and quantified.
2.1.2.1. Usefulness of PRA
PRA presents many benefits, in particular to compensate for some of the weaknesses of
the deterministic basis mentioned above. Without trying to provide an exhaustive list of all
potential benefits of PRA, we present in this section some of the most recognized successes of
this approach, based upon Ref. [4].
Benefits in design
The use of PRA can have a very beneficial effect at the design stage. It enables a designer
to identify deficiencies in the design of a new reactor and to compare the effect upon safety of
different design alternatives. It also enables one to quantify the risk level of the new design and
thus to compare it with current or past reactor designs. PRA can be used to verify that plant risk
is sufficiently "balanced" in the sense that it is not dominated by a particular kind of initiating
event or accident sequence.
Benefits in operation
PRA techniques can help one identify and compare specific improvements in
maintenance, testing and emergency procedures that may have a cost-beneficial effect upon
safety. It can be a very powerful tool to supplement traditional, deterministic techniques in
justifying hardware or procedure modifications. It can be used to assess the effect of component
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or system unavailabilities and help to identify the best course of action, whether these
unavailabilities are planned or unplanned.
Staff capabilities
The use of PRA results has enabled improvement of the safety cultures among
engineering and operation personnel. When exposed to these techniques, they are more capable
of understanding the interdependencies among different systems and their combined effect upon
the plant risk level. Also, PRA insights can be incorporated into operator training programs in
order to enhance the ability of operators to diagnose and respond to incidents.
Interaction with the regulator
PRA can be a powerful tool to improve communication and interaction between licensees
and the regulator. It can enable utilities to respond more efficiently and effectively to regulator's
concerns, and, as mentioned above, it can be particularly useful in justifying hardware and
procedure modifications or in requesting changes in licensing basis.
2.1.2.2. PRA limitations
In spite of its many benefits, PRA also presents particular limitations of which one must
be aware. In particular, there are three domains where further developments are still needed:
- Quantification of human reliability
- Quantification of common cause failure (CCF) probabilities. A CCF is defined as the
simultaneous failure or unavailability of more than one component due to shared causes
other than the dependencies already explicitly modeled in the PRA logic model [4].
- Quantification of component aging.
During the last 20 years, significant progress has been made concerning each of these
difficulties, through the development of models to deal with human errors and the development
of large databases to evaluate parameters in CCF models and the effects of plant aging. In
addition, codes and standards have been developed to help licensees and regulators ensure that
PRA models are of adequate quality, both in terms of model complexity and data accuracy.
Another major issue when using PRA insights concerns uncertainties. Quantitative results
cannot be used without having some information about the underlying uncertainties, with a level
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of detail that must be consistent with the role of these results in the decision-making process.
Details concerning this issue can be found in Section 2.4.
2.1.3. Three PRA levels
Level 1 PRA
A Level 1 PRA analyzes how initiating events can develop into accidents that lead to core
damage. The concept of "core damage" (also called "severe accident") is defined by the NRC in
NUREG-1150 as the uncovering of the core by coolant, without imminent recovery. A
distinction is made between PWR and BWR:
- For PWR: uncovering of the top of the active fuel (without imminent recovery)
- For BWR: water level less than 2 feet above the bottom of the active fuel (without
imminent recovery).
A Level 1 PRA consists of the following activities: initiating event analysis, event tree
construction, fault tree construction, accident sequence probability quantification. The main
product of a Level 1 PRA is the Core Damage Frequency (CDF).
Level 2 PRA
Starting from the results of the Level 1 PRA, a Level 2 PRA consists of accident
progression and source-term analysis, which yields the fractions of the inventory of radioactive
materials released from the plant.
One product of a Level 2 PRA that is commonly used is the Large Early Release
Frequency (LERF), defined by the NRC in RG 1.174 as "the frequency of those accidents
leading to significant, unmitigated releases from containment in a time frame prior to effective
evacuation of the close-in population such that there is a potential for early health effects".
Level 3 PRA
A Level 3 PRA (also called "consequence analysis") considers the full range of
consequences caused by the dispersion of radioactive materials into the environment. It yields a
set of consequence measure values for each source term group, such as early fatalities, latent
cancer fatalities, population dose, land contamination... These consequences depend upon many
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factors, including the population that lives in the vicinity of the plant, evacuation plans, path of
the radioactive plume (impacted by wind speed and direction, rainfalls and snowfalls).
2.2. PRA basics
2.2.1. Event tree and fault tree
A Level 1 PRA is usually based upon the association of event trees and fault trees. Event
trees enumerate sequences leading to an accident for a given initiating event, while fault trees are
used to define how actions in the event tree can fail and to compute the frequency of such
failures. A fault tree consists of a top event, basic events and logical operators.
2.2.2. Reliability, availability and failure rates
The reliability R(t) of a system is defined in [4] as the probability that this system will
perform as required until time t, i.e.:
R(t) = P(T t) = f (t')dt' (2.1)
t
where T is the time of failure of the system and f(t) is the probability density function associated
with T. The availability A(t) of a system is defined in [4] as the probability that this system will
be operational at time t, regardless of its operability at previous times. If the system is not subject
to any maintenance, the availability is defined with a formula similar to the one given for R(t). In
the literature, reliability and availability are sometimes used interchangeably, but one usually
uses the term availability for a standby system and the term reliability for an operating system.
The reliability or availability is needed for each basic event in a fault tree.
The (conditional) failure rate of the system is then defined as:
P(t T 5 t+dtT ! t) 1 dR(t)AWt = lim =- -(2.2)
at-+o dt R(t) dt
(or similarly with the availability). If the failure rate is constant, the reliability is then simply
given by R(t) = e1t (similarly for the availability).
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Whether the failure rate of a component is taken as a constant or as a function of the time,
some parameters need to be evaluated, which can be done based upon failure data and/or expert
judgment. These parameters can be described either as fixed values (point estimates) or as
random variables associated with particular probability density functions. If point estimates are
used, they can be evaluated using experimental failure data and methods such as the method of
moments or the method of maximum likelihood. If one wishes to describe these parameters as
random variables or to combine expert judgment with experimental data, a Bayesian approach
can be used.
2.2.3. Minimum cut sets and risk importance measures
In a fault tree, a minimum cut set (MCS) is a cut set that does not contain a smaller cut
set, while a cut set is defined as a set of basic events in the fault tree that causes the top event to
occur. MCS are highly useful tools in risk analysis. Indeed, the probability of occurrence of the
top event in a fault tree is given by P(Top Event) = P(U MCSi).
For each component i, several risk importance measures can be computed using the PRA
model. In particular:
- The Fussel-Vesely value: it is defined as the risk generated by the MCSs where the
component i is involved, normalized by the nominal risk:
R (MCS 1 + ---+ MCS,n) (2.3)
Rnom
It enables one to identify the components that contribute the most to the total risk.
- The Risk Achievement Worth (RAW): it is defined as the total risk assuming that the
component i is unavailable (qi = 1), normalized by the nominal risk:
RAW = Rtoelq* (2.4)
Rnom
It enables one to identify components that must be kept reliable to avoid a significant risk
increase.
- The Risk Reduction Worth (RRW): it is defined as the nominal risk divided by the total
risk where the component i is assumed to be always available (qi = 0):
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RRW =- Rnom (2.5)
Rtotlqi=
0
It enables one to identify which components are more valuable for improvement.
2.3. Effect of surveillance
The effect of surveillance tests on a system can be quantified, using the concept of
availability, or unavailability Q(t) = 1 - A(t). For a system that undergoes a single kind of test
at a given period, the unavailability can be modeled as shown on Figure 2-1.
On this figure, t, is the duration of standby, t, is
Q(t) t the duration of the test, and when necessary, tR
tR is the duration of repair, where repair is needed
at a frequency fR (i.e. fR is the fraction of tests
for which repair is needed). Then, for each
t, tc T'ime interval, the unavailability is given as follows:
Figure 2-1 Effect of testing on the unavailability
- For t E [0, t]: Q (t) = 1 - e A t At for a taken as a constant and t K 1/A
- For t E [t, t' + tt]: Q(t) = 1
- For t E [tS + tt, tS + tt + tR Q(t)=
The mean unavailability over a cycle can then be simply computed as:
1 rAtt2(Q) = -. [7-+tt +fRtR (2.6)
By minimizing (Q), one can find an optimal value for ts: ts* = [2(tt+f RtR)] (see Figure 2-2).
<0>7 1
This optimum shows well that a balance must be found
between the positive effect of testing on the
unavailability and the fact that, when the system is
tested, it is completely unavailable (Q = 1).
Figure 2-2: Optimal surveillance period
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In this simple example, it was assumed that the surveillance test fully reset the
unavailability of the system to zero. It is however not always the case.
2.4. Uncertainties
PRA results cannot be used without paying some attention to the underlying issue of
uncertainties. The discussion presented in this section is based upon Ref. [6].
2.4.1. Aleatory and Epistemic uncertainties
Uncertainties can by classified into two different categories that have been named
aleatory and epistemic uncertainties.
Aleatory uncertainty is related to events or phenomena being modeled as stochastic, or
random. For example, the time of failure of a given system can be modeled as stochastic, with a
probability density function that can be determined to model this "uncertainty". Of course, this is
just a modeling treatment, since there is nothing intrinsically random associated with this event
(we are not dealing with quantum phenomena, which are intrinsically random), as far as we
know. This treatment is just a way to deal with some unknowns of the system, for example non-
visible defects in the system varying from one system to another (while macroscopically
speaking, these systems would be considered to be strictly identical), or small variations in the
use of these systems during their lifetimes. Aleatory uncertainty is considered to be somehow
"natural", and there is nothing one can do for a given system to reduce it, one can only refine the
stochastic modeling of these systems (type of model, model parameters ... ). It is this aspect of
uncertainty that gives the term "probabilistic" in the name PRA, in which phenomena are
modeled as random: failure rates, human errors, transition to one scenario or another...
Epistemic uncertainty, however, is not intrinsic to the system, but reflects the analyst's
confidence in the prediction of its PRA model, in the adequacy of the modeling of the different
phenomena, and in the scope and the level of details of its PRA. For example, some random
phenomenon may be modeled with a binomial or Poisson law, with some success, but the
phenomenon is not strictly speaking governed by such a law, this is just a modeling treatment,
more or less suitable (see "model uncertainty", Section 2.4.3). Likewise, when a mathematical
model is thought to be appropriate for a given phenomenon, it is defined with some parameter(s),
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for which there are also uncertainties (see "parameter uncertainties", Section 2.4.2). And so on.
But contrary to Aleatory uncertainty, even though epistemic uncertainty cannot be completely
eliminated, it (or at least some components of it, see below) can be reduced. Depending upon the
applications of the PRA results, more or less (epistemic) uncertainty concerning the results may
be acceptable, but these uncertainties have to be assessed, quantitatively or qualitatively, to the
extent feasible.
What follows in this section concerns epistemic uncertainty, which can be broken down
into several components, among which are Parameter Uncertainty, Model Uncertainty, and
Completeness Uncertainty (which can be regarded as one aspect of model uncertainty).
2.4.2. Parameter Uncertainty
In order to develop the PRA logic structure or to represent the basic events of this
structure, risk analysts use mathematical models that are defined by one or several parameters.
Assuming that these models are appropriate (which is not completely true, see "model
uncertainties"), the numerical values of these fundamental parameters are not perfectly known,
and uncertainties will be associated with these values used in the PRA model. In order to deal
with these uncertainties, analysts will typically establish probability distributions concerning the
value of these parameters (this is somehow a second level of uncertainty, or an uncertainty on the
uncertainty, the first level being the aleatory uncertainty of the modeled phenomenon). Once the
uncertainty on each PRA model parameter has been assessed, elementary uncertainties can be
propagated through the PRA structure in order to obtain the resulting probability distribution on
the results of the calculation (e.g., CDF or LERF).
2.4.3. Model Uncertainty
The state of knowledge about the occurrence of some events or phenomena is often
incomplete, and there may be different opinions concerning how some models should be
formulated, for example to model complex matters such as common cause failures or human
reliability, which gives rise to model uncertainty.
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Different approaches have been suggested to address that kind of uncertainty, depending
upon the specific case that is studied. In some cases where alternative models are well defined,
model uncertainty can be addressed by using discrete probabilities over the alternative models
that are proposed, based upon the confidence in the appropriateness of each of these models.
Another approach that is used to address model uncertainty consists of modifying a defined
model using an adjustment parameter to cover the different retained models. A probability
distribution can then be determined for this adjustment parameter, and uncertainties can then be
propagated in the exact same way as in the case of parameter uncertainty. Such approaches are
however not always feasible, and different kind of sensitivity studies can be performed to assess
numerically the impact on final results of some model uncertainties. Model uncertainty can also
be addressed qualitatively, based upon specialists' understanding of the contributors to the
results and how these results are altered by changes in assumptions or models.
2.4.4. Completeness Uncertainty
This "uncertainty" refers to the limitation in the scope of the probabilistic assessment.
This limitation is sometimes chosen (e.g. to simplify the problem), sometimes imposed by the
level of knowledge and understanding of particular systems or phenomena. Because it reflects an
unanalyzed contribution, it appears very difficult to analyze that kind of uncertainty in a
pragmatic, systematic manner. The choice of scope and level of details will often be based upon
expert appreciations and experience feedbacks. One way to address some aspect of completeness
uncertainty has been to build increasingly elaborate models to the point that the results become
sufficiently insensitive to certain parts of the model. This practice does not guarantee adequate
completeness, but it provides a procedure to indicate a minimum level of needed model
development.
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Chapter 3
Use of PRA in the US - Background
3.1. Historical Perspective
The first PRA study performed to assess the safety of nuclear reactors was the so called
Reactor Safety Study, or WASH 1400, published in 1975, from an AEC project led by Professor
Norman Rasmussen. Surprisingly, this first PRA was a Level 3 analysis, while Level 3 PRAs
have not been very common until recently. The work of this report examined the events that may
occur during a severe accident, as well as their radiological consequences and the probabilities of
occurrence of these events, using a fault tree and event tree approach. The general conclusion of
this study was that the risk to the individual posed by nuclear power stations was acceptably
small, compared with other tolerated risks. In particular, it estimated the risk of core meltdown at
1/20,000 ry-1 (= per year and per reactor).
Prior to this study, it was usually thought that large LOCAs (Loss of Coolant Accidents)
were the dominant contributors to plant risk, hence significant efforts were made to avoid or
mitigate this kind of event. The CDF was also thought to be extremely low (-10~8 ry'1). The
Reactor Safety Study refuted these beliefs: it established that small break LOCAs and transients
were the major contributors to the risk, while the CDF was estimated to be around 10-5 - 10-4 ry
Even if it was much criticized for its understatement of the uncertainties of the method,
WASH 1400 established the use of PRA in the nuclear industry, in the US as in many other
countries, since its methodology was considered useful and powerful.
The methods of PRA used in WASH 1400 have been greatly developed since its
publication, especially after the TMI accident (1979). Indeed, this event was similar to a small
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break LOCA, which the Reactor Safety Study had identified as a risk dominant class of events.
Most US PRAs were developed by the licensees in the 1990s in response to NRC's Generic
Letter 88-20 (ref. [14]), which required licensees to perform an Individual Plant Examination
(IPE) for severe accidents associated with internal events (including internal flooding but not
internal fire). Supplement 4 to the Generic Letter requested licensees to perform an Individual
Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for severe accidents associated with external
events and internal fire events. Since the completion of the IPE and IPEEE programs, licensees
have continued to update their PRAs to reflect plant modifications (many of which involved
improvements identified by the IPEs and IPEEEs) and current operational experience. Five of the
IPEs were the basis for the 1990 NUREG- 1150 study [5] (see Section 3.3). The NRC has also
developed SPAR models (Standardized Plant Analysis Risk) for each plant, which are Level 1
PRAs that the NRC uses for different applications, in particular:
- Evaluation of the significance of inspection findings, in the framework of the
ROP (Reactor Oversight Process). These PRAs are also used to support
inspection planning for both baseline inspections and supplementary
inspections.
- Identification and prioritization of modeling issues to support NRC efforts to
improve PRA quality.
- Providing support to risk-informed reviews of licensing applications.
3.2. The Safety Goals
3.2.1. Safety Goals Policy Statement
The policy statement "Safety Goals for the Operations of Nuclear Power Plants" [7] was
published in 1986. Its objective is to "establish goals that broadly define an acceptable level of
radiological risk". This policy statement resulted from the recommendations of the TMI accident
commission. In this document, the NRC establishes two qualitative safety goals that are
supported by two quantitative objectives, based upon the principle that "nuclear risks should not
be a significant addition to other societal risks". This policy statement was also developed to lead
to a "more coherent and consistent regulation of nuclear power plants, a more predictable
regulatory process, a public understanding of the regulatory criteria that the NRC applies, and
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public confidence in the safety of operating plants". More specifically, the two qualitative goals
of the policy statement are as follows:
- "Individual members of the public should be provided a level of protection from the
consequences of nuclear power plant operation such that individuals bear no significant
additional risk to life and health."
- "Societal risks to life and health from nuclear power plant operation should be
comparable to or less than the risks of generating electricity by viable competing
technologies and should not be a significant addition to other societal risks."
In order to support these qualitative goals and to demonstrate that they are being met, the
Commission has established two quantitative objectives, which are directly related to the use of
PRA:
- "The risk to an average individual in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant of prompt
fatalities that might result from reactor accidents should not exceed [0.1 percent] of the
sum of prompt fatality risks resulting from other accidents to which members of the
U.S. population are generally exposed."
- "The risk to the population in the area near a nuclear power plant of cancer fatalities that
might result from nuclear power plant operation should not exceed [0.1 percent] of the
sum of cancer fatality risks resulting from all other causes."
The vicinity of the plant is described as the area within a mile from the plant site boundary.
3.2.2. Subsidiary Goals
In the document SECY 89-102, Implementation of the safety goals (1990) [9], the NRC
endorsed subsidiary objectives concerning CDF and LERF. Such objectives are usually thought
to be easier to address than the quantitative health objectives (QHOs) presented above, because
they do not require a Level 3 PRA. However, they are more difficult to justify from a societal
point of view than quantitative health objectives. These subsidiary objectives are:
- The CDF should be less than 104 ry(1
- The LERF should be less than 10~5 ry-1.
These goals are also called "surrogate objectives" because they may be used as
alternatives to the QHOs. However, there is no strict equivalence between the two sets of
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objectives, and the subsidiary objectives are generally thought to be more conservative than the
original QHOs, i.e., some plants meeting the QHOs may not meet the subsidiary objectives.
The subsidiary goals do not have the status of fundamental safety goals. In 2004, the
NRC explained that: "This goal [= the CDF subsidiary goal] has been determined by the staff to
be a useful benchmark, but is not a Commission-approved safety goal" [12]. However, in [10], it
had been stated that "the CDF of 104 is by de facto already used as a fundamental Commission
goal".
3.3. NUREG-1150
The study NUREG-1150 [5], published in 1990, may be seen as an improvement of the
original Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400). It is based upon the results of five plant-specific
PRA studies, serving as a basis for the IPE program started in 1988, in which the NRC requested
information on the assessment of severe accidents vulnerabilities by each licensed nuclear power
plant. This IPE could be done either with PRA or with other "approved means". Virtually all
licensees performed their IPE with PRA.
The objectives of NUREG-1150 were to provide a "current assessment of the severe
accident risks of five nuclear power plants of different designs" (2 BWRs and 3 PWRs). One
major objective was to update the results of WASH 1400, including this time quantitative
estimates of risk uncertainty, in response to a principal criticism of WASH 1400. Another main
objective was to assess the performance of these reactors regarding the Safety Goals.
In this study, only initiating events while the reactor is at full-power operation were
considered. For two of the five plants, internal and external (earthquake, fire ...) initiating events
were considered, and for the remaining three, only internal events were addressed. The main
results concern:
- Accident frequency estimations (Level 1 PRA): total CDF (from internal events, and
external events when estimated), contribution of some plant damage states (station
blackout, ATWS, LOCA ... ), measure of the importance of individual events.
- Accident progression, containment loading, and structural response analysis.
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- Analysis of radioactive material transport: produces an estimate of the radioactive
release magnitude, with associated energy content, time, elevation, and duration of
release.
- Offsite consequence analysis (Level 3 PRA): analysis of transport and dispersion of
radioactive material, analysis of the radiation doses, analysis of dose mitigation by
emergency response actions, calculation of health effects.
Globally, NUREG-1150 determined that the five power plants met NRC Safety Goals
with some margin.
3.4. Policy Statement on the use of PRA
3.4.1. Background of the policy statement
This Policy Statement [8], entitled "Use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Methods in
Nuclear Regulatory Activities", was published in 1995. It is a major document concerning the
use of PRA in the US nuclear industry, and may to some extent be compared to the French RFS
[16] presented in Section 4.3. In this document, the NRC states that "a probabilistic approach to
regulation enhances and extends [the] traditional, deterministic approach", in the sense that it
enables the "consideration of a broader set of potential challenges to safety; [it provides] a
logical means for prioritizing these challenges" on the basis of risk significance, operating
experience, engineering judgment; and it allows the "consideration of a broader set of resources
to defend against these challenges".
3.4.2. Content of the policy statement
In this document, the NRC emphasizes that PRA application constitutes an extension and
enhancement of traditional regulation rather than a separate and different technology. Currently,
the NRC uses PRA techniques as an integral part of the Design Certification review process for
new reactor designs.
The two most important statements in this policy statement are as follows:
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- "The commission believes that an overall policy on the use of PRA in nuclear
regulatory activities should be established so that the many potential applications of
PRA methodology can be implemented in a consistent and predictable manner that
promotes regulatory stability and efficiency and enhances safety."
- "The use of PRA technology should be increased in all regulatory matters to the extent
supported by the state-of-the-art in PRA methods and data and in a manner that
complements the NRC's deterministic approach and supports the NRC's traditional
defense-in-depth philosophy."
3.4.3. An extension and enhancement of traditional regulation
In this Policy Statement, the NRC presents some of the advantages of PRA techniques as
a complement to the traditional deterministic approach. First, PRA addresses a broad spectrum of
initiating events, and mitigating system reliability is then assessed, including the potential for
multiple and common cause failures. Therefore, this treatment goes beyond the single failure
requirements of the deterministic approach. PRA can also be used to eliminate unnecessary
conservatism and to support new regulatory requirements. In addition, PRA enables one to
evaluate whether nuclear facilities meet the quantitative probabilistic guidance of the Safety
Goals. The PRA framework is also a powerful tool for logically and systematically evaluating
the importance of uncertainties.
3.5. Use of PRA for plant-specific changes to licensing basis
3.5.1. Introduction
Regulatory Guide 1.174 [6] entitled "An approach for using Probabilistic Risk
Assessment in Risk-Informed decisions on plant-specific changes to the Licensing Basis" (1998)
is an example of the many PRA applications that have been promoted after the promulgation of
the policy statement described in Section 3.4. This RG describes what the NRC considers to be
an acceptable method to assess the nature and the consequences of permanent Licensing Basis
(LB) changes, when the licensee is required or chooses to support this modification using risk
information. It is important to note that this guidance does not preclude other approaches for
requesting LB changes. It presents PRA as an efficient tool for justifying such requests that is
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consistent with the Safety Goals policy statement. In this RG, the NRC presents a policy that
would allow only small risk increases, consistent with the Safety Goals, and only when it is
reasonably assured that sufficient defense-in-depth and sufficient margins are maintained.
The approach described in this guide supports NRC's "desire to base its decisions on the
results of traditional engineering evaluations, supported by insights (derived from the use of PRA
methods) about the risk significance of the proposed changes". Once again, PRA is meant to
complete and support traditional engineering methods, whether it is based upon quantitative or
qualitative results. Key principles of the approach are as follows:
- The proposed change is consistent with the defense-in-depth philosophy.
- The proposed change maintains sufficient safety margins.
- The risk increase (if any) is small and consistent with the Safety Goals.
- The impact of the proposed change should be monitored.
3.5.2. Use of risk information to support LB change requests
Licensee-initiated change requests that are consistent with official NRC regulations or
guidance are generally not expected to be justified with risk information. However, when the
request goes beyond NRC's positions (e.g. Technical Specifications changes not consistent with
Standard Technical Specifications), risk information may efficiently support the request. In
addition, if such risk information is not submitted, the NRC may require the licensee to
complement its request with risk insights.
Figure 3-1: Risk-informed request for plant-specific changes to Licensing Basis [6]
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The role of risk information is to justify that proposed LB changes are consistent with the
Safety Goals. However, as is explained in Section 3.2.2, the QHOs are often not easily usable,
and in particular it would require a Level 3 PRA, whose uncertainties would have to be carefully
studied. This is why RG 1.174 acceptance guidelines are based upon the subsidiary objectives
(see Section 3.2.2) associated with CDF and LERF instead of the official Safety Goals. The main
elements of a risk-informed request for plant-specific LB changes are summarized in Figure 3-1.
3.5.3. Consistency with defense-in-depth and margins
One role of the engineering analysis is to show that fundamental safety principles such as
margins and defense-in-depth would not be compromised by the requested LB change, and
should therefore be reevaluated to support the request.
Defense-in-depth has been an effective way to account for lack of knowledge and for
uncertainties regarding materials and human reliability, and even with the advent of risk-
informed techniques, defense-in-depth is still central to NRC's safety policy. In RG 1.174, the
NRC gives some criteria to assess the consistency of proposed changes to the defense-in-depth
philosophy:
- A reasonable balance is preserved among prevention of core damage, prevention of
containment failure, and mitigation of consequences.
- Over-reliance upon programmatic activities to compensate for plant design
weaknesses is avoided.
- Redundancy, independence and diversity of systems are preserved.
- Defenses against CCFs are preserved and the potential for the introduction of new
ones is assessed.
- Independence of barriers is preserved.
- Defenses against human errors are preserved.
3.5.4. PRA quality
The PRA used to support the request for LB changes must have appropriate scope, level
of detail and technical adequacy. This is particularly the case when the risk analysis constitutes a
major piece in the justification of the request. Conversely, if traditional engineering arguments
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are already convincing and sufficient by themselves to justify the request, the quality (or the
justification of the quality) of the PRA could be reduced.
Different approaches may be used by the licensee to establish the technical adequacy of
its PRA. RG 1.174 suggests two of them:
- Performance of a peer review of the PRA (by qualified reviewers)
- Use of industry PRA certification programs.
3.5.5. Acceptance guidelines
The quantitative guidelines are meant to be compared with full-scope PRA results
(including internal and external events, full-power, low-power and shutdown operations), and the
PRA should be of at least Level 2 in order to evaluate the LERF and the incremental LERF
associated with the proposed changes. However, these guidelines may be adapted to deal with
non full-scope, Level 1 PRA, as outlined later (see Section 3.5.6). In addition, during particular
shutdown conditions when the containment function is not maintained, the LERF guidelines are
not applicable. In such cases, RG 1.174 suggests that licensees use a more stringent guideline
concerning the baseline CDF, e.g. by dividing numerical indications (see below, Figure 3-2) for
the baseline CDF by a factor 10.
There are two sets of guidelines, one for CDF, one for LERF, and both should be met.
The acceptance guidelines are summarized on Figure 3-2 and Figure 3-3. For each metric (CDF
and LERF), different regions are established, with the value of the metrics prior to the realization
of the proposed LB change shown along the x-axis (baseline CDF or LERF), and the increment
in the corresponding metrics due to the proposed LB change shown along the y-axis (ACDF or
ALERF). The NRC indicates that numerical values presented on these figures are only indicative,
and these goals are intended to be compared with the actual mean values of the distributions.
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Figure 3-2: Acceptance Guidelines for CDF [6]
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Figure 3-3: Acceptance Guidelines for LERF [6]
In more detail, the acceptance guidelines are as follows:
1) For the CDF:
-If indications clearly show that ACDF < 0, the proposed LB change is considered to have
satisfied the principle of risk-informed regulation (for the CDF part only).
-If the calculated incremental CDF is very small (< 10-6 ry~c), the proposed change will be
considered, and there is no requirement to calculate the total CDF. However, if there are
indications (e.g. IPE or IPEEE result) that the CDF may be considerably higher than 10-4 ry-1,
then focus should be on finding ways to reduce it.
-If ACDF E [10-6; 1-5] -1, proposed changes will be considered only if it can be shown that
CDF < 10-4ry.
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- If ACDF > 10-' ry, the proposed change would usually not be considered.
2) For the LERF:
- If indications clearly show that ALERF < 0, the proposed LB change is considered to have
satisfied the principle of risk-informed regulation (for the LERF part only).
- If the calculated incremental LERF is very small (< 10-7 ry'1), the proposed change will be
considered, and there is no requirement to calculate the total LERF. However, if there are
indications that the LERF may be considerably higher than 10-5 ry-1, the focus should be on
finding ways to reduce it.
- If ALERF c [10-7; 10-] ry 1 , proposed changes will be considered only if it can be shown that
LERF < 10- ry1 .
- If ALERF > 10- ry 1 , the proposed change would usually not be considered.
3.5.6. Comparison of PRA results with acceptance guidelines
The different regions of Figure 3-2 and Figure 3-3 require different levels of analysis, as
explained earlier, but also inside a given region, the level of detail in the analysis of uncertainties
will depend upon the calculated values of CDF and LERF. For example, in region H of Figure 3-
2 and Figure 3-3, the closer the estimates of ACDF and ALERF are to the upper bounds of these
regions, the more detailed the analysis must be.
As explained earlier, these Acceptance Guidelines are not meant to be used
prescriptively, and even in Region I or in the upper part of region II, the request to LB changes
may be considered if additional elements that would not be reflected in the quantitative risk
results are provided and detailed. In addition, if compensatory measures are proposed by the
licensee to counter the effect of major contributors to CDF and LERF increments, these
arguments will be considered by the NRC, even when the risk impact of these compensatory
measures is not quantitatively assessed [6].
As is explained in Section 3.5.5, acceptance guidelines have been developed for full
scope PRAs, but adaptations are possible when the PRA is not full scope. In such cases, an
assessment of the contribution of out-of-scope elements to CDF and LERF may be necessary, the
level of detail of which depending on how close the calculated CDF and LERF are to the upper
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bounds of the different regions (Figure 3-2 and Figure 3-3). There are also cases where such
assessment would not be necessary, in particular when the non-full-scope PRA shows small CDF
and LERF increments (regions III), for which the baseline CDF and LERF values are not
fundamental: if it can be shown (e.g. qualitatively, or on the basis of expert judgments) that out-
of-scope elements would not affect ACDF and ALERF (even though they may affect baseline
CDF and LERF), then the incompleteness of the PRA would not be an issue.
Similarly, when only a Level 1 PRA is available, the LERF cannot be calculated, but
alternatives exist. RG 1.174 recommends the approach presented in NUREG/CR-6595 An
Approach for Estimating the Frequencies of Various Containment Failure Modes and Bypass
Events, in which a subset of core damage accidents (that can be studied with a Level 1 PRA) can
be analyzed in lieu of Large Early Releases.
3.5.7. Integrated decisionmaking: contribution of risk insights
There is no general rule for establishing the role of risk insights in the decisionmaking
process, it will be application dependent. However, quantitative risk results from PRA (CDF,
LERF, ACDF, ALERF...) are considered to be the most "useful and complete characterization of
risk" [6], especially when proposed changes have an effect upon many SSCs (Structures,
Systems and Components), and there are cases where PRA results will be "crucial" to the
success of the request for LB changes [6]. But they will usefully be supplemented by qualitative
risk information (including industry-wide past PRA results and experience feedback) and
traditional engineering analyses. Such supplemental information can effectively support the
application for LB changes and reduce NRC's reliance on the technical acceptability of the PRA.
3.6. Risk-informed changes to the Technical Specifications
Plant-specific, permanent changes to the Technical Specifications are a sub-category of
plant-specific changes to licensing basis, for which guidance is provided in RG 1.174, but
additional, specific guidance is provided in RG 1.177 "An approach for plant-specific, risk-
informed decisionmaking: Technical Specifications" [11].
Since the 1980s, the NRC has been reviewing and granting many requests to change TS,
and a part of them was based upon PRA insights. Typically, these requests involved relaxation of
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allowed outage times (AOTs) and surveillance test intervals (STIs). Regulatory Guide 1.177
focuses mostly on these two kinds of TS changes, but other types of TS changes are possible. In
this RG, the NRC identifies three categories in which most requested TS changes fall:
- Improvement in operational safety, i.e. a reduction of the plant risk or a reduction of
occupational exposure of plant personnel.
- Consistency of risk basis in regulatory requirements: TS may be changed to reflect
improved design features or improvements in equipment reliability that make a previous
TS requirement unnecessary or ineffective.
- Reduction of unnecessary burdens: based upon the operating history of the plant and
industry-wide experience feedback, some TS requirements may appear to be too stringent
or inefficient.
Use of compensatory measures
Compensatory measures to reduce the risk increase may be considered in light of the
acceptance guidelines provided in RG 1.174 (see Section 3.5.5). The licensee may consider
compensatory measures even if these acceptance guidelines are met. RG 1.177 suggests some
examples of relevant compensatory measures such as:
- Improving test and maintenance procedures to reduce risk-associated errors
- Improving operating procedures and operator training to reduce the risk and the effect
of human errors
- Testing a redundant train before initiating a scheduled maintenance activity.
Acceptance Guidelines for TS changes
In addition to the acceptance guidelines provided in RG 1.174 and presented in Section
3.5.5, RG 1.77 gives additional risk acceptance guidelines for AOT change requests, in order to
ensure that the risk increment is acceptably small. These guidelines are based upon the concepts
of ICCDP (incremental conditional core damage probability) and ICLERP (incremental
conditional large early release probability), defined as follows:
- ICCDP = [(conditional CDF with the considered equipment out-of-service) -
(baseline CDF)] x (duration of the considered AOT)
- ICLERP = [(conditional LERF with the considered equipment out of service) -
(baseline LERF)] x (duration of the considered AOT).
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That being said, the additional acceptance criteria are (Ref. [11]): the licensee should
demonstrate that the AOT change has only a small quantitative effect upon plant risk, where:
- An ICCDP smaller than 5x10-7 is considered to be small for a single AOT change.
- An ICLERP smaller than 5x10-8 is considered to be small for a single AOT change.
3.7. Implementation strategy and steady transition towards a
risk-informed framework
3.7.1. NRC implementation strategy
According to [14], one of the biggest obstacles at the NRC for implementing a more risk-
informed regulatory strategy was that some staff members believed that the application of risk
information would be accompanied by the abandonment of the concept of safety margins. The
IPEs demonstrated the benefits of the methods to help in identifying plant vulnerabilities, even
though these studies were of unequal quality. The Maintenance Rule was one of the first major
applications of risk-informed techniques, and even if many utilities had already RCM programs
(Reliability Centered Maintenance), it made risk assessment a part of the formal regulatory
framework. In order to improve the acceptance of PRA techniques among its staff, NRC's
management implemented a training program focused upon risk-informed techniques and their
applications. This program is considered as an important element contributing to the
improvement in the acceptance of the risk-informed philosophy [12].
3.7.2. Industry implementation strategy
At first, the development of risk-informed tools was mostly driven by the NRC,
especially through the IPE program. Afterwards, some utilities became particularly convinced of
the usefulness of these techniques, and they improved these technologies and their applications,
even though some utilities were more skeptical or even opposed to a risk-informed regulation.
Indeed, many utilities first saw risk-informed regulation as an unnecessary additional burden
[12]. This early reluctance was soon overcome when it appeared how efficiently these tools
could help in managing risky operations. The application of the Maintenance Rule was the first
major attempt of using risk information in a formal, regulatory way and it was followed by
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several pilot projects regarding specific issues to develop, improve and apply risk-informed
techniques. Utilities began to use risk monitors not only to obtain plant status information, but
also to improve the scheduling of planned operations by improving the safety level and by
making operations more efficient.
It has also proven to be an efficient way to improve the safety culture and the risk
awareness among engineers and technicians through site-specific training on PRA tools and their
applications. For example, in some utilities, during morning status reports senior plant
management require a discussion of the risk of the current plant configuration and of the
quantified changes of the risk that will occur during the day's operation (e.g. if systems were to
be taken out of service for maintenance). Some utilities have even incorporated risk performance
metrics into the employee evaluation and bonus programs in order to encourage them to be more
aware of the risk status of the plant when performing their job (Ref. [14]).
3.7.3. Improvement of safety level and operational performance
Risk-informed regulation will likely be more widely accepted if it can be shown that plant
safety level and operational performance are at least as good, if not better, as they have been in
the past 40 years of deterministic regulation. Even if performing this comparison is far from
being straightforward, the industry and the NRC have made attempts to develop performance
metrics to make quantitative comparisons in order to assess potential improvements brought by
risk-informed practices and regulations. Some of these comparisons are presented in [14]. These
metrics are used to compare performance of utilities that have chosen to use risk information as a
management tool with those that have not, in order to evaluate whether performances are
improved by the use of risk-informed techniques.
INPO performance indicator
The INPO performance indicator (PI) index is computed using a weighted combination of
several INPO performance indicators ranging from 0 to 100 (the higher the indicator, the better
the performance):
" Unit capability factor * Forced loss rate
" BWR high pressure injection/heat removal system 0 BWR residual heat removal system
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* Unplanned automatic scrams per 7,000 hrs critical
* Safety system performance indicator
* PWR high pressure safety injection system
* PWR auxiliary feedwater system
* Emergency AC power system
e Fuel reliability
" Collective radiation exposure
e Chemistry performance indicator
Utilities are grouped into two categories: utilities that have adopted rigorous risk
management practices, called "risk active" (35 plants), and utilities that have not adopted risk-
informed management techniques (but have, however, implemented the risk-informed
regulations such as the Maintenance Rule), called "risk inactive" (19 plants). There are also
plants in neither of these two groups that will however appear in the category "all plants". Figure
3-4 presents the results for all US plants. We observe that, from 1995 to 2004, the index has
increased for both categories, but it has more drastically increased for the plants in the category
"risk active", because even if all plants show similar performance in 2004, the risk active ones
started at a lower level. It would suggest that the use of risk-informed techniques has helped in
improving performances of these plants.
INPO PI Index
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Figure 3-4: Standard INPO performance indicator indices for all US plants [14]
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NRC accident precursor index
Since 1979, the NRC has tracked accident precursors and has ranked operating events
that were most likely to lead to core damage. The ASP (Accident Sequence Precursor) index
represents the total CCDP (conditional core damage probability) of all precursors during a given
year divided by the total number of plants, so the smaller the ASP index, the better the
performance. Figure 3-5 presents the ASP index for the different plant categories from 1994 to
2003.
The results on this figure may appear less convincing. For example, we note that there are
between 1997 and 2000 very few significant precursors for risk inactive plants, while this is not
the case for risk active plants. However, one can notice that between 2001 and 2003 risk active
plants have performed better than risk inactive plants, and during the whole period 1994-2003,
risk active plants have always been below 10-5 ry-1, except in 1996, due to the occurrence of a
LOOP event with unavailable EDG (Emergency Diesel Generator) at Catawba 2. This index is
indeed very sensitive to particular events: we have just mentioned the peak of 1996 for risk
active plants, but other peaks are also caused by specific events. Therefore, this index does not
enable one clearly to differentiate performance of risk active and risk inactive plants. One can,
however, conclude that, at least, performance of risk active plants is not degraded compared to
risk inactive plants.
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Figure 3-5: NRC Accident Precursor Index [14]
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Therefore, if risk-informed approaches enable one to improve other parameters, such as
the efficiency of regulation and the competitiveness of nuclear power plants (which has been the
case), the transition of the US nuclear industry toward a more risk-informed framework seems
justified. It has also increased the level of risk awareness and safety culture at nuclear utilities,
which is another positive element.
3.7.4. Role of defense-in-depth in risk-informed regulation
Through the process of moving towards risk-informed regulation, the issue of the role of
defense-in-depth within this new framework arises. In this context, two types of concern have
been expressed: on the one hand, some people fear that the benefits of risk-informed regulation
could be diminished by arbitrary appeals to defense-in-depth [15] to avoid regulatory changes
that seemed appropriate in the light of risk insights, as it has happened in the past. On the other
hand, some people fear that risk-informed regulation could degrade the defense-in- depth
philosophy. The concept of defense-in-depth is sometimes unclear, and there is no official or
preferred definition of this concept. Currently, there are two main uses of this concept. The first
one refers to the philosophy of maintaining high level lines of defense, such as the prevention of
initiating events, the quick termination of progression of accident sequences, and the mitigation
of accidents that are not quickly terminated. The second refers to the multiple barrier approach
and to attributes such as redundancy, diversity and independence. In both cases there is the
concept of successive and parallel levels of protection.
As seen in Section 3.4, the PRA policy statement gives PRA a subsidiary role to defense-
in-depth. We have also seen in Section 3.5.3 that RG 1.174 reaffirms the importance of the
defense-in-depth philosophy to account for uncertainties in system and human performance,
stating also that PRAs can be used to assess the appropriate extent of defense-in-depth that
should be used to achieve an acceptable safety level. It, thus, addresses the concern mentioned
above of preventing the risk-informed approach from undermining the defense-in-depth concept.
In [15], the authors have identified two schools of thought concerning the scope and
nature of defense-in-depth:
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Structuralist Model
The structuralist model is somehow the traditional approach. It is based upon the
repetition of the question "What if this barrier or safety system were to fail?" It looks for a
balance between accident prevention, quick termination and mitigation, regardless of the
probability of use or failure of the different systems. The implementation of this model of
defense-in-depth has led in some cases to unnecessary regulatory burdens, which licensees are
now trying to reduce. In addition, with this model licensees do not have an integrated view of the
plant, which has resulted in the negligence of some risk-significant accident sequences (e.g.
small break LOCA, see Section 3.1). In the modem version of the structuralist model (which is
generally the current form of defense-in-depth, especially in France), defense-in-depth keeps a
central position, while PRA is used to measure how well it has been achieved. When PRA
reveals weaknesses, safety constraints will be added, and when PRA reveals unnecessary burden,
constraints may be reduced. However, in most cases, there have been more regulatory reactions
in cases where PRA reveals safety deficiencies than in cases where it shows that regulations or
systems are superfluous [15].
Rationalist Model
The rationalist model is a more recent conception of defense-in-depth. It considers
defense-in-depth as the aggregate of provisions made to account for uncertainty and lack of
knowledge regarding accident initiation and evolution. It relies on two main aspects of PRA:
quantified risk insights and uncertainty evaluation. Proponents of this model suggest the
following process:
1) Establishing quantitative acceptance criteria, e.g. QHOs, CDF, LERF
2) Analyzing systems using PRA techniques to establish that the quantitative acceptance
criteria are met
3) Evaluating the uncertainties of this analysis, and establishing what should be done to
compensate for these uncertainties.
In this model, defense-in-depth is used to increase the degree of confidence in the insights of the
risk analyses supporting the conclusion that the safety level is acceptable.
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In [15], the authors insist on the fact that the structuralist and rationalist models are
generally not in conflict. The fundamental difference between these two models is that the first
presents defense-in-depth as a central value, while the second one gives defense-in-depth a
subsidiary role. In order to prevent defense-in-depth from imposing unnecessary regulatory
burdens, the authors recommend that the rationalist model be at least partially incorporated into
the regulatory framework.
3.8. Other ongoing developments
There are numerous other ongoing activities related to PRA, among which:
- The NRC and industry are making a significant effort to develop PRA guidance
documents as well as supporting technical reports.
- Both the NRC and industry continue to collect and analyze data needed to support the
development and quantification of PRA models (in particular, data concerning fire risk
and Human Reliability Analysis).
- In order to improve PRA quality, the NRC is also developing guidance for the
treatment of uncertainties. Both traditional PRA techniques (e.g., regarding the
propagation of uncertainties) and supplemental techniques (e.g., sensitivity studies,
qualitative analyses, bounding analyses, screening methods) will be addressed.
- Risk-informed Technical Specification (see Chapter 7).
- Attempt to adapt current risk-informed regulation to new, safer reactor designs.
3.9. Summary
Originally considered by many licensees as an additional, unnecessary burden, risk-
informed applications have found their place in the US nuclear industry and regulatory
framework. Risk-informed applications are generally well accepted, even though the degree to
which these tools are used and the quality/scope of the PRA models vary strongly among the
licensees. Risk-informed applications were initially driven by the safety authority (IPE/IPEEE,
Maintenance Rule ... ); nowadays, their development is strongly influenced by a group of utilities
particularly advanced in the development and the use of PRA tools. By developing (or
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endorsing) detailed technical guidance for specific risk-informed applications, the NRC
facilitated the implementation of these techniques by the licensees.
Indicators seem to show that risk management practices have enabled licensees to
improve safety and operational performance. Undoubtedly, the use of PRA tools in licensing and
operations at sites has induced an improvement in the safety culture and the risk awareness of
workers. It has also enabled the NRC to improve the efficiency and the consistency of its
regulatory actions.
Even though the NRC has been approving more and more ambitious risk-informed
applications (such as the risk-informed Tech Specs presented in Chapter 7), it should be
remembered that none of these applications is "risk-based", i.e. decisions and behaviors are
never based upon risk information solely, but rather upon a blend of probabilistic and
deterministic considerations, as required by the PRA Policy Statement.
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Chapter 4
Use of PRA in France
4.1. Preamble
This chapter presents the regulations applicable to the use of PRA in France as well as the
main risk-informed applications that have been developed, whether they have been implemented
or not. Many of the observations made in this chapter cannot be proven definitively, but they are
based upon observations that have been encountered within EDF. They are offered here in order
to identify where there have been difficulties and to stimulate reflection on whether any changes
are needed. Also, when interpretations are made, they reflect only the opinion of the author.
4.2. Historical Perspective
The safety of French nuclear reactors is based mainly on deterministic approaches. The
first complete PRAs have been completed in 1990:
- Level 1 PRA for EDF 900 MWe reactors, developed by the IRSN, called EPS 900. One
result: CDF = 5x10~5 ry-1 [17]. Since then, EDF has redone this PRA (which now
constitutes the "Reference PRA", see below), and, reflecting PRA updates and plant
modifications, the CDF has been revised to 4x106 ry-1 .
- Level 1 PRA for EDF 1300 MWe reactors, developed by EDF itself, called EPS 1300.
One result: CDF = 10-5 ry-1 [17]. The latest value for this CDF is 4x10- ry-1.
As with any PRA, many other results could be drawn from these studies (the overall CDF is only
one result among many others), enabling a better understanding and ranking of SSCs in terms of
their risk contribution. These PRAs considered internal initiating events and all operational
modes. Internal hazards (internal flooding, fire ... ) and external hazards were not considered
[17]. One of the most outstanding results was the high contribution of shutdown modes to the
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total CDF: 32% for the 900 MWe series, and 56% for the 1300 MWe series (latest value: 32%
[26]).
Since then, there has been a substantial increase in the use of PRA in the French nuclear
industry to assess the safety of operating nuclear reactors. These first two studies have had
concrete consequences leading to specific measures to improve the design of the reactors as well
as operational procedures. More systematically, these Level 1 PRA have been used in the
framework of the Periodic Safety Reviews of the 900 and 1300 MWe reactors, also leading to
specific modifications of designs and procedures. PRA results have also been used by EDF and
the IRSN for different purposes: precursor analyses (analysis of the conditional risk posed by
actual operational events), partial assessment of technical specifications (TS), definition of
scenarios exercised on simulators for operator training, maintenance optimization ...
The EPS 1300 and 900 have been continuously updated, taking into account evolutions in
designs and procedures, better knowledge of the different systems, as well as improvements in
PRA methodologies. PRAs have also been developed for the 1450 MWe series and for the
Flamanville 3 EPR. For this latter plant, the PRA model goes up to level 2, and a complete set of
hazards PRAs has been developed.
4.3. The Basic Safety Rule (Regle fondamentale de suret6")
With the positive results of the first major PRA studies and an increase in the use of such
studies, the ASN issued in 2002 a Basic Safety Rule: Regle Fondamentale de Suret6 (RFS) 2002-
01 [16]. The purpose of this Rule is to define acceptable methodologies for PRA and to
recommend some PRA applications. The Basic Safety Rule constitutes the main official
document on the use of PRA studies in the French nuclear regulatory system.
4.3.1. General doctrine of the Rule
The rule states that, even though the safety of French nuclear power plants mostly relies
on deterministic methods, based upon the defense-in-depth principle, PRA studies complement
these deterministic bases, thanks to their contrasting investigative approach. Therefore, the ASN
reaffirms that deterministic methods (in particular the defense-in-depth principle) must remain
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the fundamental basis of nuclear safety; PRAs are not supposed to supplant them or to have an
equivalent role, but they are meant to complement them. More specifically, the ASN states that
PRA helps to define and prioritize actions to be performed in order to reach or maintain an
acceptable safety level. It enables one to have a more general view of safety, accounting for
systems reliability as well as human behaviors. Indeed, PRAs consider a large number of
initiating events and reveal situations covering complex associated events. Also, the Basic Safety
Rule insists on the importance of uncertainties, and their effects upon the results must be
analyzed, either quantitatively or qualitatively.
4.3.2. Reference PRAs
The Safety Rule requires that a Reference PRA be developed for each type of operating
reactor and that it be continuously updated. For each Periodic Safety Review, a summary of the
Reference PRA must be included in the safety report.
For future reactors, a Reference PRA must be developed as part of the design process,
obviously iteratively. In particular, a synthesis of the PRA study must be included in the
Preliminary Safety Report, presenting major contributions to the total CDF.
4.3.3. Quantitative objectives
In the Rule, the ASN strongly insists on the fact that, even though specific PRA
applications may include references to quantitative objectives (e.g. CDF objectives), these
objectives should be considered as guidelines and under no circumstances as strict limits. Even
though it has never been made explicit, it has been mentioned that the ASN may be reluctant to
define official quantitative guidelines because it does not want to fix a definitive value of
acceptable safety, and it does not want operators to content themselves with a given safety
objective. This situation is therefore very different from the US case, where Safety Goals and
official quantitative guidelines in guidance documents associated with many different
applications are used. However, quantitative objectives have been defined in consensus between
EDF and the ASN, as is explained subsequently.
4.3.4. Domain covered by PRAs
55
Reference PRAs must be Level 1 PRAs, addressing to the extent possible all internal
initiating events (except for internal hazards, e.g. internal flooding or fire) that may affect the
reactor, in all reactor operational modes. In addition, Reference PRAs may be extended to
address internal and external hazards as well as the frequency of radioactive release after core
damage (Level 2 PRA). In the future, a new version of the Rule should be released, adding
requirements concerning Level 2 PRA and hazards.
4.4. PRA applications recommended by the Rule
The Rule focuses on five main applications:
- Periodic Safety Review of operating reactors
- Precursor analysis
- Design of future reactors
- Safety assessment of materials and systems
- Technical specifications improvement.
4.4.1. Periodic Safety Review
4.4.1.1. General approach
The TSN Act requires that, every ten years, each reactor must undergo a Safety Review
in order to assess the ability of the reactor to keep operating. This reassessment is accomplished
in two main steps:
- First step: the Safety Review must demonstrate that the power plant meets the
safety standards.
- Second step: the safety standards are reassessed, in the light of national and
international experience. The safety standards may then be modified.
PRA is used during the Periodic Safety Review to estimate the CDF and its evolution
since the previous Safety Review. It also helps in identifying any possible weakness involved in
major contributions to the CDF.
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During the first step of the safety review, the Reference PRA shall be updated to take into
account most recent operating experience and new elements regarding the understanding of
nuclear power plant systems. Then, in order to reveal and prioritize main contributions to the
CDF, an acceptable method (according to the RFS) would be to group together elementary
sequences that have analogous functional characteristics in "functional sequences". The purpose
of this gathering is to constitute functional sequences whose frequencies and consequences could
be reduced by implementing a single modification (or set of modifications) of the operating
procedures or the design.
If modifications are decided upon after analyzing PRA results (or by other means), PRAs
also help to assess advantages and drawbacks of the different available options. After the Safety
Review process, the Reference PRA is updated, accounting for possible modifications decided
during the review process.
4.4.1.2. EDF practice
The Level 1 analysis is comprised of three main steps [26]. First, EDF checks that the risk
is balanced and identifies contributions that should be reduced, following ASN's
recommendations outlined above. Then, ways to reduce these contributions are identified, and
hardware and/or procedure modifications are proposed. A cost benefit approach was used for the
900 MWe third decennial review, and will be used for the 1300 MWe third decennial review.
Even though not required by the RFS, EDF has developed a methodology for a Level 2
analysis in the framework of these periodic safety reviews. This methodology will be proposed
for the next periodic safety review (1300 MWe) [26].
4.4.1.3. Example
Reference PRAs have first been used during the second Periodic Safety Review of the
900 MWe reactors. As a result, several backfits have been required by the ASN, regarding in
particular (Ref. [19]):
- Functional redundancy of AFWS (Auxiliary Feedwater Systems) for all modes of operation
- Improvement of the ventilation system
- Diversification of the reactor scram function
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- Modifications that could mitigate the consequences of Class lE emergency bus CCF.
4.4.2. Design of future reactors
The ASN insists that, as it was the case for past reactors, the safety of future reactors
must still rely on deterministic bases. However, PRA studies will have a new role to play during
the design process, and will effectively complement deterministic approaches. More precisely,
some of the main contributions of PRA will be:
- Help to conceive safety-related systems, especially in terms of redundancy and diversity
- Verification that the design is "balanced" in the sense that there should not be event
sequences having a large dominance in terms of CDF
- Assessment of the differences between the safety level of the new reactor concept and
current reactors
- Assessment of safety improvements due to new devices designed against severe
accidents
- Help to demonstrate that event sequences leading to large early releases are virtually
dismissed.
Quantitative objectives will be used to assess the safety performance of the concept, but,
again, these values are just guidelines, and should not be the only elements in the use of PRA
results.
4.4.3. Technical specifications improvement
The role of the technical specifications is to define the limits of normal operation as well
as the required actions in case of a beyond-design situation or upon the unavailability of a
required system or component.
PRA can provide valuable information to help in identifying the most risk-effective
course of action if a system is unavailable. PRA can also be used by the operator when asking
the ASN for the authorization to perform special actions and/or to operate the reactor in a state
that is not in accordance with the technical specifications, and to justify that the CDF increase
remains small during such activities.
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4.5. PRA quality management - Guidance
The adequacy of EDF's PRA models is managed through the use of several guides. Some
of them have been internally developed, while others have been developed by other
organizations such as EPRI. Information in this section is mostly based upon Ref. [26].
Level 1 PRAs
The quality of Level 1 PRAs is managed through the use of a guide developed by EDF in
2003-2004. This guide is mostly based upon EDF practice, but international standards have been
used on a case-by-case basis (e.g. for the treatment of CCF). The goal of this guide is to ensure
quality and consistency between the Level 1 PRAs, the Level 1 PRAs of the different reactor
series being developed by different teams. This guide has not been subject to peer review, but
has been transmitted to EPRI for information.
Level 2 PRAs
There is no equivalent guide used at EDF for Level 2 PRAs, even though a set of
guidelines is available to the developers. Furthermore, all level 2 PRAs are developed by a single
team, which reduces the risk of inconsistency between the different reactor designs and therefore
reduces the need for such detailed guide.
Hazards PRAs
For the existing hazards PRAs (internal flooding, fire, seismic, see Section 4.7.1), EDF's
practice is mostly based upon EPRI standards. Also, EDF has developed a detailed guide on fire
PRA for the 1300 MWe Series, also usable for other designs.
IRSN review
The IRSN can request EDF to transmit their PRA models, but rarely does. More
generally, the IRSN can require any information needed to evaluate EDFs PRAs. The guides
mentioned above have not been reviewed by the IRSN, but these guides are for internal use only,
to provide guidance on how to perform a PRA and to permit some standardization of the
practices within EDF. Instead, the IRSN will review results and technical explanations included
in the reports transmitted by EDF. It will pay attention to the validation of the tools, but not
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particularly to the models themselves or to their maintenance. Also, the IRSN will often perform
independent calculations, using its own PRA models, and will compare the results with those
presented by EDF. It has been reported that these results are sometimes in conflict, reflecting the
fact that IRSN's PRAs may be based upon different models or hypotheses (more frequent), or
may not have the same level of detail as EDF's ones.
4.6. PRA applications to Tech Specs and Periodic Tests
In France, PRA techniques have been used to partially evaluate Technical Specifications
(STEs) and Periodic Tests [21]:
- Determination of functions, systems and components availability requirements
- Choice of shutdown state
- Shutdown Initiation Time
- Treatment of simultaneous events
- TS temporary exemptions.
Risk insights can be used either to define regulatory or operational requirements or to
assess the acceptability of these requirements. Concerning current reactors, STEs were defined
using deterministic methods only, and were often based upon pre-existing Westinghouse
Technical Specifications (because French reactors are based upon a Westinghouse design). In the
1990s, with the advent of risk-informed methods, the acceptability of STEs for most group 1
events (see Section 6.2.2 for a definition of group 1 / group 2 events, which differ according to
safety importance) was assessed, using the first PRA models and simple methods [26]. In some
cases, when risk insights revealed safety weaknesses, Shutdown Initiation Times have been
shortened. The opposite has occurred much less frequently (Ref. [24] and [21]), even when PRA
insights had revealed unnecessary regulatory burdens. Concerning Group 2 events, there has
been typically no use of risk assessment. In fact, Group 2 events are often not (or not completely)
modeled in PRA models. In the 2000s, more sophisticated methods have been developed to
assess Tech Specs adequacy (see Section 4.6.1) on a case-by-case basis.
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4.6.1. PRA applications to Shutdown Initiation Times and Repair
Completion Times
STEs provide times by which shutdown should have been initiated (typically in case of a
group 1 event) if the problem has not been solved, the "Shutdown Initiation Times", or by which
repairs should have been completed (typically in case of a group 2 event), the "Repair
Completion Times". If the licensee discovers that the problem cannot be solved before the end of
the Shutdown Initiation Time (if applicable), he must initiate reactor shutdown as soon as
possible. These times were originally defined using deterministic methods, but can now be
assessed using PRA tools, or, for new reactors, they can be directly based upon risk insights.
In [20], two different strategies have been identified to cope with the discovery of
component unavailability corresponding to an unplanned Tech Specs Group 1 event. A
compromise between these two strategies is usually adopted.
4.6.1.1. Acceptable Risk Increase Strategy
The first strategy consists in defining a maximum time, T, (the shutdown initiation time
or the repair completion time) during which the operator can keep the SSC in the unavailable
state. This maximum time corresponds to a quantified risk increase defined by an acceptance
criterion. Figure 4-1 presents this strategy, the hourly risk being the CDF.
Risk without plant shutdown
Hourly
Risk
Basis Risk AR
T
T x A R is compared to acceptability Time
criterion
Figure 4-1 : Acceptable Risk Increase Strategy [21]
The incremental risk, ARxT, is then compared to an acceptance criterion. The current
acceptance criterion for shutdown initiation time or repair is (Ref. [20]):
ARxT < 10-.
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This acceptance criterion is not regulatory, but EDF and the ASN have reached a consensus to
accept this numerical guidance. This value has been defined for Level 1, internal events PRA
(with no hazards). This strategy of Acceptable Risk Increase is used in most cases.
4.6.1.2. Risk Minimization Strategy
In cases where the risk associated with the shutdown transient is high (i.e. greater than the
consensus value, 10-7), the previous strategy may not be the most appropriate. For these cases,
EDF has developed a Risk Minimization Strategy that defines a shutdown initiation time T 2 such
that the risk if repair is performed in the initial state is equal to the risk of the situation where the
reactor is shut down to repair. These two risk profiles are plotted on Figure 4-2, on which TSD =
E t, is the total duration of the shutdown transient (E ti-Ri is therefore the shutdown transient
risk), Ra is the risk in initial state with unavailability of the system, and Rb is the risk after
shutdown with unavailability of the system. The equalization of the two risks gives:
Ra Tz = t Ri + Rb* (T2 - TSD) (4.1)
hence the time T 2:
T t - Ri - Rb TSD (4.2)
Ra - Rb
Risk due to shutdown
Risk TS Risk without shutdown
R,
t
Figure 4-2: Risk Minimization Strategy (adapted from [211)
In practice, when the shutdown transient risk is greater than 10-7, a compromise between
the two strategies is used, depending upon the value of the different parameters and a realistic
repair time. In cases where the shutdown transient risk is particularly high (>_ 3, 4 or 5 x 10-7), a
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repair strategy without plant shutdown and based upon a realistic repair time may be considered
[21].
Uncertainties are usually taken into account in two different ways, with sensitivity studies
and through the use of standard shutdown initiation times (1 hr, 2 hrs, 8 hrs, 24 hrs, 3 d, 7 d, 14
d, and 1 month in case of a repair strategy): in general, the retained value is the standard value
just below the value computed with the applicable strategy, even if this computed value is very
close to the next standard value (e.g. if the computed value were 13.9 d, the retained value would
be 7 d and not 14 d) (Ref. [24]).
It should be noted that the computation of the risk associated with a shutdown transient as
performed using this method is something rather uncommon (e.g. in the United States), due to its
complexity. It seems to be made possible with EDF's PRAs thanks to the fact that the number of
reactor modes considered in the PRA model is greater than the number of reactor modes
considered in the technical specifications. Therefore, a transient between two Tech Specs reactor
modes can be "discretized" into several PRA reactor modes, and by assigning a particular time
interval spent in each of these modes, the risk associated with the transient can, thus, be
computed (also, point risk increases are added).
4.6.1.3. Current status
These methods have been extensively applied to assess STEs of AC power sources and
Auxiliary Feedwater Systems. In particular, these applications have shown that all AOTs
specified in current STEs are overly conservative, except one (that of auxiliary transformer
failure). However, these studies have not led to STE modifications [26]. The safety authority has
not approved these studies, and has recommended in particular that hazards and CCFs be
addressed in these probabilistic studies. Even though hazards PRA are available for some
reactors, there are, however, several barriers to their use. In particular, these hazards PRA are
considered at EDF to be too conservative to be used in such studies. Additionally, no quantitative
criterion has been defined for acceptable risk increase that takes hazards into account [26]. EDF
is collecting information on the international practices regarding this issue. These matters are
currently in standby status.
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Concerning the development of EPR (Flamanville 3) Tech Specs, these methods should
be used for studying the most important safety systems. However, at this point, it is unclear that
the results of these studies will actually be used to develop the Tech Specs [26]. The difficulties
mentioned above are also applicable to the EPR. In addition, as design and construction of the
EPR progress, PRA models are still evolving, which means that these studies would have to be
repeated (even though the methodology presents some robustness, thanks to the use of standard
AOTs), which may not be feasible due to limited resources.
4.6.2. Probabilistic analysis of operational configurations
PRA insights are more and more used to analyze the risk associated with particular
operational configurations. In some cases, these analyses (along with traditional deterministic
approaches) may lead to TS temporary exemptions. PRA is used to assess the risk increase
associated with the exemption, and to identify appropriate compensatory measures. The CDF
increment is assessed and compared to an indicative acceptance criterion.
Hourly Risk Exemption Configuration Risk
Baseline
Risk T
Time
Figure 4-3: TS Exemption Acceptance Criterion [221
Using the notations of Figure 4-3, the product, T x AR, is compared to the acceptance
criterion, 10~7 (if there has been significant conservatism in the risk assessment, values of 2-3 x
10~7 may be acceptable) (Ref. [21] and [22]). In cases where T x AR > 5 x 10~8, PRA is used to
identify compensatory measures and their effects upon plant risk.
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This use of PRA appears to be one of the most accepted. Even though not mandatory, the
ASN may ask for such probabilistic analysis in some cases, and it appears to have a significant
importance in its decision making process.
4.6.3. Treatment of simultaneous events in the Tech Specs
For the EPR (Flamanville 3), EDF R&D is currently working on a methodology to treat
the simultaneous occurrence of a planned event and an unplanned event using a blend of
probabilistic and deterministic concepts. The new methodology is not meant to be used in real
time, but rather in background in order to develop EPR Tech Specs (i.e. only a limited number of
risk-significant configurations would be studied using this methodology). It is still at an R&D
stage and it has not yet been decided whether to use it or not. One of the main difficulties would
be the amount of work required to use it, given the limited available resources [26].
4.6.4. PRA application to Surveillance Test Intervals
Methodology
For current, two-train EDF reactors, STIs (Surveillance Test Intervals) have been
determined using deterministic tools only. However, if these STIs were to be kept with the four-
train EPR, there would be a requirement for twice as many surveillance tests, which would mean
additional costs and burdens that might not be justified from a probabilistic standpoint.
Therefore, for Flamanville EPR, EDF has developed a risk-informed STI determination process
for safety-related systems to provide decision makers with risk insights. Proposed STI changes
would then be reviewed by an expert panel that would consider quantitative results but also
qualitative aspects of the proposed changes.
The maximum STI change, ASTI., will be associated with the maximum CDF
increment, ACDF.nx = CDF.x - CDFbase. Acceptance guidelines (that are only indicative, not
regulatory) defined for full-scope, internal events, Level 1 PRA are as follows:
- For an individual STI change: ACDFmaxdin = 106 ry-1
- For all STI changes: ACDFm,ani = 105 ry-1.
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If the baseline CDF is smaller than 10-5 ry-1 (which is the case for the EPR), then the criteria are
as follows:
- For an individual STI change: acceptable CDF increase = 10% of baseline
CDF (in practice, usually less than 3% [26])
- For all STI changes: acceptable CDF increase = 100% of baseline CDF.
Current status
The methodology has been presented to the safety authority. It has raised many questions,
in particular regarding the needed scope of the PRA (Level 1, no hazards). At this time, it is
unclear whether this methodology will actually be used [26].
4.7. Other evolutions and prospects
4.7.1. Ongoing developments
As is mentioned earlier, the first PRAs developed in France were the Level 1, internal
events EPS 900 and 1300 (1990), which did not consider internal and external hazards. Even
though these PRAs were only of Level 1, they were some of the first in the world to cover all
operational states of the reactor. Since then, the IRSN and EDF have been working on several
developments. First, they have kept improving the quality of these Level 1 PRAs by updating
them continuously, taking into account most recent experience and progress. Also, EDF's PRAs
for 900 and 1300 MWe have been revised after the promulgation of the Basic Safety Rule, the
reference PRAs required by this rule being now the ones made by EDF. IRSN's PRAs are used
to perform independent, comparative studies. To date, EDF has for the 1300 MWe series [25]:
- Level 1 PRA, covering the reactor and the fuel pool (internal events)
- Level 2 PRA
- Hazards PRA, covering fire, internal flooding, and also seismic risk for a pilot
plant (Saint-Alban).
A similar set of PRAs is being developed for the 900 MWe series, within the framework of the
life extension program [25] (a Level 2 PRA for the 900 MWe series has already been developed
by EDF). Concerning the 1450 MWe (N4) series, only a Level 1 PRA is available at this time.
66
4.7.2. Evolution of the regulatory framework
As is explained in Section 1.2.2.3, the ASN is a member of WENRA, an association of
European safety authorities that is working towards a certain harmonization of nuclear safety
regulation among its member countries. This association has established a list of about 300
"Reactor Safety Reference Levels" [1] that are meant to be implemented into the different
national regulatory frameworks. In 2010, it was assessed (Ref. [3]) that, even though almost all
of these Reference Levels were implemented by French plants, few (about one third) were
actually formalized into official regulations, which is consistent with the preliminary
observations made in Section 1.2.2.2 about the French regulatory system: most of the ASN's
requirements have been expressed in individual letters to the sole licensee, EDF, rather than in
formal regulatory documents, and EDF has also implemented safety provisions on its own
initiative. The promulgation of the TSN Act in 2006 had unexpectedly disrupted ASN's original
plans to transpose WENRA's Reference Levels into national regulation, but this transposition
should be achieved during the coming months through the completion of certain regulatory
documents [3].
In the list of Reference Levels, a small set is dedicated to PRA. This is one of the points
that has been emphasized as being insufficiently implemented into French nuclear industry and
regulation [2]. Indeed, these Reference Levels contain recommendations that go beyond those
provided by the ASN in its Basic Safety Rule (RFS) on PRA:
- They recommend the development of Level 2 PRAs, covering all modes of
operation, while the French RFS requires that reference PRA be of Level 1 only.
- They recommend that PRA models consider the following hazards: internal fire,
internal flooding, severe weather conditions and seismic events. The French RFS
does not require these considerations. Indeed, at the time of publication of the RFS,
hazards PRAs were not well developed yet, internationally.
As explained above, EDF is anticipating these new requirements, while an updated version of the
RFS (re-named "Guide" in the new regulatory framework) should be published soon.
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4.8. Difficulties and barriers
Even though PRA tools have been successfully used for several applications (Tech Specs
exemption requests, precursor analysis, ...), advanced, ambitious applications have sometimes
failed to be widely accepted, either by the safety authority or within EDF, as shown by some
examples mentioned above. There have been technical barriers, but also non-technical
difficulties.
The safety authority does not seem to be opposed to risk-informed applications, but it
often appears to be very demanding regarding the scope of the PRA models that are used for
these applications (Level 2, hazards...), while acceptance criteria may not have been established
for guiding such a scope, both in terms of level of needed detail and results, and models may be
deemed to be too conservative. Also, there have regularly been debates between EDF and the
IRSN regarding the PRA models and hypotheses that each uses, and in some cases, the
hypotheses or studies of EDF were not accepted. Indeed, the IRSN performs independent
calculations using its own PRA models or hypotheses, and its results may differ from those of
EDF.
There have been also difficulties within EDF in applying some risk-informed
methodologies. At the risk of caricaturing or oversimplifying, we can try to classify the reasons
for these difficulties in four categories, which are obviously, to some extent, interdependent:
- Resource issues: some of the risk-informed applications that have been proposed
would require significant engineering resources that may not be made available
considering the priority of other needs. It has been pointed out that, generally,
resources are primarily affected for the development and quality of PRA models rather
than for the applications. Doing this can limit the benefits reaped from the
developmental expenditures.
- Self-censorship: the difficulties encountered regarding the acceptance of some PRA
applications, and the absence of methodologies for those applications or for new ones,
led EDF management to think that the associated regulatory process would be long
and even uncertain to succeed. Hence, it did not encourage them to propose extending
some applications or to suggest new applications. [26].
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- Doubts regarding operational benefits: The belief that risk-informed applications
would bring operational benefits to the operator, in particular by reducing unnecessary
regulatory burdens, is not unanimous at EDF: even though managers agree that PRA
applications might allow some benefits, some fear that they might also induce (more)
additional constraints or that the cost-benefit ratio might be too high. This reasoning
led to not generalize applications or to develop new ones [26].
- Mistrust regarding PRA: PRA tools are sometimes questioned by EDF management,
with many concerns existing regarding the uncertainties of these methods. Some
people have expressed a feeling that risk-informed tools may allow behaviors that are
not acceptable from a deterministic standpoint (e.g., use of too little conservatism or
defense-in-depth). However, in the Basic Safety Rule there exist deterministic
safeguards against such behaviors, as is explained in Section 4.3.1.
Due to all these reasons, the present applications such as the one for the Tech Specs will
probably not be generalized, nor will new risk-informed applications be developed. No new
R&D exploratory study is currently planned. As for risk-monitors, its use for the French existing
plants is not considered to be appropriate, as STEs (in particular the Simultaneity Rules, see
Section 6.2.2) are considered as the only basis upon which the operator should base its behavior
for configuration management, for the sake of safety. Rather, EDF has developed some
pedagogic tools to promote the PRA culture on-site, such as a simplified presentation of PRA
results.
4.9. Summary
Since the development of the first French PRAs in 1990, much progress has been made,
in the models themselves, their quality, as well as their applications. However, some of the
contemplated applications were actually not implemented. For some of these applications, there
have been difficulties not only with the safety authority (concerning scope, criteria, models...),
but also in some cases within EDF. Also, until now, most of the resources have been allocated to
the development of PRA models rather than their applications. There are however great
opportunities to successfully implement risk-informed applications in French nuclear power
plants. Indeed, tools and skills have reached a considerable level of maturity, and the high level
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of standardization of the EDF nuclear fleet is a strength that permits a reduction in the amount of
work required to implement applications in a consistent way, and that provides valuable
experience feedback to improve these applications.
Even though similar benefits (and limitations) are attributed to PRA in the French and US
regulatory frameworks, in France these techniques have not reached the same status as in the US.
In the US, not only have risk-informed practices penetrated the regulations, but they are also
more and more used on a daily basis at the operational level, as is shown in the following
chapters (regarding risk-monitors, the Maintenance Rule, risk-informed Tech Specs), while in
France there appears to be some reluctance towards such practices. EDF is a much larger
company than any typical US operating company, and there is at EDF a clear separation between
the different entities (R&D, engineering, operations). In particular, the centralization of the
engineering divisions, and their separation from operations, may, to some extent, explain some
of the differences from the US case, where engineering and operations are typically site-oriented
and more closely coupled, hence an easier transfer of PRA technologies and expertise from the
engineering staff to the operational staff. In France, ambitious risk-informed applications at the
operational level are therefore unlikely to be considered in the short term. An important, but
difficult step would be the decision to use risk-monitors on site, which would not necessarily
involve recasting fundamentally the current configuration risk management practices
(Simultaneity Rules), as will be explained in Chapter 10.
Also, in the US, for many years the NRC has stimulated the development and the use of
PRA tools, e.g. through the IPE/IPEEE programs and the enforcement of the Maintenance Rule
(even though, strictly speaking, the use of PRA techniques was never mandatory), to improve
safety as well as regulatory efficiency. In France, the ASN has not provided similar incentives.
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Chapter 5
Maintenance in France and the US -
Background
5.1. Introduction
5.1.1. Role and objectives of maintenance
There are two types of maintenance: preventive maintenance, to prevent equipment
failures, and corrective maintenance, to fix broken equipment. Many years of operational
experience have confirmed the link between maintenance and safety: even if maintenance alone
will not make a plant safer than its original design, maintenance is fundamental to ensure that the
original design basis is maintained (or not unacceptably degraded). Preventive maintenance is
usually well planned, using well defined procedures. Corrective maintenance procedures,
however, may be lower quality, workers may be less prepared, and less time may be available to
plan and perform corrective maintenance. Traditional maintenance practices focus upon
individual systems and their performance, with detailed instructions and requirements. They
have the advantage of being usually clear and easy to implement and regulate, even though they
may sometimes lead to focusing attention upon compliance with protocols with less
consideration for performance and results. Current trends in safety related maintenance take the
plant into account as a whole, and focus is placed upon general safety performance rather than
upon individual components and their individual performance. This is especially illustrated by
the use of PRA in safety related maintenance activities (see Section 5.1.3).
In the past, equipment preventive maintenance priority ranking was based upon
subjective engineering judgment. With the development of risk-based techniques, it can now be
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accomplished based upon these techniques, in combination with engineering judgment and
analysis of experience feedback. Online maintenance programs can also contribute to improving
the quality of maintenance and the safety level, diminishing time constraints and other loads that
affect personnel during outages. Indeed, outages are recognized as times of high workload, with
greater risks arising due to time pressure, fatigue, and added burdens on supervisors. If workers
perceive time pressure, they may make more errors and take shortcuts to complete tasks faster. In
order to reduce time pressure, realistic schedules need to be justified and used in order to provide
enough time to complete maintenance tasks (with sufficient time margins) while reducing the
potential for maintenance errors. Increased use of online maintenance can also result in fewer
forced outages.
5.1.2. Management strategy
5.1.2.1. Outage management strategy
Outage duration and quality directly influence availability and costs. Outages are periods
when significant resources are expended. Past experience has shown that well-planned outages
improve both safety and operational performance [27]. Comprehensive planning can enable one
to reduce outage durations, avoid outage extensions, ensure reliable plant operation and reduce
radiation exposures to the staff. It is recognized that an outage PRA is a good tool to provide an
overview of the overall safety level obtained during the different outage operations. If an outage
PRA is not used, deterministic considerations may be used, but with less coherent results being
likely.
In more competitive energy markets, having emphasis on demand-dependent pricing, it
appears that reliable and predictable performance during outage is often more rewarded than
minimizing outage duration [28].
5.1.2.2. Human and organizational performance
There exists a weight of evidence across different industries (nuclear in particular)
showing that a large proportion of equipment failures occur after maintenance and periodic tests,
and that a substantial portion of those failures can be traced back to human and organizational
factors arising within the tests themselves. Maintenance errors may not always be revealed by
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post-maintenance tests. The proportion of maintenance errors remaining undetected may be
increased by the following common trends [29]:
- Economic pressure leads to reductions in staffing, new shift schedules, and more work
being performed by external contractors who may typically be less familiar with systems
of the specific plants being treated.
- Many nuclear organizations worldwide are facing retirements of experienced staff,
including maintenance specialists. The transfer of knowledge must be planned and
managed to the extent feasible.
- The volume of maintenance activities is increased due to plant ageing.
5.1.3. Use of PRA in maintenance
5.1.3.1. An efficient tool
Current maintenance programs have been developed using mainly engineering and
deterministic considerations such as defense-in-depth, functional performance based upon
accident analyses, and manufacturers' recommendations. Increasing competitiveness and
liberalization of electricity generation are putting emphasis upon operating plants at reduced
costs. Maintenance can play a significant role in reducing costs, keeping in mind that safety must
not be compromised in order to achieve cost reductions. The "risk significance" concept, arising
with the advent of PRA, has opened up many possibilities to improve maintenance strategies,
while improving public safety in the same time. Such methods are increasingly used to address
many aspects related to maintenance, e.g.:
- Maintenance planning and scheduling
- Ranking of components according to their risk significance
- Guiding decisions related to online maintenance
- Appreciation of the risk effects during maintenance activities
- Supporting technical specification changes to accommodate maintenance needs
- Establishing use of performance indicators and criteria.
Currently, PRA based maintenance applications are often conducted using Level 1,
internal event, at-power PRAs. The use of these PRAs can be more effective if the scope of
available PRAs is enhanced. For example, the availability of a shutdown PRA allows the
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evaluation of the effect of maintenance activities performed during shutdown periods, which can
be compared to the effect of the same activities if performed online. This is a powerful tool for
deciding whether some maintenance activities should be carried out online or during outages,
from a purely overall safety point of view. However, other aspects must be taken into account
when making any decisions of that kind: workers habits and preference, available guidance,
human reliability (which may change depending upon whether maintenance is performed online
or during outages). In many cases, the complexity of available plant specific PRAs may not
correspond with the needs for maintenance applications (e.g., electrical components are often
grouped into "macro-components" in order to simplify the models). In order to deal with this
problem, the licensee can either decide to increase the level of detail of its PRA or to perform
post-processing of the PRA results to achieve similar objectives.
5.1.3.2. PRA limitations for maintenance related applications
PRA is one tool among several, which has however some limitations. The risk-based
ranking of systems and components can be very sensitive to PRA quality and complexity.
Therefore, the use of PRA can result in a ranking that could be unrealistic, which can lead to
focusing maintenance efforts where they are less required. And as mentioned above, the scope of
available plant specific PRAs is in many cases not detailed enough to be effectively used in some
maintenance activities.
Great attention should also be paid to uncertainties. For example, if a component ranked
as "low risk" is associated with a large uncertainty, this could mean that this component may
actually be risk significant. In such a case, the uncertainty should be considered in order to
prevent this component from being left out of the scope of the maintenance program.
5.1.3.3. Interfaces with deterministic considerations
Traditionally, maintenance has been based upon deterministic considerations and
engineering analyses such as defense-in-depth, single failure criteria, deterministic accident
analysis, manufacturer's recommendations, experience feedback and industrial standards. The
advent of modem PRA has opened up new opportunities to improved maintenance strategies
with cost and safety benefits. Table 5-1 estimates the effect that PRA techniques could have
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concerning different maintenance and testing tasks. We see that it could have a significant effect
on many different aspects of maintenance programs.
Test/Inspection Preventive Maintenance Corrective Maintenance
- Test type (L) - Task - Design specification
- Scope (H) - Scope (L) - Scheduling (H)
- Frequency (H) - Frequency (L) - AOT (H but only exemptions)
- Scheduling (H) - Scheduling (H)
- AOT (H) - AOT (H)
Table 5-1: Estimated effect of PRA on maintenance programs (L=Low, H=High) [27]
It is recognized however that some dangers associated with undue reliance on PRA can
arise. For example, using PRA may show that removal of all protection against a particular fault
for a short period of time would be numerically acceptable, but it would remain unacceptable
from a deterministic and conservative point of view, since important events, not taken into
account in the PRA model, may occur and be disastrous. Therefore, the IAEA expresses the
following deterministic safeguard: "For all maintenance operations, there should be protection
provided for all faults at all time" [27]. The general idea to draw from such considerations is that
in maintenance, but more generally in safety matters, probabilistic assessment should always be
combined with deterministic, engineering considerations, because of the underlying limitations
of PRA techniques (which can be reduced, but not eliminated). This is consistent with the US
PRA Policy Statement and the French Basic Safety Rule.
PRA can however address some of the deterministic weaknesses regarding maintenance
activities, for example [27]:
- The original basis of deterministic maintenance requirements is often not clear, and not
logically developed: maintenance activities can sometimes be performed without an
understanding of why they are being done and of their effect upon safety. PRA can help
to rank SSCs and to show how changes in reliability can modify the public risk.
- Deterministic considerations are often binary: for example, activities are classified as
either safety related or not safety related, while the reality is not always that clear. PRA
enables one to use a more continuous range of judgment and to define priorities.
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- Risk and reliability are not considered in a consistent and systematic way through a
deterministic approach, contrary to that of PRA.
- Dependencies and CCFs are not adequately addressed by deterministic approaches, while
PRA explicitly models dependencies and enables one to identify the effect of CCFs.
5.2. Maintenance in the US: the Maintenance Rule
5.2.1. The Maintenance Rule: regulatory aspects
In addition to the technical specifications that regulate most of the safety-related
maintenance activities (which consumes about 80% of maintenance resources, even though it
concerns only a minority of plant equipment) , the NRC has published on July 10, 1991 the
Maintenance Rule, as 10 CFR 50.65 "Requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of
maintenance at nuclear power plants" [30]. This Rule took effect on July 10, 1996. Before the
enforcement of the Maintenance Rule, NRC inspections showed that even if licensees had
adequate maintenance programs, some maintenance-related weaknesses were regularly observed,
such as inadequate root cause analyses leading to repetitive failures and inadequate consideration
of risk when prioritizing, planning and scheduling maintenance activities.
5.2.1.1. Performance-Based Regulation
In [31], the NRC distinguishes two kinds of rules:
Process-oriented (or programmatic, or prescriptive) rule
This is the traditional approach for most rulemaking. Such a rule includes detailed
requirements and instructions. The advantage of such a rule is that it is easier to enforce:
licensees have a clear idea of what they must do to implement the rule, and inspectors know
exactly what to inspect. The drawback is that such rules tend to be inflexible, and may prevent
licensees from using the means they judge the most efficient and effective to implement the rule.
Results-oriented (or performance-based) rule
Such a rule describes in general terms what results are expected, leaving the methods and
details to achieve them up to the licensee. It has the advantage of letting the licensee decide
which means are the most effective and efficient to achieve these objectives, contrary to process-
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oriented rules, thus reducing regulatory burdens. It also allows the licensee to consider risk
significance when designing its strategy. The drawback is that such rules are more difficult to
enforce, because the requirements are less clearly defined than in process-oriented rules. It
appears that licensees clearly prefer results-oriented rules to process-oriented ones. It also has the
safety benefit of aligning both authority and responsibility with the operator for the results
obtained.
The NRC Maintenance Rule is a results-oriented rule. It was one of the first major
applications of risk insights in the US nuclear safety regulation, enabling utilities to take
advantage of their IPEs to develop risk-informed programs. The positive results brought by the
implementation of this Rule are widely believed to have influenced the pace of transition towards
more risk-informed, performance-based regulation.
5.2.1.2. Content of the Rule
Goals and Monitoring
10 CFR 50.65 §(a)(1) requires each licensee to set goals and to monitor the performance
of SSCs in a way that gives reasonable assurance that these SSCs are able to perform their
functions. The Rule adds that these goals should be commensurate with safety and should take
into account industry-wide operating experience. In addition, it requires licensees to take
appropriate corrective actions when the performance or the condition of an SSC does not meet
established goals. Being intentionally non-prescriptive, it is important to note that this paragraph
requires that goals be established by the licensee, not the NRC, but with concurrence of the
NRC.
Effective Preventive Maintenance
10 CFR 50.65 §(a)(2) defines an alternative strategy to the monitoring approach defined
in §(a)(1). Here, the NRC states that, in some specific cases, the performance or condition of
SSCs can be effectively controlled through adequate preventive maintenance rather than
monitoring in terms of performance goals.
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Periodic evaluation and safety assessments
10 CFR 50.65 §(a)(3) requires that performance and condition monitoring activities and
associated goals ( §(a)(1) ) and preventive maintenance activities ( §(a)(2) ) be periodically
evaluated, at least every refueling cycle, taking into account industry-wide experience. In
addition, this paragraph requires that, when necessary, adjustments be made to ensure that the
objective of preventing SSC failures through maintenance is appropriately balanced with the
objective of reducing SSC unavailability due to monitoring or preventive maintenance.
Assessing and managing risk before maintenance activities
In 1999, the NRC amended the Maintenance Rule by adding a new paragraph (a)(4) that
completes 10 CFR 50.65 §(a)(3). This paragraph requires that licensees perform risk assessments
before maintenance activities are performed on SSCs covered by the Maintenance Rule (see
below) and that they manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance
activities.
Scope of the Rule
10 CFR 50.65 §(b) defines which SSCs are within the scope of the Rule as follows:
- Safety-related SSCs
- Non-safety-related SSCs that are relied upon to mitigate accidents or are used in
emergency procedures
- Non-safety-related SSCs whose failure could prevent safety-related SSCs from fulfilling
their role
- Non-safety-related SSCs whose failure could cause a scram or actuate a safety system.
5.2.1.3. Industrial Guidance: Endorsement of NUMARC 93-01
Following the publication of the Maintenance Rule in 1991, the nuclear industry
developed a document that provides guidance to licensees regarding the implementation of this
Rule: NUMARC 93-01, "Industry Guideline for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at
nuclear power plants" [34], first published in 1993. The NRC endorsed this guidance in RG
1.160 [32]. NUMARC 93-01 is the practical reference to comply with the Maintenance Rule.
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5.2.2. The Maintenance Rule: industrial guidance
As a whole, NUMARC 93-01 clarifies and complements many aspects of the
Maintenance Rule, while still respecting the intentionally non-prescriptive philosophy of the
Rule. A simplified flowchart in Appendix A presents a summary of the Maintenance Rule
process as recommended by NUMARC 93-01.
5.2.2.1. Risk Significance Determination
Once SSCs within the scope of the Maintenance Rule have been selected (see first row in
flowchart of Appendix A), the licensee must establish risk significant and performance criteria.
First, risk significant criteria must be established in order to determine which of these
SSCs are risk-significant, often based upon CDF calculations. Several existing guidance
documents can be used, such as NUREG/CR-5695 "A Process for Risk-Focused Maintenance",
NUREG/CR-3385 "Measures of Risk Importance", NUREG/CR-4550 "Analysis of Core
Damage Frequency", or the EPRI PSA Application Guide (EPRI Report TR-105396). Utilities
that have developed Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) programs may use studies that
support such programs to find useful data to establish the risk significance of SSCs.
Alternatively, NUMARC 93-01 suggests methods using the following risk importance measures
to assess the risk significance of SSCs (see Section 2.2.3 for definitions of these metrics): RRW,
RAW, and the CDF contribution. Specifically:
- RRW, method A: SSCs that, cumulatively, account for about 99% of the sum of RRWs
related to maintenance should be considered to be candidates for risk significant SSCs.
- RRW, method B: SSCs with an RRW greater than 0.5% should be considered to be
candidates for risk significant SSCs.
- CDF Contribution: Maintenance-related SSCs involved in cut sets that account for 90%
of the overall CDF should be considered to be candidates for risk significant SSCs.
- RAW: SSCs with an RAW greater than 200% should be considered to be candidates for
risk significant SSCs.
5.2.2.2. Establishing Performance Criteria
For SSCs that have been established as being risk-significant (see above), and for non-
risk significant SSCs that are in standby mode, specific performance criteria shall be established.
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Most often, the performance criteria are related to the availability, the reliability or the condition
of the SSC (in particular, these criteria should be established to assure that assumptions used in
plant-specific PRA or other risk-analyses are still valid). For the remaining non-risk significant
SSCs, plant level performance criteria shall be established, such as:
- Unplanned automatic reactor scrams per 7000 hours critical
- Unplanned safety system actuation
- Unplanned capability loss factor.
5.2.2.3. Treatment of SSCs under §(a)(2) or §(a)(1)
The philosophy of the Maintenance Rule is to separate the treatment of SSCs into two
categories:
- SSCs treated under §(a)(2) of the Rule: they are addressed through preventive
maintenance programs and their performance is monitored against the performance
criteria defined in Section 5.2.2.2.
- SSCs treated under §(a)(1) of the Rule: these SSCs are subject to more attention and
stricter practices. It concerns SSCs that have shown performance lower than expected.
For these SSCs, specific goals are established. When a goal has been met (or is no longer
applicable) for a sufficient period of time, the corresponding SSC can be returned to
§(a)(2) treatment.
By default, risk-significant SSCs with acceptable performance will be treated under
§(a)(2) and monitored against their specific performance criteria, as well as non-risk significant
SSCs that are in standby mode. Risk significant SSCs and non-risk significant SSCs in standby
with unacceptable performance (even if performance criteria are being met) will be addressed
under §(a)(1) and have goals established against which performance will be monitored.
Remaining non-risk significant SSCs are addressed under §(a)(2) and their performance
is monitored against the established plant level performance criteria, as defined in Section
5.2.2.2. If a plant level performance criterion is not met, a root cause analysis will be conducted
to determine whether this was due to failure of an SSC within the scope of the Rule, and if this
failure was an MPFF (Maintenance Preventable Functional Failures). If this is the case, the
licensee may decide to treat this SSC under §(a)(1) and to establish a specific goal for this SSC.
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Alternatively, the licensee may continue to address this SSC under §(a)(2) after implementing
adequate corrective actions. If after some time it is determined that the corrective actions have
not corrected the problem, the SSC will be placed in §(a)(1) category.
5.2.2.4. Configuration Risk Management
Following the revision of the Maintenance Rule in 1999 with the addition of §(a)(4)
concerning the assessment and management of risk increases resulting from maintenance
activities, section 11 of NUMARC 93-01 was revised to provide guidance regarding this new
paragraph, which is endorsed by the NRC in RG 1.182.
Assessment of the risk resulting from maintenance activities
The first stage in the risk-informed maintenance process is to assess the risk increment
resulting from the proposed maintenance activities. NUMARC 93-01 states that this assessment
should include the consideration of the following aspects:
- Technical specifications requirements
- The degree of redundancy available to perform safety functions normally served by the
SSC taken out of service for maintenance
- The duration of the proposed maintenance
- The likelihood of an accident sequence that would require the out-of-service SSC
- SSCs that are affected by some dependency with the maintained SSC.
If desired, the assessment may also consider the comparison of the risk effect between the case
where the SSC is maintained during outages and the case where it is performed during at-power
operations. The assessment may also take into account the time necessary to restore the SSC to
service if the need arises due to an emergency situation, to be compared with the time at which
the SSC function would be needed.
Assessment methods for power conditions
The removal from service of a single SSC is usually covered by the Technical
Specifications, therefore the assessment may be limited to the consideration of unusual external
conditions (e.g. severe weather, offsite power instability ...). However, removal from service of
multiple SSCs requires an assessment, performed with quantitative or qualitative (or both)
considerations.
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1) Quantitative considerations: this can be done using PRA insights. NUMARC 93-01
recommends that this PRA be a Level 1 PRA covering internal initiating events in at-
power mode (i.e. mode 1). The use of an expanded PRA (external events, Level 2, other
modes of operation) is only optional. If the PRA is not detailed enough to describe the
SSC to be removed from service (for example, diesel generators may be modeled as a
single component in the PRA model), the assessment should study the effect of the out-
of-service component on the safety function of the component modeled in the PRA.
2) Qualitative considerations: such an approach can be performed by addressing the key
safety functions affected by the SSC to be removed out of service, as well as the degree
of redundancy available. In addition, the licensee may consider implementing
"compensatory measures" to address the risk increase due to the maintenance activity
(see below). Qualitative considerations may be especially useful to address events and
SSCs not within the scope of the available plant-specific PRA.
Assessment methods for shutdown conditions
Except when a plant-specific shutdown PRA is available, the assessment will generally
be performed using a qualitative approach, as described previously. However, due to decreased
redundancy during outages, the licensee may consider contingencies and backup methods to
achieve the key safety functions, as well as measures to reduce the probability and the
consequences of potential events.
Risk management
Risk management involves using the results of the risk assessment to control the overall
risk impact, through careful planning, scheduling, coordinating, monitoring, and also by taking
additional actions beyond routine controls to address risk increases above particular thresholds. It
can often be effectively accomplished by making use of qualitative or quantitative insights from
the plant-specific PRA.
1) Action thresholds:
If the risk exceeds particular thresholds, compensatory actions would be necessary. The
establishment of these thresholds can be based upon qualitative considerations: duration of out-
of-service conditions, type and frequency of initiating events addressed by the out-of-service
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SSC, number of remaining success paths available to mitigate these initiating events ... It can
also be based upon quantitative considerations, using CDF and/or LERF criteria. The product of
the incremental CDF (or LERF) and duration gives a probability (ICDP: incremental core
damage probability; ILERP: incremental large early release probability). Table 5-2, from
NUMARC 93-01, presents performance acceptance thresholds in terms of ICDP and ILERP: if
the incremental probability is low (bottom row), no additional action is required; if it is
intermediate (middle row), risk management actions shall be taken; and high incremental
probabilities (top row) are not allowed in normal conditions.
ICDP Requirement ILERP
> 10_ - Configuration should not normally be entered voluntarily > 106
10-6 - 10.5 - Assess non quantifiable factors 10-10-6
- Establish risk management actions
< 10, - Normal work controls < 10-
Table 5-2: Action thresholds [34]
Alternatively, similar tables can be developed using ICDF (Incremental CDF) and ILERF
(Incremental LERF) in lieu of ICDP and ILERP.
2) Risk management actions:
In NUMARC 93-01, four types of risk management actions are considered.
1. Actions to provide increased risk awareness and control:
- Discuss planned maintenance activities with operating shift and obtain operator
awareness and approval of planned evolution
- Conduct pre-job briefing of maintenance personnel, emphasizing risk aspects
- Request the system engineer to be present for the maintenance activity,
2. Actions to reduce duration of maintenance activity:
- Pre-stage parts and materials
- Preparation, training of the personnel
- Establish contingency plan to restore out-of-service equipment quickly if needed,
3. Actions to minimize magnitude of risk increase:
- Minimize other work in areas that could affect initiators to decrease the frequency of
initiating events mitigated by the out-of-service SSC
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- Minimize other work in areas that could affect redundant systems associated with the out-
of-service SSC
- Establish alternate success paths for performance of the safety function of the out-of-
service SSC,
4. A threshold should be establish such that risk significant configurations are not entered
voluntarily.
5.2.2.5. Use of an Expert Panel
In order to implement different aspects of the Maintenance Rule, licensees typically use
an Expert Panel made up of utility employees who have sufficient experience with the plant PRA
and with operations and maintenance. The NRC recommends that the Expert Panel be used in
particular for the following applications ([32],[35]):
- Members of the Expert Panel should use their expertise in maintenance and operation in
conjunction with PRA insights (the importance measures mentioned in 5.2.2.1) to
establish the final list of risk significant SSCs. This process enables one to compensate
for particular limitations of PRA and risk importance measures, and it makes the process
risk-informed rather than risk-based.
- The Expert Panel may be used to provide assistance in defining which SSCs should have
goal established and be treated under §(a)(1), and when SSCs should be moved from
§(a)(2) to §(a)(1) and vice versa.
- It may also be used to define adequate corrective actions, to define and review the
effectiveness of the periodic evaluations (§(a)(3)) and to provide inputs to the
configuration risk management program (§(a)(4)).
5.3. Maintenance at EDF
5.3.1. Maintenance regulation
5.3.1.1. Main Regulatory Documents
In France, there is no regulatory document similar to the US Maintenance Rule.
Maintenance activities and periodic tests are regulated by the General Operating Rules (RGEs,
rbgles gdnerales d'exploitation), which supplement the preliminary safety report and translate
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initial hypotheses and safety study results into operating rules. Among the 11 chapters of the
RGEs, the following are of particular interest:
- Chapter III of the RGEs describes the technical specifications (STEs). Details about the
STEs are given in Section 6.2.2.
- Chapter IX defines maintenance and testing programs for safety related systems.
- Chapter X defines testing programs regarding core physical tests.
These three RGE chapters need to be formally approved by the safety authority.
In order to improve the safety level and industrial performance, EDF regularly modifies
materials and STEs. These modifications may be a consequence of periodic safety reviews or
experience feedback. Modifications of the STEs may be permanent, and would then need a
thorough review from the ASN. In some circumstances, EDF may temporarily need to go beyond
some limits fixed by the STEs. In such cases, EDF must declare a temporary modification of the
STEs to the ASN. The ASN will then review this modification, and may give its agreement. In
some cases, the ASN may require additional compensatory measures if it deems that the
measures proposed by EDF are not sufficient to cope with the consequences of the modification.
5.3.1.2. Operational documents
In addition to the RGEs, EDF uses more operational maintenance documents that are first
written at a centralized engineering division level (e.g. for each reactor design), and these
documents are then used at a plant level to write plant-specific operational documents taking into
account the specificities of each individual plant. Some of these maintenance documents need
ASN's approval before being used on site, while some others do not need to be formally
approved as long as they respect the RGEs. More specific details about these operational
documents are provided with the EDG maintenance case study (Chapter 9).
5.3.1.3. EDF general maintenance policy
In the middle of the 1990s, EDF embarked on a policy of maintenance volume reduction.
This is due to several factors (Ref. [37]):
- The duration of refueling outages had significantly increased in the late 1980s (from 7
weeks in 1986 to 12 weeks in 1991 [37]) due to additional regulatory requirements.
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- Before the 1990s, the production capacity was higher than the electricity demand, which
is no longer the case. Then, it became a necessity to reduce the outage durations to
improve the plant availability and meet the demand.
- In terms of costs, operational failures have become more expensive by a factor 3.
- In the 2000s, electricity markets were liberalized; therefore EDF needs to increase its
competitiveness.
EDF's objective is to increase its competitiveness while maintaining or improving the
safety level of its plants. Maintenance activities have been focused upon systems most
significant to safety, radiation protection or operation effectiveness. EDF has developed a
maintenance methodology called "Reliability Centered Maintenance" (OMF, Optimisation de la
maintenance par la fiabilitd), based upon probabilistic and deterministic considerations. Details
about this method are provided in Section 5.3.2. More recently, EDF has been implementing a
new maintenance strategy called AP913 (see Section 5.3.3).
EDF also takes advantage of the high level of standardization of its fleet of nuclear
reactors. Beyond the possibility to standardize to some extent maintenance programs and
doctrines, EDF has developed a concept of maintenance based upon "control systems" known as
"sample-based maintenance" or "pilot equipment maintenance". This concept is based upon the
creation of groups of similar systems or components similarly used in all plants of the fleet. EDF
will then closely monitor some of the systems or components in each group, and if no fault has
been detected, it reduces the need to control each of these systems or components individually.
5.3.2. Reliability Centered Maintenance
5.3.2.1. Background
Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) is a generic term used to describe a systematic
approach to the evaluation, design and development of cost effective maintenance programs.
This concept originated in the civil aviation sector in the late 1960s, when wide-body jets were
being introduced into service. It was then implemented in different sectors, in particular the
nuclear industry in the 1980s - 1990s. This process focuses on the functionality of equipment and
the critical failure mechanisms that could lead to a loss of functionality. When used effectively,
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this methodology can result in the elimination of unnecessary maintenance tasks as well as the
identification and introduction of measures to address deficiencies in maintenance programs. It
can also result in higher reliability at reduced costs.
Traditional maintenance programs were in the past often time-based, while RCM is often
condition-based, with maintenance intervals being based upon equipment criticality and
performance data. This methodology was adapted to the nuclear sector by EPRI in 1984, partly
motivated by the fact that preventive maintenance programs were often based upon vendor's
overly conservative recommendations and that in some cases, too little preventive maintenance
was performed on some components that had not been identified as critical, leading to repetitive
failures that increased costs and reduced plant availability. The RCM methodology was then
adapted and developed by different operating companies around the world, leading to
maintenance programs that may all be labeled "RCM" but that may actually differ significantly.
PRA can be useful for several of the typical steps of an RCM methodology, in particular
for the following activities:
- System selection, based upon their safety significance (e.g. using importance measures
such as RAW, RRW, CDF contribution, Fussel-Vesely, ... )
- Identification of component failure modes, evaluation of failure probabilities
- Determination of component criticality
- Assessment of the impact of proposed changes to the plant safety level.
5.3.2.2. Reliability Centered Maintenance at EDF
Methodology
In 1990, an RCM project was initiated at EDF, called OMF (Optimisation de la
Maintenance par la fiabilit6). This methodology was first implemented on a pilot system, and in
1991 it was decided to extend the OMF methodology to many other elementary systems. The
approach was based upon four major steps:
1) Identification of critical components: this identification was based upon the analysis of
the consequences of the different failure modes for each component. PRA results were
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used to perform this analysis and to rank components and their different failure modes in
terms of their contribution to the plant risk.
2) Critical component failure analysis: this second step consisted in a further analysis of
failure modes and failure causes for components identified as critical. This analysis was
performed with tools such as functional analysis, FMECA (Failure Modes Effects and
Criticality Analysis), fault trees.
3) Identification of preventive maintenance tasks: the goal was to identify maintenance
tasks in order to avoid the failures identified in the previous step.
4) Experience feedback analysis: the identification of significant failure modes and
adequate preventive maintenance tasks requires deep understanding and knowledge of the
different degradation mechanisms leading to failures, and experience feedback is
essential to perform this analysis. In each EDF plant, data are collected, then centralized
and analyzed by experts to evaluate and update reliability parameters.
Concerning this last step, EDF has a strong advantage since EDF plants are very
standardized, especially reactors in the same series (900 MWe, 1300 MWe, 1450 MWe).
Therefore, the volume of experience feedback data is larger and more valuable than in other
companies, and the resulting analysis gains in precision. In addition, this standardization enabled
one to perform a single OMF study for all plants within the same series, hence with reduced
analytic costs.
Often, the OMF has led to increased in-service surveillance and functional testing while
reducing the frequency of the most intrusive (and costly) maintenance tasks, sometimes even
abandoning them. Also, the list of critical components identified in the OMF process was often
shorter than the one in previous preventive maintenance programs (Ref. [40]).
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Current status
From 1992 to 1995, EDF progressively applied the OMF method to develop optimized
maintenance programs for 50 elementary systems classified as "high stake systems" in the 900
MWe and 1300 MWe series. From 1995, the implementation of these maintenance programs has
been compulsory for all EDF plants. Due to the absence of corporate coordination, reliability-
centered preventive maintenance programs were applied by the plants in a heterogeneous way
[39]. Therefore, a so-called "Second Generation RCM method" was developed in 2003, which
was meant to be simplified.
However, due in particular to difficulties in implementing the OMF on-sites and to low
capacity factors, it was decided in 2007 to switch to a new maintenance strategy called AP913,
developed by INPO, which is currently being implemented. Elements on this new methodology
are given in Section 5.3.3.
Effects of the OMF
Many beneficial changes have been attributed to the use of RCM [39] at EDF:
- Maintenance has been aligned with the objectives of the production process
- Maintenance programs have been justified on a formal basis
- Experience feedback has been incorporated with better consistency
- Improvement of the culture of economic performance in the maintenance personnel
- Non-intrusive maintenance has been enhanced.
In addition to these effects, there have been economic gains directly attributable to the
implementation of the RCM method. Typically, these gains were associated with reductions in
the frequency of some maintenance tasks, sometimes even the elimination of particular
maintenance activities, the replacement of systematic maintenance by inspections, or the use of
condition-based and pilot equipment maintenance.
5.3.3. New maintenance strategy: AP913
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Background
Due to difficulties in implementing the OMF on-site and to low capacity factors
(compared to other countries such as the US, Finland, Switzerland...), it was decided in 2007 to
implement a new maintenance strategy, AP913, an equipment reliability process that had been
developed by US licensees within INPO in 2001. This implementation has several objectives
([41], [42]):
- To improve the safety level of nuclear power plants, by improving the availability of
safety-related systems
- To improve the capacity factor of EDF plants
- To reduce the amount of corrective maintenance
- To standardize the monitoring of systems reliability through the use of a centralized
information system
- And, indirectly, to hire new, qualified workers in order to renew the skills of the staff.
AP913 has been implemented by many US licensees. At Exelon, it resulted in a significant
diminution of the forced loss rate (from 2.3% in 2003 to 1.3% in 2007) and a drastic reduction in
the amount of corrective maintenance (-80% at LaSalle between 2003 and 2007) [42]. However,
it is noted in ref. [43] that these benefits could also be associated to some extent with the
implementation of the Maintenance Rule, especially §(a)(1) to §(a)(3) of this Rule (see Section
5.2). The Maintenance Rule strongly influenced the development of AP913, which somewhat
generalized the treatment of the SSCs under the scope of the Rule to SSCs that are important for
plant availability and operation. While EDF is following the example of US utilities in
implementing AP913, all the aspects of the Maintenance Rule (§(a)(1) to §(a)(3)) are not
necessarily part of this implementation (Ref. [43]).
Basic overview
The AP913 process consists of six basic processes, summarized on Figure 5-1. The first
basic process, "scoping and identification of critical components", results in the following
classification of components:
- Critical components: their failure can have an effect on plant safety, availability or
operation
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- Significant components: their failure can have an effect on radiation protection, the
environment, the redundancy of some equipment, or can induce small losses of
production
- Economic components: those for which preventive maintenance makes sense from an
economic standpoint
- Run-to-failure components.
Life Ccle Management
Figure 5-1 AP913 - Basic processes (from [43])
For each component, this classification is based upon the answers to a pre-established list of
questions, such as:
- Could the failure of this component cause a reactor scram?
- Could it cause the actuation of certain safeguard systems?
- Could it generate an event associated with an AOT smaller or equal to 72 brs?
No probabilistic consideration is involved in this process. Also, based upon a list of questions,
each component is further classified as:
- High/low duty cycle
- Severe/mild service condition.
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Based upon this classification, maintenance templates are developed for each component, using
French and US practices. These maintenance templates will then regularly evolve, taking into
account experience feedback. This classification will also be used to help prioritize corrective
maintenance.
Surveillance of SSCs
The surveillance of SSCs will be accomplished through the use of an integrated,
centralized information system provided by IKS* (Insert Key Solutions). There are two levels of
surveillance, one at the plant level and one at the national level. Based upon the use of color-
coded performance indicators, surveillance will be made at the component, system and then
reactor level. These results will then be integrated, locally and nationally, and maintenance
programs may then be modified accordingly.
Impact and differences with the OMF
The implementation of the methodology AP913 is expected to have significant
consequences, even though most maintenance programs should not be dramatically modified
(current programs will be used to develop new ones), in particular safety-related systems that
were already closely monitored [26]. Among the major evolutions brought by this new
maintenance strategy ([26], [42]):
- More components (by a factor of 2 to 3) will be subject to maintenance.
- The amount of preventive maintenance will increase, while corrective maintenance
should decrease (hence resulting in higher capacity factors). The duration of refueling
outages is not expected to change.
- New workers will be hired, and the reliance on sub-contractors is expected to decrease.
- Maintenance programs should evolve more quickly, taking into account experience
feedback at the local, national, but also international levels, thanks to the use of the
integrated information system.
In contrast to the OMF, AP913 brings several novelties, in particular ([42],[26]):
- A significant increase in preventive maintenance
- More focus will be placed upon some non-safety related systems, such as those that have
potentially high economic effects (e.g. the turbine, the alternator ... )
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- AP913 is expected to be more pragmatic and easier to understand and use for those that
actually perform maintenance or analyze maintenance results, in particular thanks to the
IKS* software and the use of color-coded performance indicators.
While PRA insights were often used to help identify critical components within the OMF
methodology, it is no longer the case with the implementation of AP913 at EDF (while it is
usually the case in the US for SSCs under the scope of the Maintenance Rule).
5.4. Summary
While similar overall maintenance strategies may be used by French and US nuclear
facilities (such as the methodology AP913, which is already used by many US companies and is
being implemented at EDF), there are however two significant differences regarding general
maintenance regulation and practices:
- The Maintenance Rule: there is no equivalent of this rule in the French system, neither in
the regulations nor in EDF practices. It concerns paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of the Rule
(establishment of performance criteria, at SSC or plant level), as well as paragraph (a)(4)
(risk assessment and requirements for risk management actions when planning and
performing maintenance activities). While there appears to be no equivalent of §(a)(1)
and §(a)(2) within the French system, we will see that there is however a sort of
deterministic counterpart of §(a)(4) (see "Simultaneity Rules", in Section 6.2.2).
- The use of PRA in maintenance-related matters: while PRA is commonly used by US
licensees, in particular to comply with some requirements of the Maintenance Rule (risk
significance determination process, maintenance planning, configuration risk
management), this is not the case in the French system. PRA insights were previously
used within the OMF methodology to assess the criticality of components, but this is no
longer the case with the AP913 strategy.
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Chapter 6
Online Maintenance - Regulation and
practice
6.1. Online maintenance in the United States
6.1.1. Introduction -
Online maintenance is defined by EPRI in [44] as maintenance that is performed while
the main electric generator is connected to the grid. Online maintenance has always been used
for some non-safety significant SSCs, but its use has been extended in the US to particular
safety-significant SSCs, as well as SSCs that are important for plant availability. Nowadays,
online maintenance is more used in the US than in many other countries [44]. The use of online
maintenance has been increased in US nuclear facilities for operational reasons, but also for
safety reasons. In particular, much attention was paid to the issue of online maintenance in the
US after the 55-minute station blackout that occurred at the Vogtle nuclear power plant in 1990
while the reactor was in shutdown and one EDG was undergoing maintenance. While formerly
shutdown risk had not been subject to much concern, it was then reconsidered, and performing
online maintenance (not only for EDGs) appeared to make sense from a safety and operational
point of view.
The benefits of online maintenance have been widely recognized (see ref. [44] (EPRI),
[28] (IAEA), for example): improved equipment reliability, shorter and simpler refueling
outages, better work planning, reduced stress on workers, longer fuel cycles ...
The use of online maintenance increased in the 1990s, after the introduction of mature
risk-informed approaches that enabled licensees to apply online maintenance in a more
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consistent way, taking into account the safety effect of multiple outages. But many US nuclear
facilities began applying online maintenance more systematically after the enforcement of the
Maintenance Rule [44], which was one of the first risk-informed, performance-based regulations
in the US. Further, the favorable operational and safety experience of US plants has been
consistent with expectations for such beneficial results.
6.1.2. Regulatory aspects
Maintenance and testing activities in US nuclear power plants are governed by the plant
technical specifications (see Section 6.1.3 for details), which are part of the operating license,
and by the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) and related documents ([32], [33]), presented in
Section 5.2. Licensees must comply with the AOTs and STIs prescribed by the Tech Specs and
with the additional required actions that may be associated with particular Tech Specs action
statements (or LCOs, Limiting Conditions for Operation).
Beyond that, in general, licensees are allowed to perform online maintenance and tests
after having performed an assessment of the risk generated by the proposed maintenance
configurations, providing that they manage the potential risk increase that may result from these
activities (§(a)(4) of the Maintenance Rule), before and during the maintenance activities. This
assessment is reviewed by resident NRC inspectors on a routine sampling basis, under the ROP,
and in more depth by region-based inspectors on a periodic basis.
It should be noted that some periodic tests are required by the Tech Specs to be
performed during plant shutdown. Also, licensees may apply for temporary relief from technical
specifications that currently prohibit some maintenance activities during at-power operation.
Additionally, some aspects linked to the Reactor Oversight Process may limit particular
online maintenance activities. Within the ROP, the NRC uses performance indicators to assess
the safety level of US plants. Among these performance indicators, the MSPI (Mitigating System
Performance Index) monitors the readiness of some important safety systems (emergency AC
power systems, high pressure injection systems, heat removal systems, cooling water systems) to
perform their safety functions in response to abnormal events. The principle of the MSPI, which
consists in fact of several indicators (one for each type of monitored system), is to evaluate the
CDF increase associated with each type of systems, and then, based upon particular thresholds, a
95
color is assigned (green, white, yellow, red). A degradation of the MSPI value may result in an
increased regulatory oversight. As a result, licensees must to limit the unavailability of these
safety systems, in particular when performing online maintenance on these systems.
6.1.3. Technical Specifications
6.1.3.1. Background
10 CFR 50.36 requires that each operating license contain technical specifications that are
derived from the analyses and evaluations included in the safety analysis report, describing
operational conditions required to provide adequate protection to public health and safety.
Technical Specifications cannot be changed by licensees without NRC's approval.
As part of its regulatory standardization effort, the NRC issued in 1992 vendor-specific
"improved Standard Technical Specifications" (STS) for each of the four nuclear reactor
vendors. These improved STS were the result of extensive technical discussions among the
NRC, owner groups, vendors and NUMARC (now NEI). While the use of these STS is not
mandatory, the NRC strongly encourages licensees to update their TS (with NRC's approval still
required) to be consistent with the vendor-specific STS (Ref. [46]). Their implementation is
thought to improve the safety of nuclear power plants as well as the efficiency and the
consistency of NRC action.
Since 1992, numerous changes have been made to the improved STS through cooperation
between the NRC and the industry, represented by the owner groups and the NEI TSTF
(Technical Specifications Task Force). Since 1993, a majority of US plants have converted their
TS to Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) based upon the applicable vendor-specific STS
[47], although some plants still use early custom technical specifications. In addition, over the
past several years, most plants have requested TS changes using risk-informed approaches based
upon Regulatory Guides 1.174 and 1.177 (nearly 100 such requests have been approved in the
past ten years [48]), and these changes are generally not reflected in the corresponding STS.
The Tech Specs consist of:
- LCOs, such as a system unavailability, associated with specific required actions and a
completion time (AOT)
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- Surveillance requirements (SRs) (including periodic tests), associated with a certain
frequency (or STI).
6.1.3.2. Voluntary entry into an LCO
Performing online preventive maintenance often requires intentionally entering a TS
event for the affected SSC. But, contrary to the French case (see below), there is no particular
requirement in the technical specifications regarding the voluntary entry into an LCO, and an
intentional entry into an LCO is not a violation of the Tech Specs (except in particular cases
when it is associated with a change of reactor operational mode, see Section 7.2.2) [49].
According to the NRC (ref. [50]), acceptable reasons for doing so include: performance of
surveillances (including periodic tests, except in particular cases), preventive maintenance, or
investigation of operational problems. Also, intentional entry into a TS event that would result in
redundant systems being simultaneously inoperable should be avoided [50].
There are several reasons for which the NRC allows such behaviors, in particular (ref. [49]):
- The time needed to perform most surveillances is usually a small fraction of the AOT of
the corresponding SSC
- The benefit to safety (higher reliability, verification of the operability) of the surveillance
tasks is considered to more than compensate for the risk increment associated with the
unavailability of the SSC.
Additionally, the NRC makes the following recommendations [49]:
- The licensee should not abuse the allowance to perform online maintenance by repeatedly
entering and exiting TS events
- The licensee should have sufficient confidence in the operability of the SSC that is
redundant to the out-of-service one
- When performing online maintenance, the licensee should avoid performing other
maintenance activities that may increase the likelihood of a transient.
As always, when taking an SSC out of service, the licensee must:
- Comply with the corresponding TS required actions and AOT (otherwise, the licensee
may have to shut the reactor down)
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- Comply with the requirements of the Maintenance Rule
In practice, compliance with §(a)(4) of the Maintenance Rule ensures that the risk.
associated with the planned maintenance configuration is assessed and managed, while the TS
usually cover single outages only or a very limited set of combined outages (e.g. two redundant
SSCs, an SSC and a support SSC, ... ). However, it does not exempt the licensee from complying
with the Tech Specs requirements. It can result in conflicts between the results of the
Maintenance Rule risk assessment and the requirements of the Tech Specs. For example, the risk
assessment may show that taking an SSC out of service for a duration longer than the AOT
prescribed in the TS would be acceptable. In such cases, the licensee must either comply with the
AOT provided in the Tech Specs or ask the NRC for a TS temporary exemption (via a Notice of
Enforcement Discretion, NOED), which can be resource consuming for both the licensee and the
NRC. This issue is being addressed through the development and the implementation of the risk-
informed technical specifications (see Chapter 7).
6.1.4. Online maintenance: practice and results
Practice
As is explained in the previous section, voluntary entry into TS LCOs for online
maintenance has been possible for decades. However, even if not prohibited, multiple
simultaneous LCOs were considered not to be recommended, and hence of limited potential for
online maintenance. With the advent of PRA and the promulgation of the Maintenance Rule, this
situation changed: the intrinsic weaknesses of the technical specifications, in particular regarding
multiple outages, could then be complemented by the risk assessment and management required
by §(a)(4) of the Maintenance Rule, using, in particular, probabilistic tools. Closely linked to the
enforcement of the Maintenance Rule is the use of software-based On-line Configuration Risk
Management Tool, or risk-monitor. In 1996 (end of the Maintenance Rule implementation
period), most plants were using or planning to use such tools [44].
To help licensees decide between online and offline ( = during outages) maintenance, and
to help them apply good online maintenance practices, guides have been developed, such as the
EPRI guide Guidance for developing and implementing an on-line maintenance strategy [45],
and forums and working groups were created so that licensees may share and discuss their
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practices, such as the Configuration Risk Management Forum and the Maintenance Rule Users
Group, created in the 1990s.
As shown in Table 6-1, about one half of components in an average US nuclear power
plant are maintained through preventive maintenance programs (for critical and important
components). In ref. [44], it is reported that all US licensees (that responded to the survey) apply
some sort of online maintenance, and that more than 80% apply online maintenance to some
safety-significant SSCs. As shown on Figure 6-1, overall, more than 70% of maintenance is
performed online. Expectedly, this figure also shows that online maintenance is more widely
applied to non-safety-significant SSCs (about 80% of them are maintained online), but nearly
half of safety-significant SSCs are subject to online maintenance in a typical US plant.
Component Type Percentage
Critical 22 %
Important 26 %
Run-to-failure 43 %
Not classified 9 %
Safety
significant
Non-safety
significant
All
p
- ~ -
- ~ -
0 O,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1
Fraction of Maintenance Conducted Online
Table 6-1: Component classification [44] Figure 6-1: Use of online maintenance [44]
Results
While some were concerned that industry's efforts to improve plant performance
(including online maintenance) could compromise plant safety, industry data have proven
otherwise, showing that operational performance and plant safety are not mutually exclusive:
- Figure 6-2 shows a significant reduction in refueling outage durations
- Between the late 1980s and today, most US plants extended the duration of their
refueling cycle from 12 months to 18 or 24 months [44]
- Figure 6-4 shows a significant increase in the average capacity factor
- And, in the same time, the automatic scram rate has been reduced by a factor of five
(Figure 6-3) and the US average CDF has decreased (Figure 6-4), reflecting plant safety
improvement.
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Of course, online maintenance is not the only cause of these improvements, but it is
recognized as a major element, in particular regarding the reduction of refueling outage durations
[44]. There are also other interesting effects that may be more difficult to quantify:
- Improvement of the safety culture, the staff being more aware of the risk importance of
SSCs during at-power operations
- Less stress on workers when performing online maintenance, because of better
preparation and exposure to fewer distractions than during refueling outages
- As a result, smaller risk of human errors.
6.2. Online maintenance in France
6.2.1. Regulatory aspects
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Figure 6-3: US automatic scram rate [44]
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In France, as in the United States, there is no specific regulation for preventive
maintenance and testing of safety-related systems during operation: during outage or during
operation, the licensee must comply with the technical specifications (STEs). No risk assessment
is required before and during maintenance activities (even when an unexpected event occurs),
contrary to the US case (Maintenance Rule §(a)(4)). However, there are significant differences in
the treatment of voluntary entry into Technical Specifications and multiple outages, so that the
STEs are assumed to be sufficiently conservative to avoid any configuration that would be
unacceptable from a risk standpoint, hence no additional requirement. All these aspects are
presented in the following section.
6.2.2. Technical Specifications (STEs)
6.2.2.1. Introduction
The Technical Specifications (STEs) constitute the third chapter of the General Operating
Rules (RGEs). The STEs used on site are made up of three sections: (1) The standard document,
which is valid for all reactors of the same series; (2) Site-specific complements to the standard
document; and (3) generic complements to the standard document. Here, we shall focus on the
standard document of the 1300 MWe series [51].
The RGEs are a direct extension of the Safety Report: they define specific rules that have
to be respected in order to stay in the framework of the safety assessment presented in the Safety
Report. Within the RGEs, the STEs have 3 main roles:
1) Establish boundaries for normal operating conditions in order to remain within the design
limits of the systems
2) Define the essential safety functions that are necessary to maintain the integrity of the
different barriers and to ensure the operability of the safety systems
3) Define required actions if these conditions are no longer met.
The standard document of the STEs has been approved by the Safety Authority and
cannot be modified without its prior approval.
The STEs are organized differently from US Technical Specifications. First, they contain
only TS events, with the associated allowed outage times (referred to as Shutdown Initiation
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Times) and potential additional requirements. Surveillance requirements (periodic tests) are not
treated in the STEs. Then, while US Technical Specifications are organized by systems or
functions, French STEs are first organized by reactor states, then by systems or functions. An
elementary definition of the different reactor modes is given in Table 6-2 (see [51] for more
details).
Reactor Mode Original Simplified Description
Abbreviation
At-Power Operation RP The reactor is critical or becoming critical
Normal Shutdown with Heat Primary pressure between 27 and 155 bars, primary
AN/GV
Removal by Steam Generators coolant mean temp. between 160 and 297.2 *C
Normal Shutdown with Heat
Primary pressure between 5 and 31 bars, primary
Removal by RHR (Residual AN/RRA
temperature between 10 and 180 *C
Heat Removal) System
Primary pressure 5 5 bars, primary temperature
Shutdown for Maintenance API
between 10 and 60 *C, heat removal by RHR system
Shutdown for Refueling APR Heat removal by RHR system
Completely Unloaded Core RCD
Table 6-2: Reactor Modes
Events treated in the technical specifications are organized into two categories, group 1
and group 2 events, which are treated differently throughout the STEs. In order to determine
whether an event should be labeled as group 1 or group 2 event, a probabilistic methodology has
been developed, but it is still at an R&D stage [26]. Therefore, this process is still based upon a
deterministic approach.
6.2.2.2. Group 1 Events
Definition
Group 1 events are TS events that involve important design hypotheses, shutdown
systems and safety systems. Within this group, we find events that cause an increase in the risk
of barrier deterioration (cladding, primary circuit, containment) and that can have unacceptable
radiological consequences.
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Required Actions
Generally, a group 1 event is associated with a Shutdown Initiation Time, which is the
time by which:
- Repair has been performed, and the event has disappeared, or
- Reactor shutdown has been initiated, if required by the STE, or
- Prescribed palliative measures are effective, when no shutdown is required
If the licensee establishes that repair cannot be performed before the end of the Shutdown
Initiation Time, then he must initiate the reactor shutdown as soon as possible. Once reactor
shutdown has been initiated, transitions from one mode to another have to be done within
maximum time durations that are prescribed in the STEs.
Planned events
1) For preventive maintenance and common operations: in general, the licensee is not
allowed to enter a group 1 event voluntarily, unless when a "Borderline Condition" ("Condition
Limite") has been granted, which provides some flexibility for performing preventive
maintenance or common operating actions. Such Borderline Conditions are created and granted
when a strong need for more flexibility regarding a specific TS event is expressed by the
licensee. In particular, when no such need is expressed, no Borderline Condition is created. Even
though the terms are subject to interpretation, it is mentioned in the STEs (ref. [51], section
"Definitions") that these Borderline Conditions should be used only for "operational
imperatives". Implicitly, this means that, originally, they are not meant to be used for online
maintenance tasks when there is no technical "imperative" to carry out these tasks online. These
Borderline Conditions have usually a probabilistic justification [24]. It should also be noted that
even when a group 1 event is voluntarily entered, Simultaneity Rules (see below) are applicable.
2) For periodic tests: the licensee is allowed to enter group 1 events in order to perform a
periodic test defined in the RGE only when these group 1 events have been explicitly identified
in the associated Periodic Test Rules (Rbgle d'Essais), and Simultaneity Rules are still
applicable. However, in the philosophy of the RGEs, it seems that such generic exemptions are
defined when there is a technical need to generate a group 1 event to perform the considered
periodic test, and not for operational convenience (ref. [87]).
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In any of these two cases, the licensee is not allowed to voluntarily enter a group 1 event if:
- A group 1 event is already occurring
- The reactor is not in a stable state regarding neutronic and thermal-hydraulic parameters
- An incident or accident procedure is ongoing.
Simultaneity Rules
When several TS events affecting different elementary systems are simultaneously
occurring, some rules have to be respected, regardless of the planned/unplanned aspect of these
events. These Simultaneity Rules are defined separately for group 1 and group 2 events.
1) Simultaneous group 1 events in modes RP, AN/GV, AN/RRA
If several group 1 events occur simultaneously, the reactor has to be shut down to the
mode corresponding to the lowest mode prescribed for these group 1 events (see Table 6-2 for
the definition and the ranking of the different reactor modes). For example, if the reactor is in
mode RP (at-power operation) and two group 1 events occur simultaneously, one being
associated with a shutdown mode AN/GV, the other with a shutdown mode AN/RRA, then the
reactor has to be shut down to the mode Min{AN/GV, AN/RRA}, i.e. AN/RRA, according to
Table 6-2.
Then, the Shutdown Initiation Time shall be as indicated in the third row of Table 6-3.
Number of group1 events >2 2
simultaneously occurring__ __
Shortest Shutdown Initiation Tim / 5 8 hrs 18 hrs , 24 hrs] >24 hrs
prescribed for these individualevents
Shutdown Initiation Time 1 hr 1 hr 8 hrs 24 hrs
Table 6-3: Shutdown Initiation Time for multiple group 1 events
2) Simultaneous group 1 events in modes API, APR, RCD
The simultaneous occurrence of several group 1 events shall not last longer than 24
hours, and a safety analysis shall be performed to determine the best course of actions.
6.2.2.3. Group 2 Events
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Definition
Group 2 events are events that could impair control, diagnostic capability, or the
effectiveness of actions undertaken in case of an anomaly.
Required Actions
In general, group 2 events are associated with a Repair Completion Time and, in some
cases, compensatory measures.
Planned events
The licensee is allowed to enter group 2 events voluntarily for preventive maintenance,
for periodic tests or common operations as long as the required actions are performed within the
prescribed Repair Completion Times and Simultaneity Rules are respected (see below). Also, the
licensee is not allowed to take two redundant systems out of service voluntarily.
Simultaneity Rules
1) Simultaneous group 2 events in mode RP
If five group 2 events affecting different elementary systems are simultaneously
occurring, shutdown to AN/GV mode must be initiated within 24 hours. If there are more than
five group 2 events, reactor shutdown must be initiated within 1 hour.
2) Simultaneous group 2 events in modes AN/GV, AN/RRA, API, APR, RCD
The simultaneous occurrence of five group 2 events affecting different elementary
systems shall not last longer than 24 hours, and no more than 1 hour for more than five group 2
events.
6.2.2.4. Transition between reactor modes
Except in cases when a reactor shutdown is explicitly required by the STEs, some simple
rules have to be respected when the licensee wishes to go from one reactor mode to another:
1) The licensee is not allowed to make the reactor critical if a group 1 event is currently
occurring or if more than four group 2 events affecting different elementary systems are
currently occurring.
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2) The licensee is not allowed to go to another reactor mode if it would generate (in the final
mode or in an intermediary one) a group 1 event or more than four group 2 events
affecting different elementary systems.
6.2.3. Practice and barriers
In France, while online maintenance is certainly applied for non-safety-significant
systems, this is rarely the case for safety-significant SSCs. It has been reported to us in
interviews that online maintenance is not in the culture of the operator, and that, on the whole,
EDF's management and the safety authority are currently satisfied with the quality of
maintenance being performed during refueling outages. In particular, as long as the operator
complies with the STEs and the Simultaneity Rules, the configuration risk is considered to be
sufficiently managed, both within EDF and the safety authority. The need to further assess the
safety level, for example by performing a risk assessment as that required in the United States by
the Maintenance Rule, is not widely felt. It is however true that French STEs are much more
restrictive than US Tech Specs regarding the issues of voluntary entry into Tech Specs and
multiple outages, through the use of prescriptive, systematic Simultaneity Rules. Hence a smaller
need for such risk assessment exists. Nevertheless, a probabilistic risk analysis of planned
maintenance configurations may enable the operator to assess the conservatism of these STEs,
and, in some cases, to reveal possible weaknesses.
The consequence of current French STEs is that online maintenance is usually not
allowed for SSCs associated with a group 1 event (i.e. safety-significant SSCs), unless when a
"Borderline Condition" has been defined. But even in this case, such Borderline Conditions are
often very restrictive, as is shown subsequently with the example of EDGs, hence allowing little
freedom for online maintenance to occur. Also, as is mentioned in Section 6.2.2.2, Borderline
Conditions were originally meant to be used for "operational imperatives", and not in order to
permit on to perform online maintenance when there is no technical need to do this online
(although the terms of the instructions are subject to interpretation). As for periodic tests, group 1
events can be entered only when it is technically necessary and when they have been explicitly
identified in the associated Periodic Test Rules (a distinction is made between "preventive
maintenance", for which Borderline Conditions apply, and "periodic tests", covered by Periodic
Test Rules). There is therefore very little flexibility with current STEs to allow one to perform
106
online maintenance/testing. Even planning of maintenance during refueling outages is
complicated due to the Simultaneity Rules [26].
In addition to these regulatory barriers, there exist other barriers to the use of online
maintenance that have been reported [26]. Even though there may be an interest in online
maintenance, especially for economic reasons (shorter refueling outages, higher capacity factor,
better SSCs reliability...), there are other considerations that prevent going further in this
direction: the need to stabilize maintenance practices and to avoid frequent changes, the feeling
that questioning the STEs and the Simultaneity Rules is unacceptable, and the difficulty
regarding the acceptance of these practices by the ASN.
6.3. Summary
While US technical specifications provide much flexibility for intentionally entering Tech
Specs LCOs for online maintenance and periodic tests, French STEs are much more restrictive
regarding this aspect and multiple outages. In the United-States, the Maintenance Rule requires
licensees to assess further the risk associated with maintenance configurations, for planning but
also to evaluate the impact of unplanned events when performing maintenance activities. While
this requirement could have been seen as an additional burden for the operators, it actually
enabled them to assess better the effect of multiple outages (during operation and refueling
outages). This, coupled with the development of configuration risk management tools (risk-
monitors), has effectively supported the development of online maintenance practices for risk
significant SSCs (and it also supported maintenance planning and optimization during refueling
outages). The consequences of an extended use of online maintenance are difficult to quantify,
but studies have shown that such practices have efficiently contributed to operational as well as
safety improvements. In France, the rigidity of the STEs, obstacles to the use of a risk-monitor
(and more generally towards the use of risk information at the operational level) and cultural
barriers all constitute difficulties in the development of online maintenance practices for safety-
related systems.
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Chapter 7
U.S. Risk-Informed Technical
Specifications
7.1. Project description
7.1.1. Introduction
Traditionally, Technical Specifications have been addressing configuration control
through specifying AOTs and actions, typically leading to plant shutdown when these AOTs are
exceeded. Until very recently, US Technical Specifications were primarily based upon the
deterministic design basis accidents (even though some may have been justified using PRA
insights), with no consideration for the configuration-specific plant risk effect as a factor in the
action requirements. In addition, Technical Specifications usually do not cover configurations
involving multiple out-of-service equipment.
It has been recognized that plant configuration control can have significant temporary
effects upon risk profiles, hence the addition in 1999 of §(a)(4) of the Maintenance Rule that
requires a risk-informed plant configuration control. However, it has been recognized that in
many instances, the deterministic TS control requirements and the risk-informed Maintenance
Rule plant configuration control requirements are in conflict, while the licensee is required to
comply with both. For this reason (among others), risk-informed technical specifications have
been studied in order to address these incompatibilities and to provide a single, consistent
treatment for plant configuration control. As appears in the following sections, these risk-
informed initiatives are completely relevant to the issues of online maintenance regulation and
practice in the United States.
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It is important to make a clear distinction between these risk-informed TS Initiatives and
"classic" TS where AOTs or STIs may have some risk-informed justification, but remain fixed,
no matter what is the current plant configuration. Here, we are talking about risk-informed TS in
the sense that they are based upon the current, configuration-specific risk, and not just on a fixed
plant risk, as is the case when PRA is used in order to justify classic, fixed AOTs or STIs.
7.1.2. Benefits
Several benefits are expected from use of risk-informed technical specifications. A first
benefit would be improved plant capacity factors and safety through the avoidance of shutdowns
required by the technical specifications. Indeed, in many cases when a shutdown is required by
the technical specifications, it is not the safest course of action, as a change of the plant state
creates opportunities for transients and human errors. Such situations have been addressed
between the licensee and the NRC on a case-by-case basis, through the use of "Notices of
Enforcement Discretion" (NOEDs) that are resource consuming for both the NRC and the
licensee. This process involves the use of risk-informed methods for justifying the avoidance of
the shutdown required by the Tech Specs. Avoidance of this process through the use of risk-
informed technical specifications would eliminate the need for exceptions to requirements, with
the associated outcome uncertainty, and would provide enhanced regulatory consistency [52]. In
addition, risk-informed specifications would provide more flexibility for online maintenance,
hence further reduction in outage duration and better plant capacity factor. Currently, plants have
often optimized their online maintenance programs to the extent feasible given their current TS,
which has already enabled them to achieve shorter planned outage durations.
Initially, the risk-informed TS project was defined as eight separate initiatives intended to
improve existing TS requirements through the use of risk information. In the following sections
the most advanced and/or most ambitious of these risk-informed TS Initiatives are presented.
7.2. Risk-informed Initiatives 2 and 3
7.2.1. Risk-informed Initiative 2
7.2.1.1. Background
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Until 2001, Technical Specifications required that, when a surveillance requirement was
not performed within the prescribed surveillance test interval, the corresponding LCO (Limiting
Condition for Operation) should be entered, potentially leading to a plant shutdown requirement.
However, this course of action is not always the safest (Ref. [52]): indeed, there are cases where
a missed surveillance cannot be performed without an operational mode change whose risk effect
may actually be higher than that involved in deferring the surveillance, and shutting the reactor
down may also have a higher risk than deferring the performance of this surveillance. In
addition, in most cases the equipment remains capable of performing its function even though
some surveillance has been missed. The goal of the proposed change was to allow that a missed
surveillance may be rescheduled using the results of the configuration risk management program
associated with the Maintenance Rule ( §(a)(4) ).
7.2.1.2. Past regulation versus proposed regulation
In the STS (e.g. Ref. [50]), Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.0.2 specifies that a
surveillance is considered to have been performed in due time if it has been performed within
1.25 times the prescribed interval, i.e. the licensee is granted 25% time in addition to the
specified STI. After that, the surveillance is considered to have been missed.
Until 2001, when a surveillance requirement was missed, SR 3.0.3 allowed the licensee to
delay the requirement to declare the LCO not met for up to 24 hours, or up to the limit of the
specified STI, whichever was less (i.e. no more than 24 hours). After that, the LCO was
considered not to have been met, and required actions had to be taken, potentially leading to a
shutdown requirement if the surveillance was not successfully performed within the AOT of the
system.
Risk-informed Initiative 2 was proposed to modify SR 3.0.3 in order to grant more time
to perform a missed surveillance without having to declare the LCO not met. More specifically,
the Initiative 2 proposed to modify SR 3.0.3 so that it would allow the licensee to delay the
requirement to declare the LCO not met up to 24 hours or up to the limit of the specified STI,
whichever was 2reater, so that the licensee could have enough time to perform this missed
surveillance. In addition, modified SR 3.0.3 would require that the licensee performs a risk
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evaluation for any surveillance delayed by more than 24 hours, and that the risk effects be
managed (Ref. [64]).
7.2.1.3. Status of the Initiative
This initiative was approved be the NRC in 2001, and it has been incorporated into the
vendor-specific STS in the framework of their last revision. In addition, this STS modification
has been adopted by all except two plants [54].
7.2.1.4. Rationale of this risk-informed Initiative and implementation details
Assuming that a system or component is inoperable when a surveillance test has not been
performed is deemed to be overly conservative [64]. Indeed, the vast majority of surveillances do
in fact demonstrate that the systems or components are operable.
Because the AOT (which starts as soon as the LCO is entered) of some systems is too
short for performing the missed surveillance before shutdown is required, it was deemed that the
Technical Specifications should grant a sufficient time limit before having to enter the LCO such
that the licensee could have sufficient time to perform the missed surveillance. The previous time
limit before having to declare the LCO not met, min(24 hrs, limit of the specified STI), was often
too short to perform the missed surveillance, while the proposed (and accepted) time limit,
max(24 hrs, limit of the specified STI), was deemed acceptable [64]. Indeed, surveillances that
have an STI smaller than 24 hours typically involve straightforward monitoring activities, and
can therefore be performed within 24 hours when they have been missed, while other
surveillances are more significant and could not be performed within 24 hours.
In addition, the Tech Specs Task Force has surveyed that between 1996 and 2001, more
than 10 NOEDs regarding missed surveillances had to be issued by licensees and processed by
the NRC, which is considered to be an unnecessary use of NRC and industry resources (Ref.
[64]).
While max(24 hrs, limit of the specified STI) is provided to perform the missed
surveillance, the NRC expects (STS, vol. 2) that the missed surveillance will be performed "at
the first reasonable opportunity".
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The risk effect should be assessed and managed through the program already in place to
implement paragraph (a)(4) of the Maintenance Rule, using quantitative or qualitative methods,
or both, using a degree of depth and rigor commensurate with the safety significance of the
component for which a surveillance has been missed. Therefore, the implementation of this risk-
informed TS initiative uses existing programs and methods only, hence it imposes no additional
burden.
7.2.1.5. Situation in France
In France, the licensee has a ' 25 % margin on the Surveillance Test Intervals with
respect to the periodicity specified in the French regulatory documents regarding periodic tests.
However, if the periodic test has not been performed within this margin, then the surveillance
requirement is considered not met, the licensee must implement compensatory measures, the
associated component is considered to be inoperable and the corresponding technical
specification action statement is immediately entered (possibly leading to a plant shutdown).
Therefore, the situation in French nuclear power plants is even more stringent than in the two US
plants where Initiative 2 has not been implemented (these two plants are granted up to 24 hrs
before entering the TS event).
7.2.2. Risk-informed Initiative 3
7.2.2.1. Background
Until 2003, Technical Specifications specified that a plant could not enter a mode in
which an LCO would become applicable (with some exceptions). In particular, a plant was not
allowed to go to higher operational mode (e.g. full power mode) if a Tech Specs LCO was
ongoing, which means that if one system required to be operable in full power mode was not
operable when the reactor was still in shutdown state, the reactor was not allowed to start up,
while if it had already been in the full power mode, it would have been allowed to continue
operations without shutting the reactor down for the duration of the corresponding AOT. The
goal of risk-informed Initiative 3 was to resolve this discrepancy, by allowing entrance into the
higher operational mode while the system is inoperable, and then entering the LCO applicable to
the higher mode (i.e., the system has to be made operable before the end of its AOT, otherwise
the reactor must be shut down).
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7.2.2.2. Past regulation versus proposed regulation
Before 2003, in the STS, LCO 3.0.4 specified that it was not allowed to enter a mode
such that an LCO previously not met would become applicable (except in cases where the
associated actions permitted continued operation for an unlimited period of time in this new
mode). Risk-informed Initiative 3 proposed to modify LCO 3.0.4 in order to allow entry into a
mode where an LCO previously not met becomes applicable if one of the following conditions is
met (Ref. [50]):
a) When the associated actions that would have to be entered permit continued operation in
this new mode for an unlimited period of time (i.e., same condition as before 2003),
b) After performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components,
determination of the acceptability of entering this mode where the LCO becomes
applicable, and establishment of compensatory measures, if necessary,
c) In individual cases where it is specifically allowed.
The novelty brought by risk-informed Initiative 3 essentially concerns point b).
7.2.2.3. Status of the Initiative
This initiative was accepted by the NRC in 2003, and it has been incorporated into the
vendor-specific STS in the framework of their last revision. In addition, this STS modification
has been adopted by 85% of the utilities [66].
7.2.2.4. Rationales for this risk-informed Initiative and implementation details
As is mentioned in Section 7.2.2.1, there was earlier in LCO 3.0.4 some kind of
discrepancy: when an LCO became applicable when the reactor was already in a given mode, the
licensee was allowed to continue operation for the duration of the corresponding AOT, providing
him with some time to repair the problem without having to shut down the reactor immediately,
while if the component was already inoperable in another mode where it was not required, the
licensee was in general not allowed to enter the same mode as earlier where the component is
required to be operable.
This situation caused some trouble to licensees, and many systems or components were
given individual LCO 3.0.4 exceptions (almost all the LCOs with AOT greater than or equal to
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30 days, and many of the LCOs having AOTs greater than or equal to 7 days) (Ref. [65]). LCO
3.0.4 was thought to be overly conservative: indeed, unit startups were frequently delayed due to
the restrictions imposed by LCO 3.0.4. For example, a single maintenance activity that was
almost complete could cause significant delays and changes in the plans for returning the unit to
service, while allowing the unit to enter the mode where the LCO becomes applicable would
allow the maintenance task to be completed (without exceeding the applicable AOT, otherwise
the unit would have to be shut back down) while possibly reducing the likelihood of human error
caused by expediting the completion of the maintenance task before the scheduled startup.
Another rationale for this modification of LCO 3.0.4 is that when the unit goes up in
mode (i.e. in power), the complement of systems available to mitigate particular events is
increased. In most cases, going to higher operational mode from shutdown cooling results in
lower risk due to termination of shutdown cooling and the additional mitigation capability
provided by steam driven systems at higher power modes [65].
There are however cases where the risk may increase when the reactor goes to higher
modes. In such cases, there are notes in the technical specifications that specifically prohibit the
use of LCO 3.0.4.b when some system is inoperable. For Westinghouse PWRs, systems that
were determined to be "higher risk" systems to which LCO 3.0.4.b should not be applied are
presented in Table 7-1 (see Table 9-1 for a definition of the operational modes).
Mode(s) that cannot be entered under LCOSys3..4.
Diesel Generators 1,2,3,4
Auxiliary Feedwater 1 (and 2, 3, 4 in some cases)
ECCS High Head Safety Injection subsystem 4
Low Temperature Overpressure Protection 4
Table 7-1: Exceptions to LCO 3.0.4.b for Westinghouse PWRs (from [50])
Concerning the risk assessment required by LCO 3.0.4.b, the NRC states in the STS that
it may use quantitative or qualitative methods, or both, and that it will be conducted using the
program in place to implement §(a)(4) of the Maintenance Rule. Therefore, as in the case of
Initiative 2 presented above, the implementation of Initiative 3 does not constitute an additional
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burden to the licensee, and no guidance in addition to the existing set regarding the
implementation of the Maintenance Rule is required.
7.2.2.5. Situation in France
In the French Technical Specifications, it is specified that the licensee is not allowed to
make the reactor critical if:
- A group 1 event is currently ongoing, or
- More than four group 2 events affecting different elementary systems are ongoing.
Also, the licensee is not allowed to go to another reactor state (unless when required by the TS)
if it generates:
- A group 1 event, or
- More than four group 2 events affecting different elementary systems.
Therefore, no risk-assessment is involved in this process, but the distinction between
group 1 and group 2 events allows the licensee to go to higher mode even though it generates up
to four TS events affecting different elementary systems, as long as these events are in group 2.
This requirement is not as strict as the previous US regulation (before the implementation of
Initiative 3), but it does not provide the same flexibility as the risk-informed TS Initiative 3, and
it does not take into account the configuration-specific risk impact of the change in reactor mode.
7.3. Risk-informed Initiative 4b
7.3.1. Background
Current TS contain equipment-specific, fixed allowed outage times: when a system is
unavailable, required actions have to be completed prior to the expiration of the AOT specified
in the TS. While the Tech Specs may take into account systems that directly support the
considered system, usually they do not account for the combined risk impact of multiple out-of-
service SSCs. The Maintenance Rule configuration risk assessment (§(a)(4)) was added in order
to address this issue, but it does not exempt the operator from complying with TS requirements.
This situation may lead to inconsistencies with the Maintenance Rule requirements, and it may
sometimes require plant shutdown or other actions that are not the safest course of actions
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regarding the specific plant configuration [52]. The main objective of Initiative 4b is to modify
the TS in order to reflect an approach that would be more consistent with the approach of
Maintenance Rule §(a)(4). Currently, when there is a discrepancy between TS requirements and
actual risk significance, the licensee may contact the NRC and request an NOED in order to
delay the shutdown requirement, using the risk assessment to support this request.
This risk-informed TS Initiative is considered to be one of the most ambitious, if not the
most ambitious, while Initiatives 2 and 3 presented in the previous section are more
straightforward and easy to implement by the nuclear industry. Indeed, Initiative 4b calls for the
consideration of highly technical subjects such as the scope and the quality of the risk
assessments (there are currently few plants with full scope PRAs), and the definition of
appropriate risk management actions. However, it should be kept in mind that these topics have
already been addressed to some extent by the NRC and the industry, in particular through the
development and the implementation of the Maintenance Rule. But some matters may need
additional consideration.
In 2006, the NEI submitted a specific proposal and guidance on this subject: NEI 06-09
Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications
(RMTS) Guidelines, which was approved by the NRC in May 2007 [53]. A pilot implementation
project at the nuclear power plant South Texas Project (STP) was then approved in July 2007.
STP is not quite representative of US nuclear power plants (in particular, it has a three-train
safety system design), and its Technical Specifications are not based upon NRC Improved STS,
therefore a second pilot plant has been selected, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP), which
is more representative of the units of the rest of the industry. The US nuclear industry has
expressed great interest for this risk-informed Initiative, with more than 40 submittals identified
in 2010 as being planned [55]. The implementation of this Initiative is expected to have safety as
well as economic benefits.
7.3.2. Initiative description and industrial guidelines
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Based upon Reference [561, we present here some details about the implementation of the
RMTS (Risk Managed Technical Specifications) process as defined in the industrial guidance
NEI 06-09 (approved by the NRC in 2007).
7.3.2.1. Technical Basis
The RMTS program is intended to apply risk insights derived from the plant-specific
PRA to identify risk-informed AOTs (or CTs, Completion Times) and appropriate compensatory
risk management measures associated with inoperable SSCs, using in particular configuration
CDF and LERF results that are compared with acceptable risk thresholds. The Completion Time
that results from this analysis is called the Risk-Informed Completion Time (RICT), which can
then be used to extend the deterministic TS Completion Time (called Front-Stop Completion
Time, FSCT). A major characteristic of the RMTS process is that it is fully dynamic: if some
SSCs are repaired or if some new SSCs become inoperable during the process, a new RICT is
calculated, taking into account the cumulative risk increment that has already occurred during
this same chain of events.
In addition, an upper limit for the completion of TS actions has been defined, called the
Back-Stop Completion Time (BSCT). This BSCT has been chosen to be equal to 30 days. This
limit was chosen in order to provide a conservative limit to the time during which the plant can
remain in a configuration that is not consistent with the design basis, and the choice of 30 days
was based upon the fact that in current TS some FSCT are as long as 30 days.
The quantitative risk management threshold values that have been established for the
RMTS process are consistent with those defined in previous guidance, in particular Regulatory
Guide 1.174 and guidance on the Maintenance Rule (NUMARC 93-01). More specifically, these
thresholds are presented in Table 7-2. In this table, RMAT refers to the Risk Management Action
Time, defined below.
7.3.2.2. Details on the RMTS process
RMTS Calculations and Actions
Two different values are computed upon entry into an LCO:
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- The Risk Management Action Time (RMAT): this time is defined as the time from entry
into the LCO until the respective threshold value ICDP = 10-6 or ILERP = 10-7 is reached
(see Table 7-2). By this time, applicable Risk Management Actions (RMA, or
compensatory measures) must have been taken.
- The Risk-Informed Completion Time (RICT): this time is defined as the time from entry
into the LCO until the respective threshold value ICDP = 10-5 or ILERP = 10-6 is reached
(see Table 7-2), or 30 days (= the Back-Stop Completion Time, BSCT), whichever is
shorter. The RICT is the time by which required actions must be completed (i.e. the RICT
is simply the risk-informed AOT). If the licensee fails to complete these required actions
before the end of the RICT, then he must follow TS requirements for required actions not
met, including any requirement for plant shutdown (i.e., the plant is back to the "classic"
TS process).
Criterion RMTS Risk Management Guidance
CDF LERF
i 0-3 2104 - Voluntary entrance into configuration prohibited. If in configuration due to
ry~1 ry-1 emergent event, implement appropriate risk management actions.
ICDP ILERP
10* 104 - Follow the Technical Specification requirements for required actions not met
104 2i10 7  - RMAT and RICT requirements apply
- Assess non-quantifiable factors
- Implement compensatory risk management actions
<10i <1-0' - Normal work controls
Table 7-2: RMTS quantitative risk management thresholds (from [57])
The RMTS process is summarized on Figure 7-1. Another important feature of the RMTS
process, as part of the industrial guidance NEI 06-09, is that the integrated risk impact of the
program is tracked, and the cumulative risk associated with the use of RICT (=risk-informed
AOTs) that go beyond the classic FSCTs (=classic, deterministic AOTs) is evaluated every
refueling cycle. The integrated additional risk is then compared to the guidelines of Regulatory
Guide 1.174 to verify that risk changes are consistent with these guidelines.
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A dynamic process
As mentioned above, the RMTS is a dynamic process, i.e. it accounts for new events (e.g.
an additional inoperable SSC, or, in the other direction, one of the inoperable SSCs that has been
repaired during the process). In order to make it more explicit, let us consider a theoretical
example.
Example of application
This example is illustrated on Figure 7-2. It should be noted that in this example, only the
CDF is used, for an objective of simplicity, while in reality both CDF and LERF should be used,
and the most restrictive RICT and RMAT would then be selected to govern operations.
Figure 7-1 : RMTS process flowchart (from [57])
At time, t=O, component A becomes inoperable for a duration that is expected to exceed
its FSCT specified in the TS, therefore the operator enters the RMTS process (Figure 7-1). The
solid line on Figure 7-2 at the origin shows the evolution of the integrated incremental risk
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(product of the incremental CDF and the out-of-service time). At this time, an RMAT is
computed (intersection with the horizontal line corresponding to the threshold ICDP = 10', as
mentioned above), about 7 days here, and an RICT is computed (intersection with the horizontal
line corresponding to the threshold ICDP = 10-). Here, the RICT would be greater than the
BSCT (30 days), therefore the applicable RICT would be set to 30 days. Before reaching the
RMAT (7 days), the licensee will need to develop and implement (as soon as possible)
appropriate compensatory risk management actions.
1.OOE-05 --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - -- --- - - - - -- RICT Threshold
9.OOE-06 -
8.00E-06 -
7.00E-06
30-day -- System BV 6.00E-06 - -
Backstop-
5.OOE-06 compnents A
and B inoperable
4.00E-06 -
3.OOE-06 --
2.00E-06 . -
100E-06 -- - - - - - - - - - - ----- -- -- - - Risk Management
Action (RMA) Threshold
0.00E100
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
days
Figure 7-2: Example of RMTS application (adapted from [57])
Then, at time, t=5 days, another component becomes unavailable, component B.
Therefore, a new risk profile is established (second segment of the solid line), and new RMAT
and RICT are calculated. Here, the RMAT occurs very soon after this new evolution, which
required rapid evaluation, development and implementation of appropriate risk management
actions. The new RICT is 28 days, now smaller than the back-stop completion time
corresponding to component B (the BSCT applies separately to each inoperable component, as
shown on Figure 7-2).
At t=20 days, component B is restored to service, so a new RICT is calculated. Here
again, it would exceed the 30-day back-stop completion time of component A, so the applicable
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RICT is reset to this BSCT value. Since at t=20 days the RMA threshold is already exceeded
(ICDP = 10-6), implementation of appropriate compensatory measures is still required.
7.3.2.3. PRA characteristics
The technical quality of the PRA is a critical element in implementing the RMTS process.
According to Ref. [56], at a minimum, the PRA used to support the RMTS program must be a
Level 1 PRA with LERF estimation capability. It must include validated modeling of internal
events, including internal floods and fires. Other external events should be considered to the
extent that these events could have an effect on the calculated RMAT and RICT.
As mentioned earlier, existing codes and guidance concerning PRA quality may be used
for assessing the applicability of a plant PRA to the RMTS program, in particular Regulatory
Guide 1.200, mentioned explicitly in [56].
7.3.3. Pilot project at South Texas Project
7.3.3.1. Background
In July 2007, the NRC approved the pilot implementation project of Initiative 4b at South
Texas Project (STP) Electric Generating Station (2 x 1410 MWe, 4-loop Westinghouse PWRs)
after years of collaboration between the NRC and the nuclear industry. Information presented in
this section is mostly based upon References [58], [59] and [60]. STP provided key inputs to the
NEI guidance document, NEI 06-09.
STP has a long history of use of PRA for performing quantitative risk assessments of
online maintenance configurations under the Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP).
STP was performing such risk assessments even before the enforcement of §(a)(4) of the
Maintenance Rule. In the past, as with all US plants, STP units followed prescribed AOTs
established without the benefit of risk quantification. As a result, STP experienced unnecessary
production loss and staff workload. The implementation of the risk-informed Initiative 4b is
expected to provide greater operational flexibility for prioritizing maintenance, and lower costs
while maintaining a high level of safety. It is also expected to reduce the number of plant
shutdowns and the potential for initiating events during these shutdowns: it has been estimated
that about one unplanned outage every four years would be avoided over the plant lifetime (Ref.
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[60]), hence providing significant savings. In addition, it would remove some burden from the
NRC by reducing the frequency of some special requests.
7.3.3.2. Costs saving effect
Economic effects of the implementation of the Initiative 4b at South Texas Project have
been estimated in Reference [60]. First, some critical-path maintenance could be transferred from
refueling outages to online maintenance, which could potentially save 12 hours of critical-path
per refueling outage for half of the remaining 52 outages, which represents approximately
$970,000 (at current prices) of additional revenue for each of these 26 outages, hence a total of
$25.2 million.
Then, some non-critical-path maintenance could also be performed in at-power mode
rather than during outages. Even though labor requirements are the same, whether these
maintenance tasks are done online or during outages, performing them online would save
contractor support costs during outages as well as those of associated management oversight.
Savings are evaluated at $100,000 for each of the other 26 outages, i.e. a total of $2.6 million
over the plant's lifespan.
As mentioned above, is has been estimated that the use of RMTS would prevent about
one unplanned shutdown every four years, hence a total of 10 unplanned shutdown during the
remaining life of STP nuclear power plant. Typically, an unplanned outage of a unit costs 3 days
of production, for a $1.94 million loss per day currently at STP. Therefore, it would save an
additional $58.32 million over the plant's lifespan.
Based upon past experience, it is expected that the RMTS program will avoid one NOED
every year, which represents about $50,000 per year, as well as two non-transmitted NOEDs (not
transmitted because eventually these NOEDs were not needed), which totals $20,000 annually.
All these projected savings combined constitute an average saving of $2.223 million per
year, or a total saving of $88.92 million over the life of the plant.
7.3.3.3. Implementation of the RMTS program
The RMTS program has been implemented at STP using the guidance NEI 06-09
outlined in Section 7.3.2 and a software program called RICTCal (Risk Informed Completion
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Time Calculator), an extension of the online maintenance tool used to comply with §(a)(4) of the
Maintenance Rule, RAsCal (Risk Assessment Calculator), that has been in use for several years
at STP. RICTCal is a database application that uses a graphical user interface to retrieve stored
CDF and LERF values associated with a given maintenance state [58]. RICTCal then calculates
RMAT and RICT using the methodology presented in Section 7.3.2.2.
Since its implementation, it appears in [59] that the RMTS has not been much used, only
to replace Class 1E batteries online and another time to perform maintenance on class 1E 120V
AC instrument inverters (at the date of Ref. [59], ie. March 2010). However, there have been
more cases when RMTS has "almost" been used, and even though in these cases classic TS
AOTs were not exceeded, the existence of the RMTS program spared STP the need to prepare
NOED that might have been needed, which avoided unnecessary costs and use of resources.
Tech Spec & T Actual ActualAuaFront RMAT RICT Inoperability D
TS 3.8.3.1 >30 30-day
Class 1E Instrument 24 hr 29.1 hr 9.7x10kt 7.2x10-
Inverter (Unit 1)
TS 3.8.3.1 30-day
Train C 1E Battery 2 hr 2 weeks Backstop 3.6 days 2.7x104 1.8x107
(Unit 1)
TS 3.8.3.1
Train C 1E Battery 2 hr 2 weeks Baksaop 3.6 days 2.7xl04 1.8x104
(Unit 2)
TS 3.8.3.1 30-day
Train A 1E Battery 2 hr 2 weeks Backstop 6.6 days 4.4x1 2.7x10
(Unit 1)
TS 3.8.3.1 30-day
Train A 1E Battery 2 hr 2 weeks Backstop3.5 days 2.3x 1.4x
(Unit 2)
Table 7-3: RMTS Experience at South Texas Project [59]
The cases where the RMTS process has been used at STP from 03/2008 to 04/2009 are
summarized in Table 7-3 with the associated integrated risk (ICDP and ILERP). We can notice
that in all these cases, the final integrated risk are still far from the quantitative risk thresholds of
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the RMTS methodology (10' and 10' for the ICDP, and 106 and 10-7 for the ILERP), and in
none of these cases the RMAT was reached.
7.4. Risk-informed Initiative 5b - Brief overview
Current Technical Specifications provide specific surveillance requirements, associated
with specific surveillance test intervals with which the licensee must comply to avoid entrance
into an LCO. Initiative 2 has made the regulation more flexible regarding missed surveillances
(see Section 7.2.1). However, if the licensee wishes to modify a particular STI, he must submit a
detailed request to the NRC (typically using PRA insights and the methodology developed in RG
1.177) and obtain the NRC's explicit approval. This process can be lengthy and costly, both for
the licensee and the NRC, and it must be repeated for each individual STI modification. The goal
of Initiative 5b is to relocate STIs from the Tech Specs to a licensee-controlled program by
establishing a risk-informed process (called "Surveillance Frequency Control Program", or
SFCP), consistent with the philosophy of RG 1.174 and 1.177, that enables the licensee to
modify individual STIs, on a case-by-case basis (and not repeatedly), without explicit agreement
from the NRC for each STI modification. Only the overall process is controlled by the NRC, as
part of the ROP.
The NRC has approved Initiative 5b, as well as the associated industrial guidance, NEI
04-10 Rev.1 (Ref. [63]), in September 2007. The industry has expressed a very high interest for
this risk-informed technical specifications Initiative, and about 50 submittals to implement this
initiative 5b have been identified as being planned [55]. A pilot implementation project at
Limerick Station has been approved by the NRC in 2006, and in April 2011, the implementation
of this initiative has been granted by the NRC to a dozen plants. Detailed technical information
about this Initiative can be found in Ref. [63].
7.5. Summary
In the United States, while the technical specifications and the Maintenance Rule already
provided some flexibility for choosing between online and offline maintenance, the risk-
informed Initiatives facilitate even more the use of online maintenance, in particular the
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ambitious Initiative 4b, which provides much flexibility regarding AOTs for single as well as
multiple outages. The increased possibility to transfer maintenance from refueling outages to
online maintenance, combined with other advantages (fewer unplanned shutdowns, fewer Tech
Specs exemption requests...), is expected to allow significant savings, as explained with the
example of STP. Once again, these risk-informed initiatives (aside from Initiative 5b) are based
upon the use of PRA tools at the operational level, while in France there appears to be an
opposition to such practices.
Also, it should be remembered that none of these risk-informed Initiatives is "risk-based",
in the sense that there are always some barriers to avoid behaviors that would be unacceptable
from a conservative, deterministic point of view, in particular:
- The deterministic considerations included in the official Maintenance Rule guidance
(NUMARC 93-01)
- For Initiative 4b, the use of a Back-Stop Completion Time and the tracking of the
integrated risk impact associated with the use of this Initiative.
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Chapter 8
EDG Online Maintenance Case
Study - Background
8.1. Introduction
Onsite emergency electric power sources are an essential part of the safety systems to
provide sufficient power, and for a sufficient period of time upon a LOOP, to shut the reactor
down and maintain it in a safe, cold shutdown. All French nuclear power plants and most US
plants use EDGs as the main onsite emergency AC power sources.
Failures of EDGs are among the most important contributors to the plant CDF, which
makes their reliability particularly critical. While in the past, most maintenance tasks and
periodic tests were performed during refueling outages, there are usually no technical reasons
preventing from performing these tasks online. As is explained in Section 6.1, the 55-minute
station blackout that occurred at the Vogtle station (Unit 1) in 1990 played a particular role in the
reconsideration of online maintenance practices, for EDGs, but also more generally. This LOOP,
due to a truck accidentally driving into a transmission line support pole, occurred while the unit
was in a refueling outage, and one EDG was out of service for maintenance. The second EDG
started, but failed soon after. This event highlighted the importance of risk during refueling
outages, a period of time with many different activities going on simultaneously and reduced
system redundancy. Combined with the recognition that online maintenance can have operational
and economic benefits (see Chapter 6), it led several utilities to consider performing EDG
maintenance online, often requiring AOT extensions (for which risk-information played an
important role) and sometimes the addition of an alternate AC source.
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8.2. Emergency diesel generators: technical overview
8.2.1. Diesel engines: background
There are three main differences between diesel engines and gasoline engines: (1) diesel
engines ignite the fuel only by the heat of compression, and have therefore no external ignition
ROCKER ARMS FUEL NOZZLE VALVE SPRING system; (2) in diesel engines, air is drawn alone
FUEL INE EXHAUST VALVE into the cylinders, and there is therefore no
INLET VALVE EXHAUST carburetor; (3) in diesel engines, the fuel is
INLET MANIFOLD -a-- MANIFO LD
EADR injected into the cylinders in the form of a spray
PUSH RODS- WATER
PISTON at high pressure, using a fuel-injection pump.
WRISTPIN Also, diesel engines typically use superchargers
LE to increase the pressure of the air needed to
CAMSHAFT- ,'
support the combustion, in order to increase the
CAMSHAFT DRIVE -EARING CAP
CONNECTING ROD power output of the cylinders. The supercharger
CRANKPIN OLT can take the form of a turbocharger, which
CRANKPIN*
extracts mechanical energy from exhaust air
EDPLATE through a turbine, and this energy is used to turn
CRANKSHAFT
CRANKCASE an air pump that compresses intake air drawn
from the atmosphere and forces it into the
cylinders.
Figure 8-1 Basic parts of a 4-cycle diesel engine
The basic parts of a typical diesel engine are presented on Figure 8-1. There are two types
of cycle: 4-stroke cycle (or 4-cycle), the most common type of diesel engine, and 2-stroke cycle
(or 2-cycle).
8.2.2. EDGs in Nuclear Power Plants
There are usually at least two independent EDGs per unit. EDGs used in nuclear power
plants are typically small capacity (1 MW to 25 MW), medium speed, four-cycle diesel engines
started by compressed air. In this study, we are especially interested in the EDGs of two types of
utilities: a US utility, exemplified by Seabrook Station, and French utilities, exemplified by the
EDF 1300 MWe Series.
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EDGs at Seabrook Station
There are two main EDGs at Seabrook Station, plus a Supplemental Emergency Power
Supply (SEPS), presented later in this thesis. These two EDGs are Colt-Pielstick PC2.3, 16-
cylinder (V-arrangement), four-cycle independent diesel engines, rated at 6.083 MW. They are
designed to supply 60 Hz AC power to the 4.16 kV emergency buses. Their nominal speed is
514 rpm, and an overspeed system automatically trips the engine when the speed reaches 115%
of its nominal value [71].
One of the main performance criteria for these EDGs is that they must be able to reach
rated speed and voltage, and achieve a "ready-to-load" condition within a maximum of 10
seconds after receiving an automatic or manual start signal.
EDGs in EDF 1300 MWe reactors
There are two EDGs per reactor, plus additional emergency power systems that is
presented later in this thesis. The EDGs are Pielstick PC2.5 SEMT, 16-cylinder (V-arrangement),
four-cycle diesel engines, rated at 7.65 MW. They are designed to supply 50 Hz AC power to the
6.6 kV emergency buses. Their nominal speed is 500 rpm and an overspeed system
automatically trips the engine when the speed reaches 115% of its nominal value. Like the EDGs
at Seabrook, they are required to be able to reach nominal speed and voltage within a maximum
of 10 seconds.
8.2.3. Auxiliary Systems
In order to run a diesel generator (DG), many auxiliary systems are needed to supply fuel
and air, to remove exhaust gases, to lubricate and cool some components. These subsystems can
significantly differ from one DG to another, but they all have some common characteristics. The
goal here is not to describe these subsystems in detail; we present only some broad features of
these auxiliary systems that will enable the reader to better comprehend the EDG maintenance
case study, and we illustrate these subsystems with those in EDF 1300 MWe reactors and
Seabrook Station. The description of these subsystems is based upon information available in
[68],[69],[70] for the EDF 1300 MWe Series, and public documents [71],[72],[78] for Seabrook
Station.
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A basic, integrated representation of a DG and its subsystems as the ones in the EDF 1300 MWe
Series is provided on Figure 8-2.
Water Treatment Compressed-Air Stating System Lube Oil L OiTank Reeroi Tn
Govemnor Overspeed Exciter
Figure 8-2: An EDG and its auxiliary systems (adapted from [68])
Fuel oil subsystem
The role of this subsystem is to supply the DG with fuel oil. The main DGs at Seabrook
Station have independent fuel oil systems, each consisting of a fuel oil storage tank, a fuel oil
day tank, a fuel oil transfer pump (to transfer fuel from the storage tank to the day tank), an
engine-driven fuel pump (to transfer fuel from the day tank to the engine), an auxiliary motor-
driven fuel pump and the instrumentation and controls necessary for system operation. There are
also cross-tie connections between the storage tanks of the two main DGs. The quantity of fuel
stored on-site is sufficient to supply power to all components required to shut the reactor down
and maintain it in a safe, cold shutdown for a period of 7 days. For the EDF 1300 MWe Series
DGs, there are two storage tanks and one day tank for each DG, providing a quantity of fuel
sufficient to supply power for a period of 200 hours (8.3 days).
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Lube oil subsystem
Many parts of the diesel engine need to be properly lubricated. For the main DGs at
Seabrook Station as well as the DGs in the EDF 1300 MWe reactors, the lube oil system consists
of two subsystems:
- The prelube/keep-warm lube oil system: in standby, the diesel engine is pre-heated and
pre-lubricated to increase the startup speed and reduce engine wear. At EDF and at
Seabrook, the lube oil is pre-heated by the keep-warm heating system (see below) and is
constantly circulated when the reactor is in standby status.
- The lube oil system used when the engine is running: in both types of utilities, this lube
oil is cooled by the air coolant system (see below).
Coolant systems
The coolant systems installed on an EDG typically consist of the following three water
subsystems:
- Keep-warm heating system: it is designed to operate when the engine is in standby status
in order to maintain the engine jackets at a high enough temperature to support engine
fast start and reduce wear. This jacket coolant is also used to heat the prelube/keep-warm
lube oil.
- Jacket coolant system (= high temperature water system): the jacket coolant system is a
water circuit designed in particular to remove heat from the cylinder liner water jackets
(see Figure 8-1), the turbocharger turbines, the cylinder heads, and also to cool the
governor lube oil through a heat exchanger.
- Air coolant system (= low temperature water system): the air coolant system is a water
circuit designed to remove heat from the combustion air (after it exits the turbocharger
and before it enters the engine), the outboard bearing and the main lube oil system.
Starting air system
Starting air is used to provide motive force to the pistons and start the diesel engine. Each
DG has an independent air starting system. There are typically two 40-bar compressed air
receivers per starting air system, which is sufficient to provide five successful engine starts.
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Air intake and exhaust systems
Intake air is drawn from the atmosphere, compressed by the turbochargers, cooled by the
air coolant system, and then delivered to the cylinder heads. Exhaust gases drive the
turbocharger, go into an exhaust silencer and are discharged to the atmosphere.
Alternator
An alternator consists of a rotor and a stator, made of one or several induction coils where
the alternating current is generated. While in small generators the rotor typically consists of a
rotating magnet, it is replaced in large generators by a rotating coil fed with direct current that
also generates a variable magnetic field. There are, therefore, in EDGs three distinct alternators
on the rotating shaft:
- The main alternator: its rotor (a coil) is fed with DC, and its stator then generates the AC
used be the different safety systems in the reactor. Changing the intensity of the DC
(direct current) enables one to control the voltage delivered by the DG.
- The exciter: the rotor of the exciter is also a coil fed with DC. Its stator then generates
AC which is rectified to obtain the DC used by the rotor of the main alternator. The DC
in the rotor of the exciter is controlled by the exciter regulator.
- The pilot alternator: its rotor is made of a small magnet, its stator generates an alternative
current that is then rectified to obtain the DC used to power the exciter regulator.
Speed governor
In order to control the speed (= frequency) of the engine, at least one speed governor is
installed on the DG.
Alarms and fault protective devices
Numerous fault protective devices are installed on an EDG to prevent operation of a
diesel in a manner that could damage it. When actuated, a protective device causes the DG to
trip, i.e. turn itself off. Depending upon the mode in which the DG operates (test, safety
injection, LOOP), some protective devices may be automatically bypassed: typically, when used
in emergency mode, few protective devices will actually trip the generator, for safety reasons.
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8.3. EDG regulation in the United States
8.3.1. Background
In the US, the regulation (10 CFR 50 Appendix A) requires that onsite electric power
systems have sufficient independence, capacity and redundancy to ensure that (1) specified
acceptable nuclear fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure
boundary are not exceeded, and (2) the core is cooled, and containment integrity and other vital
functions are maintained in the event of postulated accidents, assuming a single failure.
More recently, in the light of PRA insights showing the high contribution of EDGs to the
plant risk, additional requirements have been formulated. The Blackout Rule (10 CFR 50.63),
outlined in the next section, requires that each US LWR be able to withstand and recover from a
station blackout for a particular duration, and, given the contribution of the EDG reliability to the
Blackout CDF, the NRC recommends in the associated guidance (RG 1.155) that the reliability
of these EDGs be at least 0.95 or 0.975.
In order to achieve these goals, preventive maintenance is essential, so that the NRC has
issued a guidance on that subject, RG 1.9 (Ref. [79]), which endorses the industrial guidance
IEEE 387-1995 (Ref. [80]) with some minor modifications. As always, compliance with this
guidance is not mandatory for US licensees, but it appears that most licensees do comply with it.
8.3.2. The Station Blackout Rule
8.3.2.1. Background
In the US regulatory literature, "Station Blackout" is defined as the complete loss of AC
electric power to the essential and nonessential electric switchgear buses (10 CFR 50.2), ie., a
LOOP concurrent with a turbine trip and the unavailability of the emergency AC systems. It does
not involve however the loss of AC power provided by batteries through inverters nor the loss of
power from "alternate AC sources" (see below).
The concern about Station Blackout (SBO) arose because of accumulating experience
regarding the reliability of the different AC sources. Many nuclear power plants have
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experienced LOOP, with an expected increase in the frequency of such events in the coming
years due to the deregulation of the electrical industry. For example, on August 14, 2003, the
widespread loss of electrical power due to grid failure resulted in LOOPs at nine nuclear power
plants in the United-States. In almost every case, the onsite emergency AC power sources were
available immediately to supply power to the vital safety systems. However, in some cases, one
of the redundant emergency AC sources was unavailable. In addition to these incidents,
individual EDGs have failed to start or run in many cases, in response to periodic tests or
external events.
The results of the Reactor Safety Study (WASH 1400) showed that SBO could be an
important contributor to the total risk at nuclear power plants. This result has been confirmed by
more advanced PRA, showing that SBO could contribute to more than 80% of the total CDF at
some plants (see appendix B of ref. [84]), even though there are huge variations in this
contribution from one plant to another. Appendix B, column 4, presents the contribution of SBO
to CDF for some PWRs in 2000 (after the enforcement of the SBO Rule).
8.3.2.2. The rule
The Blackout Rule, 10 CFR 50.63, states that "each light-water-cooled nuclear power
plant (...) must be able to withstand for a specified duration and recover from a station
blackout". This duration needs to be defined for each plant, based upon (i) the redundancy of the
onsite emergency AC power sources, (ii) the reliability of these sources, (iii) the expected
frequency of LOOP, and (iv) the probable time required to restore offsite power after a LOOP.
The Rule adds that onsite or nearby "alternate AC power sources" would constitute
acceptable capacity to cope with an SBO, provided that it has been shown that the plant is able to
operate safely after the beginning of an SBO and until the alternate source(s) and required
shutdown equipment are ready to operate. Alternate AC sources may serve a multiple unit site if
the onsite emergency AC sources are not shared between units. Most of the time, an alternate AC
power source takes the form of an additional diesel generator, or in some cases, a gas turbine.
8.3.2.3. Regulatory guidance
In order to help licensees comply with the SBO Rule, the NRC issued in 1988 RG 1.155
[82]. While the SBO Rule does not mention specific coping time or diesel generator reliability
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targets, this RG addresses such issues, while other issues such as the independence of preferred
power circuits and the independence between redundant diesel generators are addressed in other
standards and regulatory guides.
Emergency Diesel Generators
RG 1.155 recommends an EDG minimum reliability target of 0.95 or 0.975 per demand,
depending upon the configuration of the emergency AC power sources. The different groups of
configuration are defined according to the number of emergency AC power sources present at
the plant and the number that is required to operate decay heat removal systems.
In addition, RG 1.155 states that an adequate reliability program should be designed at
each plant to ensure the reliable operation of onsite emergency AC power sources.
Ability to cope with a Station Blackout
The plant-specific minimum SBO duration capability should be based upon the factors
presented in Section 8.3.2.2. RG 1.155 presents a method to calculate this duration, ranging from
two hours to sixteen hours, depending upon the characteristics of each plant. The categorization
of each plant is based upon (1) independence of offsite power systems, (2) reliability of EDGs
(3) probability of severe weather conditions in the area of the plant, (4) severe weather recovery
capability, and (5) probability of extremely severe weather.
If the plant's SBO capability is below the minimum acceptable plant-specific SBO coping
duration, modifications may be necessary to increase this capability to cope with an SBO, such
as the addition of an alternate AC power source.
8.3.2.4. Regulatory effectiveness
Risk reduction
The NRC expected that the implementation of the SBO Rule would result in an industry
CDF reduction of 2.6x10-5 ry-1, corresponding to a transition from a mean SBO CDF of 4.2x10-5
ry-1 before the implementation of the Rule to L.6x10-5 after the implementation of the Rule. In
addition, the NRC expected a significant change in the distribution of the different plant-specific
SBO CDF, as detailed in Table 8-1.
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After the implementation of the Rule, the industry-wide average SBO CDF was 1.0x10-5
ry-1, hence an SBO CDF reduction of 3.2x10~5 , which exceeds the 2.6x10-5 ry~1 originally
expected. Table 8-1 shows that the transformation of the plant-specific SBO CDF distribution
was also better than expected, in the sense that more plants have low SBO CDFs and fewer
plants have high SBO CDFs than expected.
Parameter Number of Plants in SBO CDF Range (x10-5 ry1)
SBO CDF Range < 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 100.5 0.99 1.49 1.99 2.49 2.99 3.49 3.99 4.49 4.99 9.99 35
Before SBO rule
Implementation 5 13 14 7 13 4 9 5 4 3 13 10
(estimated)
Expected After SBO rule 23 23 14 9 6 5 6 5 4 0 5 0
Implementation
Actual Outcome After
SBO rule Implementation 46 22 13 17 1 3 1 3 0 1 1 0
Table 8-1 : SBO CDF distribution before and after SBO Rule implementation [83]
In order to achieve these results, many plants have made some modifications. In
particular, most of the plants having the highest extremely severe weather frequencies and plants
having the greatest vulnerability to a plant-centered LOOP have now access to an alternate AC
power supply as defined in the SBO Rule. Table 8-2 presents some examples of these
modifications that have been performed to comply with the Blackout Rule and the associated
CDF reductions.
The conclusion of this section is that the SBO Rule has been effective in achieving the
desired SBO CDF reduction, and the plants that were most subject to SBO risk (high LOOP
frequency, extremely severe weather) performed major modifications and have now relatively
low SBO CDF values.
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Add EDGs:
- Calvert Cliffs (one safety and one non-safety EDG)
- Turkey Point (two safety EDGs)
24
20
Add safety EDG:
- Diablo Canyon 14-18
Add non-safety EDG for site:
- Arkansas Nuclear 1 23-36
- Arkansas Nuclear 2 43-47
Procedural:
- Arkansas Nuclear 1: EDG service water supply valve open 7
- Monticello: Depressurize during SBO 17
- Monticello: Battery load shed 17
Credit of combustion turbine generator:
- Fermi 10
Extend battery life from 2 to 4 hours:
- Arkansas Nuclear 1 16
Improve reliability of onsite gas turbine generator:
- Point Beach 13
Install AC cross-tie:
- Fermi 49
Install AC cross-connect and automatic depressurization system:
- Monticello 38
Table 8-2: Modifications and their consequences on plant CDF [83]
EDG reliability
After the enforcement of the SBO Rule, we note that all licensees were strongly required
by RG 1.155 to establish an EDG reliability program, and to maintain an individual EDG
reliability of at least 0.95 or 0.975, depending upon some characteristics of the plant. In 2003, it
has been established in ref. [83] that:
- For plants with a target of 0.95, a mean industry reliability of 0.954 has been achieved.
- For plants with a target of 0.975, a mean industry reliability of 0.967 has been achieved.
Even though the objectives of the SBO Rule concerning EDG reliability have not been
completely achieved, great progress has been made. Before the Blackout Rule was issued, only
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11 out of 78 plants surveyed had EDG reliability programs. Since the Rule was issued, all plants
have established an EDG reliability program that has improved EDG reliability. Before issuance
of the Rule, 11 of the 78 surveyed plants had a unit average EDG reliability below 0.95, and 2
below 0.90. In 2003, only 3 plants had a unit average EDF reliability below 0.95 (and above
0.90) [83].
Coping capability
In 2003, the outcome of the SBO Rule implementation was that 108 plants had selected a
minimum SBO coping duration of 4 or 8 hours, completed the coping analysis, developed
procedures, completed training, and 72 plants had completed modifications [83]. Therefore, the
SBO expectations were mostly met. The scope and number of modifications to achieve selected
coping durations even exceeded NRC's expectations, which could explain why plant risk
reductions were generally greater than expected. Currently, 60 units have an alternate AC power
source to reach their SBO coping time.
8.3.2.5. Conclusion and prospects
The SBO Rule has been very effective to improve the general safety level of US nuclear
power plants and to increase the reliability of EDGs. Most of its objectives have been achieved.
The SBO Rule has provided additional defense-in-depth to compensate for possible degradation
of the offsite power supply that may result from deregulation of the electrical industry or longer
than expected recovery of offsite power after extremely severe weather events.
However, as a result of the Fukushima accident, the requirements of the Rule are likely to
be reconsidered [85]. One of the main issues raised by the NRC task force in charge of the 90-
day review is that the SBO rule has been formulated without consideration of CCFs between
onsite and offsite AC sources: these two types of sources were handled independently. In
particular, widespread phenomena that could affect both types of AC sources (earthquake,
flooding...) were not contemplated. Other issues identified by the NRC task force include [85]:
- Near term restoration of AC power was assumed in the formulation of the coping time
requirements.
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- The SBO rule focuses on preventing fuel damage, but does not consider the potential for
hydrogen buildup in the containment and the potential need for power to actuate
hydrogen igniters when such systems are used. Also, it does not provide any requirement
regarding spent fuel cooling.
- The rule does not consider containment overpressure and the need to vent it in some
designs.
In [85], the task force recommends a strategy based on three points to review the SBO Rule:
1) Licensees would need a coping capability to maintain necessary functions for at least 8
hours, with minimum reliance on operator action. During this period of time, the operator
would focus on restoring AC power and implementing actions necessary for point 2).
2) Licensees would then have an "extended coping capability" to maintain necessary
functions for at least 72 hours, using onsite portable equipment maintained and stored in
a manner that protects it from the natural events that may call for their use.
3) Deployment of a sustainable cooling capability using preplanned and prestaged
equipment from an offsite location (possibly shared by several sites).
8.3.3. EDG testing
8.3.3.1. Regulatory Guide 1.9 - Background
The guidance on EDG periodic testing is based upon several requirements regarding
EDGs that are discussed in RG 1.9. The three main criteria that have to be ensured through
adequate maintenance and testing are as follows [79]:
1) An EDG must be able to start and take on a specific number of large motor loads in rapid
succession, while maintaining voltage and frequency within acceptable limits.
2) It must be capable of providing power quickly to engineered safety features should a
LOOP and a design-basis event occur simultaneously.
3) It must be able to supply power continuously to the equipment needed to maintain the
plant in a safe condition for a sufficient period of time (e.g. during 30 days, with
refueling every 7 days).
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Most of the emergency loads that must be powered by the EDG are those of large
induction motors, and at full voltage, this type of motor draws a starting current of 5 to 8 times
its rated current, which can result in significant voltage reduction in the electricity supplied by
the DG. Such voltage reduction must be avoided, because they can prevent some motor from
starting, can cause a running motor to stall, or damage some voltage-sensitive devices. In order
to limit this voltage reduction, EDGs use a device called "load sequencer" to gradually connect
the different loads to the generator. In addition, recovery from the transient caused by starting
under these loads or sudden disconnection of one or several loads could cause a DG overspeed
that might result in a trip (= shutdown) of the DG, due to the overspeed protective device, which
must of course also be avoided.
In order to protect the EDG against major failure, RG 1.9 requires that, in the emergency
mode of operation, two protective tripping devices be activated: the overspeed protection and the
differential current protection system, used to detect the occurrence of internal fault. Other
protective devices should be blocked from automatically tripping the DG [80] when the DG is
used in emergency mode. Indeed, on many occasions in the past these protective systems have
needlessly tripped the EDG because of spurious operation of a trip circuit. In test mode,
however, Ref. [80] recommends that all the protective devices remain effective except during
periodic tests that demonstrate the DG system response under simulated design-basis accident.
8.3.3.2. Periodic test overview
Beside the site acceptance and pre-operational tests that an EDG must undergo before it
can be considered operational, the EDG is also subject to many periodic tests to ensure that its
design criteria are still being met and that it is fully operational. There are three types of tests:
- Availability Tests: these tests demonstrate the continued capability of the DG to start and
accept loads. It consists essentially of monthly tests (slow-start and load-run test),
replaced every six months by a fast-start and load-run test.
- System operation tests: these tests demonstrate the ability of the EDG to perform its
function under simulated accident conditions. They are performed every refueling outage.
However, it is explicitly stated in RG 1.9 that "Certain [of these] tests may be conducted
during the operating mode with NRC approval if the tests can be safely performed
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without increasing the probability of plant trip, loss of power to the safety buses, or
LOOP", thus giving the possibility for online maintenance. We return to this point in the
next chapter.
- Independence verification test: performed every ten years or after any modification where
the independence of the DGs may have been affected, this test verifies the independence
of the two (or more) trains of standby electric power.
A summary of the different periodic tests recommended in RG 1.9 is presented in Table 8-3.
Testing Six-Month Refueling Outage* Ten-yearTests Monthly TTesting Testing Testing
Slow-start test X
Fast-start test X X
Load-run test X X
LOOP test X
Combined LOOP and XSIAS test
Largest-load rejection X
test
Design-load rejection X
test
Endurance and load
margin test X
Hot restart test X
Synchronizing test X
Protective-trip bypass X
test
Test mode override X
test
Independence test X
* Some may be performed online. See quote from RG 1.9 mentioned above.
Table 8-3: Summary of the EDG periodic tests recommended in RG 1.9
8.4. Summary
In the United States, the recognition of the importance of the SBO CDF has led the safety
authority to develop regulations and detailed guidance. The Station Blackout Rule requires each
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licensee to be able to withstand a blackout for a particular duration, through the definition of a
regulatory "coping time". Also, this rule requires the licensees to develop an EDG reliability
program to obtain an EDG reliability of at least 0.95 or 0.975. In order to obtain an acceptable
EDG reliability value, the NRC issued RG 1.9 that recommends specific periodic tests with
associated STIs. In particular, in RG 1.9 the NRC explicitly provides for the possibility of
performing most of these tests online, even those that were originally meant to be performed
during refueling outages. In order to comply with the SBO Rule, many utilities have made
procedure and/or design modifications to reach the coping time, sometimes even adding an
additional onsite AC power source (e.g. a DG). As a result, the industry SBO CDF has
significantly decreased and the mean industry EDG reliability has increased. However, following
NRC's review of the Fukushima accident, the requirements of the SBO Rule are likely to evolve.
In France, there are no similar regulatory requirements or guidance. Neither a regulatory
coping time nor a regulatory EDG reliability target has been defined, and the scope and
frequency of the EDG periodic tests are directly proposed by EDF and then approved by the
ASN (see next Chapter).
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Chapter 9
EDG and ECCS Online Maintenance
Case Studies
9.1. EDG maintenance at EDF
9.1.1. Emergency AC power systems (1300 MWe Series)
Emergency Diesel Generators
There are two EDGs per nuclear reactor, designed to supply power to the Class 1E
emergency buses (LHA, LHB) in case of a LOOP. A basic description of these EDGs is given in
Section 8.2. These EDGs can be started in different ways:
- Manually: from the EDG local, the control room ...
- Automatically:
o Upon a Safety Injection Signal, the EDGs are preventively started.
o Upon LOOP: after four seconds of lack of voltage at one of the two emergency
buses, the EDGs are started and connected as soon as adequate frequency and
voltage are reached (i.e., in a maximum of 10 seconds after the starting signal).
o Upon transfer of offsite power supply from the step-down transformer to the
auxiliary transformer, the EDGs are started and connected to their respective
Class 1E emergency busses as soon as adequate frequency and voltage are
reached, should supply from the auxiliary transformer be lost.
Combustion Turbine
In addition to the EDGs, there is one combustion turbine (TAC, Turbine A Combustion)
shared by all reactors of a same site. This combustion turbine, sometimes called "ultimate
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emergency source", can be manually connected to either emergency bus if the corresponding
EDG is unavailable. Power supplied by the TAC is usually similar to power supplied by an EDG
[86], but its connection to one of the emergency buses takes some time.
Steam-driven turbo-alternator
Finally, each reactor is equipped with a turbo alternator system (LLS) that extracts steam
from steam generators to drive a turbine and generate electricity when none of the offsite and
onsite sources is available (Station Blackout). It is also started and used until the TAC has been
connected to the emergency bus when it is needed [24]. The LLS does not have the same
capability as an EDG or the TAC, and it is used only to supply power to control systems and to
some systems necessary for reactor cooldown.
9.1.2. EDGs - Technical Specifications
9.1.2.1. Requirements
In full power mode, both EDGs are required to be available (as well as the TAC and the
LLS system). The unavailability of one EDG constitutes a group 1 event, associated with a
shutdown initiation time of 3 days, independently of the status of the TAC.
9.1.2.2. EDG Borderline Conditions - Online Maintenance
As is explained in Section 6.2.2, Group 1 events cannot be entered as often as desired,
even for preventive maintenance. Group 1 events can be voluntarily entered only when a specific
Borderline Condition has been granted by the ASN. For the EDGs, two Borderline Conditions
have been defined for RP and AN/GV modes [51]:
1) One EDG can be taken out of service for preventive maintenance if the cumulated out-of-
service duration for both EDGs remains smaller than 60 hours during one calendar year.
2) One EDG can be replaced by the TAC if, during one calendar year, the cumulated
replacement duration for both EDGs remains smaller than 7 days if the TAC is rated at 7
MWe, 5 days if the TAC is rated at 4 MWe.
So, in the best case, each EDG can be taken out of service for preventive maintenance for about
5 days each year, which does not provide much flexibility to perform online maintenance.
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9.1.3. EDG Periodic Testing - Background
Objectives and criteria
Periodic testing programs are defined for all systems classified as "important for safety"
(IPS). These programs are prescriptive, but only some of them (EPIS systems) need to be
formally approved by the ASN, among which are those for the EDGs.
For each periodic test, one or several criteria are defined in the applicable documentation.
Periodic test criteria are reference values or states against which measurements or observations
performed during the periodic test are compared.
Documentation
Periodic test programs are based upon four documents for each type of system [87]:
1) Exhaustiveness Analysis Note (NA, note d'analyse d'exhaustivitd): NAs are written in one
of EDF's centralized Engineering Division, and they must be approved by the ASN. For a
given system, the NA describes all tests that need to be performed to ensure availability and
operability of the system, based upon a list of all possible configurations and functions of
this system.
2) Periodic Test Rules (REs, regles d'essais pdriodiques): derived from the corresponding NA,
REs provide a more detailed description of the periodic tests identified in the NA:
acceptance criteria, Group 1 events generated, STIs, ... As the NA, REs are written in one of
EDF's centralized Engineering Division and must be approved by the ASN.
3) General Operating Rules (RGE), Chapter IX: this document, common to all reactors in the
same series, provides in particular a list of all Group 1 events generated by periodic tests. It
officially constitutes an exemption from the Technical Specifications. This document must
be approved by the ASN.
4) Site-specific document (gammes d'essais pdriodiques): derived from the REs, this is the
operational document that describes site-specific procedures to perform the periodic tests.
Periodic test acceptability
To consider a test to be satisfactory, the following conditions (among others) must be
met:
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- Applicable criteria must have been met
- The applicable STI must have been respected, with a margin of± 25%.
If the periodic test is satisfactory, the system is considered to be available. If not (for example if
the periodic test has not been performed within the ± 25% margin), the system is considered to
be unavailable, and the corresponding Tech Specs action statement is immediately entered,
possibly leading to a plant shutdown if the problem is not solved by the end of the applicable
AOT [87].
9.1.4. Periodic Test Rules
Periodic Test Rules (REs) for 1300 MWe Series (Ref.[70]) are directly derived from the
Exhaustiveness Analysis Note mentioned in the previous section. They provide a detailed
description of periodic tests and acceptance criteria identified in the Exhaustiveness Analysis
Note. Common to all 1300 MWe reactors, this document is then used on-site to write the
corresponding plant-specific document, which can differ slightly from one reactor to another.
9.1.4.1. Two-month tests
Test description
For each EDG, the licensee is required to verify every other month that the DG is able to
start automatically from standby conditions upon safety injection signal, and then reaches rated
voltage and frequency sufficiently rapidly. After at least one hour of operation (to reach steady
state), several parameters are controlled, then the EDG is shut down.
Reactor mode
Usually performed when the reactor is in power mode (RP), 2-month tests can be
performed from AN/RRA to RP mode. It does not generate any EDG Tech Specs LCO.
9.1.4.2. One-cycle tests
Test description
Many tests are performed, such as:
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- Testing of some command and control systems
- LOOP test and largest load rejection test
- EDG starting with only one compressed air system
- Synchronizing with offsite power and total load rejection test
Reactor mode
According to [70], 1-cycle tests must be performed during refueling outages, in mode
APR or RCD. Some additional precautions are applicable.
9.1.4.3. Four-cycle test
Every four cycles, during a refueling outage (reactor in APR or RCD mode), the
mechanical overspeed trip system is tested.
Also, every four or five cycles, command and control systems associated with the engine
(sensors, alarms, automatic functions) are tested while the EDG is not operating.
9.1.4.4. Six-cycle test
Every six cycles, a combined safety injection signal and LOOP test is performed,
followed by a largest load rejection test.
9.1.4.5. 10-year test
Every ten years, during one of the 1-cycle periodic tests at 100 %, a fuel consumption test
is performed to verify that the fuel consumption remains adequate.
9.1.5. Additional controls and maintenance
In addition to these periodic tests, many other controls and maintenance tasks are
performed on the EDGs. These tasks are governed by the Preventive Maintenance Basic Program
(PBMP, Programme de Base de la Maintenance Pr6ventive) applicable to the EDGs (Ref. [88]).
Written in one of EDF's centralized Engineering Division, this document does not need ASN's
approval before it can be used on site. However, respect of this preventive maintenance program
(periodicity, satisfactory results) is a necessary condition to declare the system available. This
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program has been established using results from the Reliability Centered Maintenance program
(see Section 5.3.2). These surveillance tasks are categorized as follows:
- Surveillance tasks while the EDG is in standby mode: daily verifications (e.g. no leakage,
no abnormal noise ... ) and monthly tests (e.g. control of the color of the fuel, of the
presence of solid particles in the fuel...).
- Surveillance tasks when the EDG is operating (i.e. during periodic tests): many controls
are performed in parallel with the main periodic tests described above, such as: control of
potential leakages, fuel and lube oil levels, visual controls, pressures, temperatures,
gauges, indicators, lube oil physico-chemical analysis, lubrication...
- Surveillance tasks when the EDG is in shutdown: at more or less low frequency (intervals
of a few months to 10 years or more), many maintenance and surveillance tasks are
performed, some of them including partial dismantling of the EDG and replacement of
some components.
All the basic maintenance and surveillance tasks that do not make the EDG inoperable
can be performed online. However, the majority of the other maintenance tasks are performed
during refueling outages and during decennial safety reviews, even though the Borderline
Conditions provide the possibility to perform some of them online.
9.1.6. Potential for online maintenance
In France, there is a difference regarding the treatment of online preventive maintenance
and online periodic tests, while from a safety point of view, it does not make any difference
(whether a system is unavailable for preventive maintenance or periodic testing does not change
the risk impact). Preventive maintenance involving a group 1 STE event can be performed online
only through the use of applicable "Borderline Conditions", when available, while periodic tests
involving a group 1 event can be performed online only when such group 1 event has been
explicitly identified in Chapter IX of the RGE, which then officially constitutes an exception to
the STEs.
147
Concerning online preventive maintenance, we have seen in Section 9.1.2.2 that two
Borderline Conditions have been defined, enabling the operator to take each EDG out of service
for about 5 days per year or less (in 1300 MWe reactors). It appears that this flexibility offered
by the Borderline Conditions is not used systematically and in a consistent way by all EDF
nuclear power plants [26], due to the absence of a general policy regarding the application of
online maintenance and the use of these Borderline Conditions. Also, as is explained in Section
6.2.2.2, using the Borderline Conditions to perform online maintenance, when there is no
"operational imperative" to do so, is not in accordance with the philosophy of the STEs.
Additionally, even if it were decided to use these Borderline Conditions systematically to
perform online maintenance, the potential for maintenance work would remain limited because
significant time margins are needed. Indeed, as illustrated by the US experience, the planned
duration of an online maintenance activity is usually smaller than half of the applicable AOT.
In 2004, using the PRA methodologies presented in Section 4.6, a re-assessment of the
STE requirements for AC power sources was performed for the 900 MWe reactors (ref. [89]). In
the 900 MWe series, the TAC is replaced by a diesel generator called GUS, shared by all units of
a same site, and there is also a Borderline Condition that allows the operator to replace an EDG
by the GUS for 10 days each year. The aforementioned PRA study has shown that this
Borderline Condition could be extended to one month, generating an ICDP of about 1.6x10 ,
much smaller than the acceptance criterion of 10~7 defined in consensus between EDF and the
safety authority (see Section 4.6). This Borderline Condition would provide much more
flexibility to perform some maintenance tasks online. However, this longer Borderline Condition
has never been implemented in the STEs, for some reasons already presented in Section 4.6.1.3.
Concerning the periodic tests, the EDG Periodic Test Rules outlined in Section 9.1.4 state
that only the 2-month tests can be performed online (it does not generate any group 1 event),
while all the other tests are to be performed in shutdown modes. As a result, the operator does
not have the possibility to perform these tests during at-power operation, even though there are
Borderline Conditions that allow taking one EDG out of service. If the operator wished to
perform some of these tests online, EDF would have to propose a new version of the Periodic
Test Rules that would then have to be approved by the ASN. But, as is explained in Section
6.2.2.2, in the philosophy of the RGE, the possibility to enter a group 1 event (when approved by
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the ASN) to perform a periodic test is meant to be used when there is a technical reason for it,
not for operational convenience [87]. However, it would be somewhat inconsistent if the licensee
were allowed to enter a group 1 event for online preventive maintenance (in the framework of
the Borderline Conditions) and not for periodic tests, the effect upon risk being the same if the
out-of-service duration remains the same.
9.2. EDG Maintenance at a US facility: Seabrook Station
9.2.1. Emergency AC Power Systems
Seabrook Station is a single unit, 1245 MWe, 4-loop Westinghouse PWR. There are two
kinds of AC emergency power sources at Seabrook Station: two emergency diesel generators and
a Supplemental Emergency Power Supply (SEPS).
9.2.1.1. Emergency Diesel Generators
A brief technical description of the two EDGs installed at Seabrook and their support
systems is given in Section 8.2. These EDGs must be capable of starting and reaching rated
voltage and frequency within 10 to 12 seconds (12 seconds for a LOOP only, 10 seconds for
events that require Safety Injection) [50]. The EDGs are designed to operate under three
conditions:
Loss of offsite power (LOOP)
The LOOP mode of operation is initiated by the detection of an undervoltage at one of the
two 4.16 kV emergency buses (E5 or E6), after some time delay before the EDGs are started in
order to allow for a potential transfer of load from the unit auxiliary transformers to the reserve
auxiliary transformers. If undervoltage is detected while offsite power is unavailable, the EDGs
are started immediately.
Safeguard Operation
Safeguard operation is initiated by a Safety Injection (SI) signal, emitted in case of low
pressurizer pressure or high containment pressure. Upon reception of the SI signal, the required
safety loads are energized and the DGs are automatically started, but they run with no load.
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Should offsite power fail, then the DGs would be automatically connected to their 4.16 kV
emergency bus.
Test Operation
The test operation mode is manually controlled. In this mode, most of the protective trip
devices of the DG are deactivated.
9.2.1.2. Supplemental Emergency Power Supply
The SEPS was added about ten years ago to enable EDG major maintenance tasks that
had been traditionally performed during refueling outages to be performed online. Indeed,
following the installation of the SEPS, a 14-day AOT for the two main EDGs was granted
(versus a value of 72 hours previously). SEPS maintenance is performed online and the system is
unavailable for about 5 days per year [74]. The addition of the SEPS was decided after the
extension of a refueling outage from 33 days to 100 days due to a major EDG failure that
occurred at about the fourth hour of a 24-hour run test, in November 2000.
The SEPS can be connected to both Class 1E 4.16 kV buses. It is automatically started
when the bus to which it is aligned (bus E6 by default) is no longer energized by the normal
sources. The SEPS consists of two individual 4.16 kV diesel generators that start and
synchronize automatically upon a LOOP signal. They are always used simultaneously to
energize the SEPS electrical bus [74].
9.2.2. Technical Specifications: Allowed Outage Times
The different operational modes are defined in Table 9-1.
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M eReactivity Condition, % Rated Thermal Average Coolant
Mode
kar Power* Temperature
1. Power Operation > 0.99 >5% > 350*F
2. Startup > 0.99 5% > 350*F
3. Hot Standby < 0.99 0 > 350*F
4. Hot Shutdown < 0.99 0 350*F > Tag > 200*F
5. Cold Shutdown < 0.99 0 5 200*F
6. Refueling** <0.95 0 <140*F
* Excluding decay heat
** Fuel in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head
removed
Table 9-1: Operational Modes (from [50])
9.2.2.1. Modes 1 to 4
In modes 1 to 4, LCO 3.8.1.1 states that, at least, the following AC sources must be
operable [50]:
- Two independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class
1E distribution system
- The two main EDGs with sufficient fuel oil and lube oil.
As is mentioned in Section 7.2.2, LCO 3.0.4.b (= risk-informed TS initiative 3) is not applicable
to the DGs, i.e. the licensee is not allowed to go from shutdown modes (modes 5 and 6) to higher
modes (modes 1 to 4) if an EDG is not operable.
Should one or two EDGs be inoperable, the TS prescribe the following actions.
An EDG inoperable
With an EDG inoperable, the licensee is required to [75]:
1) Demonstrate the operability of the two offsite power transmission systems within 1 hour and
at least every 8 hours thereafter by verifying correct breaker alignments.
2) Demonstrate the operability of the remaining EDG within 24 hours by verifying that it starts
from standby condition and reaches steady state voltage (4.16 kV ± 420 V) and frequency
(60 ± 1.2 Hz) (slow-start test), unless the remaining EDG has been successfully operated in
the last 24 hours or if the EDG became inoperable due to:
- Planned preventive maintenance
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- An inoperable support system with no potential common mode failure for the
remaining EDG
- An independently testable component with no potential common mode failure for the
remaining EDG.
3) Verify that all the systems that rely upon the remaining EDG to obtain emergency power are
operable, and that the steam-driven emergency feed water pump is also operable (except in
mode 4). If these conditions are not met within 4 hours, the reactor has to be at least in Hot
Standby (Mode 3) within the next 6 hours and in Cold Shutdown (Mode 5) within the next
30 hours.
4) If the SEPS is available, the AOT to restore the DG to operable status is 14 days, 72 hours
otherwise. This AOT was determined based upon the capacity and capability of the
remaining AC sources, a reasonable time needed for diagnosis and repair, and the low
probability of a design basis accident during this interval. If the end of this AOT is reached,
the reactor has to be in Hot Standby (Mode 3) within the next 6 hours and in Cold Shutdown
(Mode 5) within the next 30 hours.
This 14-day AOT was granted after the addition of the SEPS for both corrective and
preventive maintenance, thus greatly increasing the possibility to perform online some major
EDG maintenance tasks that were traditionally performed during refueling outages.
Both EDGs inoperable
With both EDGs inoperable, the licensee is required to [75]:
1) Demonstrate the operability of the two offsite power transmission systems within 1 hour and
at least every 8 hours thereafter by verifying correct breaker alignments
2) The AOT to restore at least one of the EDGs to operable status is 2 hours. If the end of this
AOT is reached, the reactor has to be in Hot Standby (Mode 3) within the next 6 hours and
in Cold Shutdown (Mode 5) within the next 30 hours.
3) If the SEPS is available, the AOT to restore both EDGs to operable status is 14 days, 72
hours otherwise. If the end of the AOT is reached, the reactor has to be in Hot Standby
(Mode 3) within the next 6 hours and in Cold Shutdown (Mode 5) within the next 30 hours.
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9.2.2.2. Modes 5 and 6
In cold shutdown (Mode 5) and refueling mode (Mode 6), LCO 3.8.1.2 states that, as a
minimum, the following AC sources must be operable:
- One circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E system
- One EDG, with sufficient fuel oil and lube oil.
If these requirements are not met, the licensee is required to immediately suspend
operations that involve the movement of fuel elements and reactivity control components within
the reactor vessel, movement of irradiated fuel, crane operations with loads over the fuel storage
pool; and within 8 hours, the licensee is required to depressurize and vent the Reactor Coolant
System [50].
9.2.3. Surveillance Requirements
The EDG Surveillance Requirements were defined in accordance with Regulatory Guide
1.9 (Rev. 2), outlined in Section 8.3.3.
9.2.3.1. Monthly testing
Monthly testing of the EDGs at can be broken up into two categories [79]:
Basic verifications
Every month, the licensee is required to:
- Verify the inventory of fuel oil (day tank and storage tank) and lube oil
- Verify the capability of the fuel transfer pump to start and transfer fuel from the storage
tank to the day tank
- Check for and remove accumulated water from the day tank and storage tanks
- Test new and stored fuel oil according to the corresponding program.
Slow-start and load-run test
Every month, the licensee must verify that the EDG starts from standby condition and
reaches steady-state voltage and frequency within the prescribed margins. For this test, a slow-
start procedure involving idling and gradual acceleration can be used to reduce stress and wear.
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Then, the operator verifies that the EDG is capable of synchronizing with offsite power, being
gradually loaded to a load comprised between 5600 kW (maximum expected accident load) and
6100 kW (continuous rating of the DG), and operating within this load band for at least 1 hour
and until equilibrium temperatures are reached.
9.2.3.2. Six-month testing: fast-start and load-run test
At least every 6 months, the licensee is required to verify that the EDG is able to start
from standby condition and achieve required voltage and frequency in 10 seconds [79]. This 10-
second start requirement supports the assumptions in the design basis LOCA analysis. Then, the
load-run test is performed as described previously. This periodic test can be performed in lieu of
the monthly test.
9.2.3.3. Eighteen-month testing
These tests were originally required to be performed during reactor shutdown. However,
this requirement has been relaxed in RG 1.9, as mentioned earlier, and the licensee is now
allowed to perform a portion of these tests during operation, provided that an evaluation supports
the safe conduct of these surveillance tests during modes other than shutdown. The extension of
the at-power AOT from 72 hours to 14 days mentioned above (thanks to the addition of the
SEPS) has greatly increased the possibility to perform online maintenance, and currently most of
the periodic tests mentioned below are performed online (Mode 1).
Largest load and design load rejection tests
At least once per 18 months, the operator is required to verify the ability of the EDG to
reject a load of at least 671 kW (largest single load) while maintaining voltage at 4160 ± 420 V
and frequency at 60 ± 4 Hz. Furthermore, it must also verify the ability of the EDG to reject a
full load (6083 KW) without overspeed tripping or exceeding a voltage of 4784 V.
LOOP test
In this test, the operator is required to verify that, when a LOOP signal is simulated, the
emergency buses are deenergized, loads are shed from these buses, the EDG starts from standby
condition and achieves steady state voltage and frequency within a maximum of 12 seconds,
energizes the shutdown loads through the load sequencer, and supplies power to these loads for
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at least 5 minutes. The 12-second requirement is derived from the requirements of the LOOP
accident analysis.
SIAS (Safety Injection Actuation Signal) test
In this test, the operator must verify that upon an SIAS (without LOOP signal), the EDG
starts from standby condition and achieves steady state voltage and frequency within a maximum
of 10 seconds, then operates for at least 5 minutes.
Combined SIAS and LOOP test - Protective-trip bypass test
This test consists in the LOOP test described above, with the addition of an SIAS and a
required starting time of 10 seconds. The operator must also verify that all EDG trips, except
engine overspeed, low lube oil pressure, generator differential protection and emergency bus
fault protection, are automatically bypassed upon the combination of an SIAS and a LOOP
signal.
Endurance and load margin test
Every 18 months, the licensee is required to verify the ability of the EDG to operate at a
load comprised between 5600 kW (maximum expected accident load) and 6100 kW (continuous
rating of the DG) for at least 24 hours, of which 2 hours or less may be at a load between 6363
and 6700 kW.
Hot restart test
The operator must verify that, within 5 minutes of shutting down the EDG after it has
operated for at least 2 hours at a load comprised between 5600 kW and 6100 kW, the EDG starts
and achieves steady state voltage and frequency (within the tolerance band) within a maximum
of 10 seconds after the starting signal.
Synchronizing test
The licensee must verify the EDG's capability to synchronize with offsite power upon a
simulated restoration of offsite power (while the EDG is loaded with its emergency loads),
transfer these loads to the offsite power, and then be restored to standby status.
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Test mode override test
This test consists in verifying that, when the EDG operates in test mode and is connected
to its emergency bus, a Safety Injection signal overrides the test mode by returning the EDG to
standby status and automatically energizing the emergency loads with offsite power. This test is
designed to ensure the availability of the EDG when being tested and connected to its bus.
9.2.3.4. Ten-year testing: independence test
At least every ten years, or after any modification that could have affected the
independence of the two main EDGs, the operator must perform a fast-start test (see above) for
both EDGs simultaneously, from standby conditions and during plant shutdown [79]. This test is
performed to demonstrate that the EDG independence has not been compromised, which is done
by comparing for each DG the evolution of the different parameters measured during this test
with the same parameters measured during the usual, individual fast-start tests.
9.2.4. PRA evaluation supporting the AOT extension
As mentioned above, the 14-day AOT for one EDG when the reactor is in Mode 1 to 4
has been made possible thanks to the addition of an additional emergency AC power source, the
SEPS. Previously, there was a 72-hour AOT, which was deemed too short for performing some
of the 18-month surveillance tests or some maintenance tasks without risking reaching this AOT
and having to shut the reactor down. Thanks to this 14-day AOT, most of the periodic tests
traditionally performed during refueling outages (the 18-month periodic tests presented in
Section 9.2.3.3) are now performed online. Benefits of this maintenance being performed online
are examined in Section 9.2.5.
It should also be noted that Seabrook Station is not an isolated case: many other US
utilities have been granted a similar AOT extension or have applied for it [48]. In order to
support this AOT extension, a probabilistic risk analysis was performed to analyze the change in
risk resulting from the addition of the SEPS and the AOT extension.
9.2.4.1. PRA model
The quantitative risk assessment performed to support this AOT extension is based upon
a living, integrated PRA that covers all reactor modes. The power mode portions (Modes 1 to 3)
156
of the PRA model are full scope (internal and external events, including internal fires, seismic
events, flooding...) and Level 2, while the shutdown mode portions (Modes 4 to 6) are internal
events and Level 1 [77]. The Seabrook PRA has been reviewed several times in the past:
- In the 1980s: by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Brookhaven National
Laboratory
- In 1999: peer review, using the Westinghouse Owner's Group (WOG) methodology.
For the purpose of this PRA evaluation, the SEPS was added to the model, using
conservative assumptions due to a lack of data for some of the SEPS parameter (in particular,
SEPS diesels are assumed to be as reliable as the main EDGs, which is deemed conservative).
Then, the 14-day AOT had to be modeled in the PRA, which is not straightforward at all.
Indeed, there is no direct link between the AOT and the risk configuration, since the maximum
number of times that the corresponding LCO will be entered in one year is undetermined. Thus,
assumptions have to be made regarding expected preventive and corrective maintenance
practices. The duration of preventive maintenance can be predicted rather easily, thanks to
industry and plant-specific experience. However, corrective maintenance cannot be easily
predicted; furthermore, switching maintenance from outages to online could change the needs for
corrective maintenance compared to past experience. A common assumption in this case is to
assume that a tenth of AOT will be devoted to corrective maintenance each year. But one should
be aware that this assumption is associated with great uncertainty.
More specifically, to model the effect on risk of the 14-day AOT at Seabrook, it was
assumed in the risk assessment that all scheduled maintenance is performed in Mode 1 (full
power operation), with (Ref. [74]):
- Preventive maintenance: 7 days every 18 months, which corresponds to the 18-month
periodic maintenance that was performed in Mode 5 and 6 prior to the 14-day AOT
extension
- Corrective maintenance (except common cause corrective maintenance): 14 days every
10 years (i.e. one tenth of AOT every year).
9.2.4.2. Risk analysis results
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The addition of the SEPS combined with the 14-day AOT and online EDG maintenance
provides a 30% CDF reduction, while the LERF remains virtually unchanged [77]. On the
whole, this PRA study effectively supported these modifications, which were subsequently
approved by the NRC
9.2.5. EDG maintenance: online versus refueling outages
Let us break up the comparison of the two strategies into several aspects:
Effect upon Refueling Outages
This is often presented as one of the main benefits of performing the maintenance of the
EDGs online: it permits the operator to achieve shorter refueling outages (RFOs), hence making
substantial savings. On the other side, not only does EDG maintenance during RFOs increase the
duration of these RFOs, but it also increases the outage scheduling complexity. Furthermore,
upon emergence of unexpected problems in the maintenance of the EDGs performed during
plant outage, this practice may further increase the duration of the RFO, and it could create the
need to resequence the outage schedule. Finally, we remember from Section 9.2.2.2 that, during
outages, if the second EDG also becomes inoperable, the TS require that movements of fuel be
immediately stopped, which would of course be a serious problem during RFOs.
Focus of Work
If EDG maintenance is done online, plant focus can be placed on that matter, while if
performed during RFO, much maintenance and many different activities are performed at the
same time, hence with less focus upon the maintenance of EDGs (and so the potential for human
error is higher). During EDG online maintenance, measures are taken to limit the work on other
systems. Even though it has not been quantified, the efficiency and quality of EDG maintenance
is thought to have improved due to the online maintenance strategy.
Onsite Workers versus Contractors
Performing EDG maintenance online provides the possibility to use mostly onsite
workers, which has many advantages: decreased costs, simpler from an administrative and
security perspective, greater productivity and work quality as onsite workers are familiar with the
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plant and its procedures, and they can prepare the EDG outage in advance and under good
conditions (planning, procedures, preparation of parts and extra parts...). However, it also
generates some additional costs due to workers that have to come to the plant especially for the
outage of one EDG, while during RFO they would be here for the outage of both EDGs and
possibly also for other tasks performed during RFO. In addition, adequate training is required to
maintain skills, which has a cost too (but maintaining the skills within the plant can be beneficial
for the company). Furthermore, contractors are specialist in EDG maintenance and may be more
experienced and aware of EDG issues at other facilities.
EDG maintenance performed during RFO causes increased costs due to the need for EDG
qualified contractors. Moreover, many plants have their RFO in the same period of the year,
during which the ability of EDG vendors to support EDG outages is therefore reduced.
TS Issues
During refueling outage, no AOT is involved (only one EDG is needed), while in full
power mode, there is a risk of shutdown if maintenance of the EDG is not completed by the end
of the 14-day AOT. However, exceeding this AOT appears to be an unlikely event.
Nevertheless, we have seen in Section 9.2.2.1 that the inoperability of one EDG in full
power modes has other consequences associated with TS requirements since the operator is
required to:
- Demonstrate the operability of the systems supplied by the remaining EDG and the
operability of the steam driven emergency feed water pump
- Demonstrate the operability of the two offsite circuits.
Impact on ROP Evaluation
As discussed in Section 6.1.2, one of the Performance Indicators of the Reactor Oversight
Process, the risk-informed MSPI (Mitigating System Performance Index), involves the EDGs.
The objective of the MSPI is to monitor the readiness of some important safety systems,
including EDGs. In order to establish the color of this Performance Indicator (green, white,
yellow, red), the average unavailability of the EDGs during the past three years is calculated and
compared to specific threshold values that have been established according to the associated
CDF increase. Planned unavailability due to online EDG maintenance contributes to this
unavailability, which increases the risk for the plant to obtain a non-green MSPI color (which is
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highly undesirable). This problem does not arise with EDG maintenance during RFO, because
only one EDG is then required to be operational.
9.3. Online maintenance of ECCS in France and the US
9.3.1. Introduction
The role of ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling Systems) is to provide borated water to
ensure core cooling and subcriticality upon one of the following postulated accidents [50]:
LOCA, rod ejection, loss of secondary coolant accident, steam generator tube rupture. There are
typically three phases in ECCS operation:
- Injection phase: water is taken from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) and
injected into the reactor coolant system through the cold legs.
- Cold leg recirculation: once enough water has been injected, water is then taken from the
containment sump and injected into the cold legs to ensure recirculation.
- Hot leg recirculation: after about 24 hours, the injection is shifted to the hot legs,
providing a backflush to reduce boiling in the upper part of the core and to avoid boron
precipitation.
In a typical US PWR, the ECCS are comprised of two redundant subsystems (trains), each one
being composed of:
- A centrifugal charging (= high head) pump
- A safety injection (SI) (= intermediate head) pump
- A residual heat removal (RHR) (= low head) pump.
Similarly, in EDF 900 MWe (CPY) series, the ECCS are comprised of [90]:
- Three high head safety injection pumps (2+ 1) (RIS HP)
- Two redundant low head safety injection pumps (RIS BP)
- Two redundant RHR pumps (RRA).
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In a PWR, there are also accumulators (vessels partially filled with borated water and pressurized
with nitrogen) that are typically used during the early phase of a LOCA to rapidly inject borated
water into the cold legs.
9.3.2. ECCS technical specifications in France
In the CPY series, all the ECCS pumps are required to be operational in full power mode.
If one system is inoperable, the following events are treated in the Tech Specs [90]:
- If one high head pump of the train that has two such pumps is inoperable: group 2 event
- If all the high head pumps of a same train are inoperable: group 1 event
- If one low head train is inoperable: group 1 event
- If one RHR train is inoperable: group 2 event
There is no Borderline Condition applicable to the low head systems. Therefore, taking a
low head pump out of service for online preventive maintenance is simply not allowed. As for
the high head pumps, it is possible to maintain online a pump of the train that has two pumps,
because its loss only generates a group 2 event, therefore the licensee is allowed to voluntarily
generate this event (as long as the Simultaneity Rules are respected). Also, there is a Borderline
Condition that allows the licensee to make this same high head train unavailable for 6 hours per
year in order to perform requalification tasks when one of the two high head pumps of this train
has undergone online preventive maintenance. However, the high head pump of the other train
cannot be taken out of service, because it generates a group 1 event and there is no applicable
Borderline Condition.
Therefore, allowed online preventive maintenance of ECCS is very limited: it is not
possible for low head systems, and it is possible only for two out of three high head pumps.
9.3.3. Online maintenance of ECCS in the US
For US PWR, the two ECCS subsystems are required to be operable in full power mode
(one subsystem = {a centrifugal charging pump, an SI pump, an RHR pump, an RHR heat
exchanger, flow paths with the RWST and the containment sump}). The AOT for one ECCS
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subsystem is typically 3 days [50], sometimes more (e.g. 7 days) when an AOT extension has
been granted.
As always, voluntary entry into this tech specs LCO is not considered to be a violation of
the TS, as long as (1) the AOT is respected, (2) the risk increase is assessed and managed
(Maintenance Rule §(a)(4)), and (3) it is done for an acceptable reason, online preventive
maintenance being considered by the NRC as an admissible reason (see Section 6.1.3.2).
Concerning the periodic tests recommended in the STS (ref. [50]), no surveillance is explicitly
required to be performed during plant shutdown, even though in practice, for some surveillance
tasks, shutdown conditions are more appropriate.
The possibility to perform online maintenance is typically exploited in order to perform
3-month tests (in particular, concerning individual pump starting) and some minor maintenance
tasks. Each time, one ECCS subsystem is taken out of service for no more than a couple of
hours. The 18-month tests and major maintenance tasks (such as pump overhauls) are generally
performed during RFO. There are two main reasons to this:
- AOT limitation: the duration of an online maintenance task must be short enough
compared to the AOT, to have sufficient time margin to avoid an unplanned shutdown.
- Operational reasons: at-power conditions are not adequate for particular tasks, especially
those that involve venting/filling the systems.
Even though the amount of ECCS maintenance performed online is small, there are
however benefits in doing them online rather than during RFO. Like for EDG online
maintenance, it enables the operator to place more focus upon these tasks when performed
online, due to the small amount of activities ongoing at this time. Also, it enables one to slightly
reduce the duration (and the scheduling complexity) of refueling outages, even though this
reduction is clearly not as significant as that associated with EDG online maintenance.
Nevertheless, it has been reported to us that many small maintenance tasks performed online
have a cumulated effect on the reduction of RFO duration that is eventually not negligible.
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Regarding the issue of ROP performance indicators, ECCS unavailability also contributes
to the MSPI. However, the couple of hours of planned unavailability associated with ECCS
online maintenance has only a small effect on this indicator.
9.3.4. Conclusion
While online maintenance of certain ECCS components (such as the low head safety
injection pumps) is not authorized under normal circumstances by the French regulations, it is
allowed in the US, under the usual conditions. But, in practice, this possibility is not heavily
used, mostly for operational reasons. However, the flexibility offered by the regulation is
beneficial for the operator to improve the focus upon some maintenance tasks and to somewhat
reduce the number of tasks performed during RFOs.
For the ECCS, the stakes are not the same as those associated with EDGs regarding the
amount and the effect of online maintenance, but these systems are probably more representative
of typical safety-related systems regarding the issue of online maintenance: online maintenance
is authorized, but the actual amount of maintenance performed in full power mode remains
limited. It provides however an appreciable flexibility for planned periodic maintenance, and it
spares the need for exemption requests when the operator occasionally needs to take a system out
of service for a short period of time. Also, the cumulative effect of online maintenance practices
is thought to be beneficial for operational and safety performances, as is explained in Section
6.1.4.
9.4. Summary
These case studies illustrate many of the differences between the French and US
frameworks that had been identified in Chapter 6. In the US, the licensee has much flexibility to
perform online maintenance, being allowed to take an SSC out of service as often as needed, as
long as the risk is assessed, acceptable and managed (§(a)(4) of the Maintenance Rule) and as
long as ROP performance indicators (such as the MSPI) are not unacceptably degraded. Also, in
the US there is no distinction in the treatment of online maintenance and periodic tests, in the
sense that AOTs and voluntary entry into TS events are considered regardless of the reason for
the unavailability of the system (online maintenance or online periodic test). In France, there is
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no such flexibility for online maintenance and periodic tests. In the case of EDGs, to perform
online some maintenance tasks identified in the PBMP that would make an EDG inoperable, the
licensee is granted a limited budget of time by the Borderline Conditions; and to perform
periodic tests online, the group 1 events generated by these tests must have been explicitly
identified in the applicable Periodic Test Rules when proposed to the safety authority, which was
not the case for the EDGs (since it was not technically necessary).
Also, the non-prescriptive configuration risk management strategy adopted in the US
(§(a)(4) of the Maintenance Rule, blend of probabilistic and deterministic considerations)
provides significant flexibility for managing simultaneous outages, planned or unplanned, which
is another point that facilitates the application of online maintenance. In France, configuration
risk management is handled using the deterministic, prescriptive Simultaneity Rules that are
more rigid, but they also have the advantage of being easier to implement.
The EDG case study also shows how PRA insights can be effectively used in the US to
support Tech Specs modifications that provide more flexibility for performing online
maintenance and testing of EDGs, while in France, the attempt to change the EDG STEs (and in
particular the budget of time allocated by the Borderline Conditions) using PRA did not succeed,
due to difficulties within EDF and with the safety authority.
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Chapter 10
Conclusions and implications
10.1. Effects of online maintenance practices
In this section, we summarize generic effects of online maintenance practices
encountered throughout our work. Given that online maintenance has been more applied in the
US than in France (for safety systems), most of the elements below are based upon US
experience.
10.1.1. Benefits of online maintenance
Online maintenance can have operational, economical, but also safety benefits. While
some benefits can be quantified, others are more intangible.
- The flexibility offered in the US to the licensee to voluntarily enter one or several Tech
Specs LCOs, as long as risk is assessed and managed, eliminates the need for some Tech
Specs exemption requests when, exceptionally, the licensee needs to (briefly) enter a
particular maintenance configuration. In France, this flexibility exists, but within the strict
limits of the Simultaneity Rules and the Borderline Conditions (for group 1 events).
- Performing specific maintenance tasks during operation rather than RFO can enable one to
reduce the duration of these outages, hence obtaining better capacity factors. On a case-by-
case basis, this effect can be quantified, especially for particular SSCs for which major
maintenance tasks are performed online (see the EDG case at Seabrook Station). For other
SSCs (see the ECCS case), the effect on RFO duration may be less visible, but the
cumulative effect is thought to be non-negligible. Also, performing particular tasks online
can enable the operator to reduce the complexity of RFO scheduling and the potential for
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RFO complication and extension. At the US industry level, online maintenance is thought to
have significantly contributed to the reduction of RFO duration observed on Figure 6-2.
The safety effect of online maintenance can be quantified, on a case-by-case basis, using
PRA, as illustrated in Section 9.2.4 with the EDG case study. It enables one to verify that
safety is improved or not unacceptably degraded, to assess the effect of potential hardware
modifications, of some hypotheses. There are also some aspects of safety that are more
intangible and difficult to quantify, but no less important, such as the improvement of the
safety culture at the operational level (in particular through the use of risk monitors), a better
focus of workers due to a reduced amount of activities during operation and better
preparation, hence a smaller potential for human errors. Improvement of SSC reliability,
when observed, can often not be linked solely to the online aspect of maintenance. At the US
industry level, reductions of the scram rate and of the average CDF have been observed (see
Section 6.1.4) showing that, at least, these safety parameters were not degraded during the
development of online maintenance practices.
Performing some maintenance online instead of during RFO can offer the possibility to
employ onsite workers rather than contractors (see discussion in Section 9.2.5), with benefits
resulting in terms of efficiency and quality.
10.1.2. Drawbacks and difficulties
Online maintenance also presents some difficulties compared to traditional RFO
maintenance practices.
- Time constraints are particularly important for online maintenance: during RFO, if a
maintenance activity lasts longer than planned (and belongs to the critical path),
maintenance tasks may have to be shifted, but, a priori, there is no major "cliff-edge effect",
while for online maintenance, if a maintenance activity lasts longer that planned and if the
end of the AOT is reached, the reactor may have to be shutdown. It implies in particular that
significant time margins are required (typically, the planned duration of an online
maintenance activity is smaller than half of the applicable AOT). Such margins are also
necessary to reduce the stress upon workers and improve the quality of maintenance.
- In order to reach an acceptable level of safety, compensatory measures and/or hardware
modifications (in particular for "major" online maintenance tasks) may be needed. It may be
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less necessary for very short maintenance tasks. Assessment of uncertainties and sensitivity
studies are essential in risk analyses justifying Tech Specs modifications requested to
facilitate the implementation of new online maintenance practices.
If onsite workers are used instead of contractors for online maintenance, even though this
may present some advantages, it also creates a need for continuous training. Onsite workers
may also be less specialized than contractors and less aware of current issues encountered
with the considered systems at other sites.
10.1.3. Potential candidates for online maintenance
For safety as well as operational reasons, it is clear that online maintenance cannot be
indiscriminately applied to plant SSCs, in particular safety-significant SSCs. Regarding safety-
significant SSCs, based upon US experience, we can identify two general classes of tasks that
can be considered as candidate for online maintenance:
- Quick tasks (compared to the applicable AOT) with very low potential for complication:
such maintenance tasks are usually acceptable from a safety standpoint, given their short
duration, and in general they do not necessitate hardware modifications or major
compensatory measures. One example encountered in this thesis is the case of the ECCS
(Section 9.3.3). Such individual online maintenance tasks will typically have a small effect
on the duration of RFOs but, cumulatively, they can help in shortening and simplifying these
RFOs. Other advantages mentioned above may also be applicable.
- Longer, well-chosen tasks for few safety-significant SSCs: in some cases, an AOT extension
may be necessary to ensure that workers have sufficient time margins to complete these
tasks, and such amendment request must be strongly supported by a risk analysis. The case
of EDGs at Seabrook Station (Section 9.2) is a good example of such major online
maintenance task. It will often require compensatory measures and, in some cases, hardware
modifications. From a deterministic standpoint, the licensee must ensure that sufficient
redundancy and defense-in-depth are available, and the amount of maintenance work
performed simultaneously must be limited in order to ensure sufficient staff capability and
focus for the considered task, in particular to minimize the risk of outage extension. A
probabilistic risk assessment is a very powerful tool, if not essential, to supplement the
deterministic approach, to establish that safety is improved (or not unacceptably degraded),
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and to assess the effect of potential hardware modifications. Such well-chosen tasks can
bring significant benefits such as those identified in Section 10.1.1.
Each individual case would need a dedicated, plant-specific study in order to assess the
implications and benefits of an online maintenance strategy. In the specific case of EDGs, the
positive results observed at Seabrook Station may not be directly applicable to EDF plants
without a dedicated study covering all aspects of this choice (economical, effect on RFO
duration, effect on safety...). There are however elements that tend to indicate that, regardless of
the regulatory difficulties (see the discussion below), an online maintenance strategy might be
acceptable at least from a safety standpoint. Indeed, redundancy and diversity are available for
onsite emergency AC sources, with the LLS and the TAC/GUS systems in addition to the two
main EDGs (it should be noted however that, contrary to the Seabrook case, the TAC or the GUS
is shared by several units), and, as is mentioned in Section 9.1.6, a PRA study had established
that the budget of time allocated for the replacement of an EDG by the GUS in a CPY unit to
perform online maintenance could be extended from 10 days to 1 month per year.
10.2. Online maintenance in France: possible directions and
implications
As is explained in the previous chapters, the current French regulatory framework is not
particularly favorable to the implementation of an online maintenance strategy for safety-
significant SSCs. If EDF were to decide to switch to online maintenance and testing for some
safety related systems (associated with group 1 events), changes would be needed. In this
section, we identify several directions that could be considered in such a case.
10.2.1. Direction 1: no major regulatory changes
The first possible direction would not involve any major regulatory change. More
specifically, the following concepts would be kept: Simultaneity Rules, distinction between
group 1 and group 2 events, Borderline Conditions (for online preventive maintenance), RGE
exemptions officialized in Periodic Test Rules (for online periodic tests), and no risk monitor.
However, some modifications would be needed, on a case-by-case basis:
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- For online preventive maintenance, Borderline Conditions may have to be created and/or
extended, when acceptable from a safety standpoint.
- For online periodic tests, Periodic Test Rules would need to be modified (to include the
possibility of performing online some periodic tests, thus constituting official RGE
exemptions) and approved by the ASN.
- The philosophy regarding the use of Borderline Conditions and the creation of RGE
exemptions in Periodic Test Rules may have to be recast to be more adapted to the issue of
online maintenance, especially when there is no "technical necessity" to perform the
considered maintenance task or periodic test online (see below).
- A significant cultural change would be needed, and an online maintenance policy would
have to be defined at a centralized level within EDF, in order to clarify, unify, and possibly
systematize the use of these two opportunities for online maintenance and testing.
For the first two items, a probabilistic approach (combined as always with more
traditional approaches) would probably be the most convincing approach, since EDF would have
to justify that the use of these new or extended Borderline Conditions and RGE exemptions
would improve, or not unacceptably degrade the safety level.
The main advantage of this first option is that the regulatory framework would remain
mostly unchanged. It presents however some drawbacks and difficulties:
- Each SSC would have to be treated on a case-by-case basis for the formulation, the
justification and the approval of the necessary changes, hence creating a need for significant
resources at the engineering and regulatory levels.
- Online preventive maintenance and online periodic tests would still be treated separately.
- The configuration risk management through the use of the Simultaneity Rules would still be
generic (i.e. non-configuration-specific) and inflexible. In most cases, it would probably be
acceptable regarding the safety level, because the Simultaneity Rules are thought to be
conservative in most configurations, but there may be situations where it is not the case.
- The performance of online maintenance/testing through the use of Borderline Conditions
and RGE exemptions formulated in Periodic Test Rules is actually not in complete
accordance with the philosophy of these elements when there is no strong operational need
for voluntary entering Group 1 events (i.e. when these maintenance tasks or periodic tests
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can be performed offline without undue operational difficulties), hence the third need
mentioned at the beginning of this section. Indeed, as is explained in Section 6.2.2.2,
Borderline Conditions should be used for "operational imperatives", which can be
interpreted as follows: if there is no imperative to perform a particular preventive
maintenance task online, then the Borderline Condition should not be used for this task, and
so this task should be carried out when the SSC is not needed, i.e., typically, offline. And, as
is explained page 103, RGE exemptions officialized in Periodic Test Rules to perform
particular periodic tests online are also typically granted only when there is a technical need
for this, and usually not simply for operational convenience.
- If EDF were to decide to use a risk-informed approach to justify some of the changes
mentioned above (which may not be the only possible approach, but probably the most
convincing one), several questions would have to be addressed (see Section 4.8) to improve
the acceptability of these methods both within the safety authority and EDF. Considering the
elements presented on that matter, it appears to be a significant difficulty.
A possible adjustment to this first approach would be to standardize the treatment of
online maintenance (tasks defined by the PBMP) and online periodic tests (tests defined by the
Periodic Test Rules) through the system of Borderline Conditions: a budget of time would be
allocated to permit voluntarily entry into a group 1 event, whether it would be to perform tasks
from the PBMP or tests from the Periodic Test Rules. It would result in a more consistent
treatment of the safety aspects, and would potentially reduce the amount of required work (no
need to modify the Periodic Test Rules). Periodic tests for which there is a technical need to
enter a group 1 event (i.e. those already identified by Periodic Test Rules) may be treated
separately.
10.2.2. Direction 2: risk-informed configuration risk management
A second direction that could be considered would be to adopt a treatment similar to the
risk-informed CRMP (Configuration Risk Management Program) developed by US utilities to
comply with §(a)(4) of the Maintenance Rule (Section 5.2.2.4), in particular based upon the use
of a risk monitor. The concepts of Borderline Conditions for online maintenance and RGE
exemptions for online periodic tests would then no longer be needed. However, it could be
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interesting to preserve the concept of Simultaneity Rules in order to maintain a deterministic
safeguard.
The simplest solution (and probably the most conservative one, in most cases) would be
to decide that, whenever the Simultaneity Rules are applicable, then they should prevail, no
matter what the results of the risk-informed approach are. If this solution were to be adopted, risk
information would be indicative only upon such multiple outages (but for configurations not
covered by the Simultaneity Rules, it would be the main input to decide whether or not this
configuration can be voluntarily entered for online maintenance/testing for the duration of the
AOT). However, a more elaborate combination of the two approaches could be considered, in
which there could be cases where, based upon the probabilistic risk assessment, the operator
would be allowed to carry on regardless of the prescriptions of the Simultaneity Rules (the
individual AOTs remaining in all cases the ultimate limits). Within this strategy, the following
aspects could be considered to decide whether the operator would be allowed to go beyond the
limitations imposed by the Simultaneity Rules: planned/unplanned nature of the events, margins
between the results of the risk assessment and certain criteria (taking into account the
uncertainties concerning these results), implementation of compensatory measures ...
Whichever solution is adopted, this second direction would call for many tasks, among
which are the following:
- Development of the online configuration risk management tool, which includes in particular
the choice of the scope (Level 2? Hazards? ...), the risk thresholds associated with the
methodology to establish the acceptability of a given maintenance configuration (ACDF,
ICDP, f A CDF -dt over a particular period, similarly with the LERF...), the treatment of
uncertainties...
- Combination with the Simultaneity Rules
- Training to allow the use of this new tool on-site
- Possible AOT extensions to make feasible (with sufficient margin) the performance of
particular maintenance tasks online
- Formulation of an online maintenance policy.
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Compared to the first direction outlined in the previous section, this second direction
presents many advantages:
- More flexibility for performing online maintenance for safety-significant SSCs (outage
durations no longer restricted by Borderline Conditions).
- Depending upon the combination with the Simultaneity Rules that is adopted, the risk-
informed treatment may provide the licensee with more flexibility regarding the allowed
maintenance configurations (possibility to go beyond the Simultaneity Rules), for online
maintenance, but also for maintenance during RFO.
- Through this option, the treatment of SSCs is more generic than with the previous one (no
need to treat Borderline Conditions and RGE exemptions for online testing on a case-by-
case basis). Also, online maintenance and testing would no longer be treated separately.
- The risk-informed approach enables one to address plant risk in a more systematic and
consistent manner, regardless of the category of the TS events (group 1 or group 2), while
currently, the Simultaneity Rules treat group 1 and group 2 events separately. Even if the
choice were made to give priority to the Simultaneity Rules (when applicable), the risk
monitor could still provide valuable risk information, possibly highlighting high risk
situations currently allowed under the Simultaneity Rules, or conversely, situations where
the Simultaneity Rules are overly conservative (and in such cases, results provided by the
risk monitor could be used as a valuable input to a temporary STE exemption request, when
needed).
- As explained in this thesis, the use of a risk monitor presents many other benefits, such as an
improvement of the safety culture among plant workers, a better risk awareness, better risk
management upon unplanned events, and better maintenance planning. The possible
applications of this tool are numerous.
Use of this option would require deep cultural and regulatory changes, and the difficulties
are numerous and considerable, in particular for EDF to agree with the safety authority on the
scope of the risk monitor and the risk thresholds. Significant investment would therefore be
needed. However, the possible applications of this new framework go far beyond the issue of
online maintenance.
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10.2.3. Direction 3: risk-informed AOTs
A third possible direction would be to develop a risk-informed treatment similar to that
developed for the US risk-informed TS initiative 4b (see Section 7.3), where the licensee has the
possibility to extend the traditional AOTs based upon a risk-informed treatment. However, in the
light of elements presented throughout this thesis, there are numerous barriers to the acceptance
of such a strategy in the French nuclear industry. Therefore, this option does not seem
conceivable, at least in the short term.
10.3. Conclusion
In the United-States, voluntary entry into Technical Specifications for online maintenance
and testing has been possible for a long time, but this possibility was not comnmonly exploited for
safety-significant SSCs until the advent of mature risk-informed techniques that enabled
licensees to quantify the effect of outages on plant risk and to compensate for some weaknesses
of the deterministic technical specifications. Most licensees actually started to perform online
maintenance more systematically after the promulgation of §(a)(4) of the Maintenance Rule. The
implementation of this rule was often supported by the use of risk monitors, and it enabled
licensees to establish a coherent framework to manage the risk associated with SSC outages, in
particular during at-power operation. Online maintenance practices have appeared to be
beneficial to operational, but also safety performance, even though some effects cannot be
quantified or cannot be attributed solely to the use of online maintenance. More recently, the US
nuclear industry has been developing and implementing ambitious risk-informed Tech Specs
Initiatives that provide additional flexibility for online maintenance.
In France, the regulation is less favorable to the implementation of online maintenance
practices for safety-significant SSCs. Online maintenance or testing of safety related systems is
generally not allowed, or allowed under severe restrictions. Therefore, regulatory modifications
would be necessary if EDF were to decide to implement an online maintenance strategy for
safety-significant systems. In this chapter, we have identified three possible directions to
implement such a strategy, ranging from very targeted modifications, without significantly
changing the regulatory framework, to a more ambitious, risk-informed configuration risk
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management. In any case, a significant culture change would be necessary, and substantial
investment would be needed to solve issues regarding the acceptability of risk-informed
applications with the safety authority and within EDF.
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Appendix A Simplified Maintenance Rule flowchart
Figure A-1: Simplified Maintenance Rule flowchart (from NRC's website)
SR = Safety-related
SSC = Structures, Systems and Components
EOP= Emergency Operating Procedures
MPFF = Maintenance Preventable Functional Failures
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Appendix B Plant specific (PWR) Station Blackout information in 2000, sample
Plant Plant CDF SBO Percent Coping time in Modification SBO factors
CDF SBO CDF hours/EDG summary
of reliabilitylAac including dc PRA LOOP Number of LOOP events LOOP eventPlant C mF access time in load shed initiating at power since recovery times
minutes/ procedural event commercial operation 240 minutes
sexremely frequency Plant Weather Grid Power Shutdow
n
Crystal River 1.53E-05 328E-06 21.5 4/.975/-44 dc load shed. 4.35E-01 3
Unit 3 Added
nonclass 1E
battery
Davis-Besse 6.6E-05 3.50E-05 53 4/.95/10/2 Added 1 DG 3.50E-02 2 1 1680
DC Cook Units 6.2E-05 1.13E-05 18.1 4/.975/-/2 dc load shed 4.OE-02 1
1&2
Diablo Canyon 8,8E-05 5,0E-06 5.68 41.951-/1 Added 1 DG 9.1E-02 1 261
Units 1&2 917
Farley Units 1&2 1.3E-04 1.22E-05 9.4 4/.95/10/3 Service water 4.70E-02 2
to Aac, auto
load shedding
Fort Calhoun 1.36E-05 NA - 4/.95/-/2 DC load shed 2.17E-01 2
Ginna 8,74E-05 1.OE-06 1.14 4/.975/41 3.50E-03 4
Harris 7.OE-05 1.71 E-05 24.4 4/.95/43 Lighting in
several areas,
ladder to
isolation valve
Indian Point Unit 2 3.13E-05 4.47E-06 14.3 81.95/60/2 Added a DG for 6.91E-02 2 3 390
gas turbine
auxiliaries
Table B-1 : Plant-specific SBO Information [83]
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